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Ambiguation and reambiguation:
Introduction to the volume
Antje Roßdeutscher (antje.rossdeutscher@ims.uni-stuttgart.de)
Institute for Natural Langauge Processing
University of Stuttgart
The papers in this volume developed as part of the two projects The Role of Lexical
Information in the Context of Word-formation, Sentence and Discourse and the project
Representation of Ambiguities and their Resolution in Context. In the former, a theory of -
ung-nominalisation in German has been developed. German -ung-formation is productive
but it is restricted. This restriction can be made precise in an account of word-formation
where the syntax and semantics of verbs emerges from their sub-lexical units. Whether
a verb has a corresponding -ung-noun or not, depends on the semantics of those units. If
the kernel predicate of a verb describes manner of action, like arbeiten (to work) there is
no ung--noun *Arbeitung. If the kernel predicate describes an entity like German Sperre
(’barrier’) in sperren (’to bar, to block sth.’) or absperren (’to cordon off’), the verb
has an -ung-noun. Moreover the sub-lexical units allow us to predict which readings –
event, result state or entity interpretations are productively derived – can be expected for
an -ung-nominal. The details of how such a theory of word-formation is motivated and
can be defended can be found in Roßdeutscher and Kamp. (2010) and in Roßdeutscher
(2010).
The two papers presented in this volume focus on the second part of the joint enterprise
of the two projects, namely on disambiguation of -ung-nouns in context. Hamm and
Kamp study a proto-typical example, die Absperrung der Botschaft ‘the cordoning-off of
the embassy’, which is three-way ambiguous. This DP can denote a material object (the
fence used for cordoning-off), an event (the process of cordoning-off) or a result state
(the embassy being cordoned off). Formally, this three-way ambiguity is represented by
an underspecified DRS, (cf. Reyle, 1993, and subsequent work). The paper contributes
a partial answer to the general question which contextual factors are responsible for the
(partial) disambiguation of this DP in discourse. The disambiguation process is described
on the level of DRT.
However, apart from problems concerning disambiguation, there are other factors af-
fecting the possible denotations of DPs like die Absprerrung der Botschaft. These factors
concern inferences which are triggered by certain verbs and blocked by others. In the ver-
bal context of behindern (’to hamper’), for instance, we may infer (non–monotonically)
that the result state – the embassy being cordoned-off – was successfully established al-
beit this aim was not achieved in a smooth way. Like behindern, the verb verhindern
‘prevent’ selects the event reading of die Absperrung der Botschaft, but in the latter case
the inference that the result state was established, is clearly blocked. The matter is more
complicated in the verbal context of unterbrechen (’to interrupt’): Intuitively, the time
profile of unterbrechen is as follows: the process in question (in our case the cordoning-
off) started at some time t and continued for some indefinite time span. At some time
later than t the process was stopped for some indefinite time span and resumed after-
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wards. As with behindern, we get as a non-monotonic inference that the result state was
eventually established although the process was interrupted for some time. This is the
by now familiar kind of non-monotonicity. However, (1) shows that the time profile of
unterbrechen is defeasible itself. It contains a necessary part roughly corresponding to
abbrechen ‘cancel’, and a part which may be resumed but which may also be cancelled in
certain contexts.
(1) Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde unterbrochen und nie wieder aufgenommen.
‘The cordoning-off of the embassy was interrupted and never resumed again.’
In order to capture both the disambiguating and the inference triggering effects of verbal
contexts, Hamm and Kamp argue for a combination of underspecified DRT and an event
calculus considered as a logic program. This combined formal system was developed in
Hamm et al. (2006).
Building on the results in the first paper, the second paper by Hamm and Solstad fo-
cuses on problems that arise in anaphora resolution of pronouns with ambiguous nouns
like die Absperrung der Botschaft as antecedent. What happens if the selection restriction
of the verb in the antecedent sentence and that of the consequent sentence are incompati-
ble? This situation is exemplified in (2):
(2) Die Absperrung des Botschaft wurde vorgestern von Demonstranten behindert.
Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhalten.
‘The cordoning-off of the embassy was hampered by protesters the day before
yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it [the state of being cordoned off] is sustained
today as well.’
Behindern ‘to hamper’ filters out both the entity-reading and the result state reading of
Absperrung, but the verb aufrecht erhalten ’to sustain’ requires the result state as its ar-
gument. Thus, in order for the anaphoric pronoun sie to be resolved successfully, the first
sentence should provide a result state which, however, is not available, if the result state
reading has been erased.
Hamm and Solstad show that the required result state can be reconstructed – even
under the assumption that behindern erases the result state reading of the first sentence
in (2). This is achieved in a process of reambiguation. Reambiguation involves a non-
monotonic inference process. The question arise what triggers this process and what its
restrictions are. Hamm and Solstad provide formally precise answers to these questions.
Again a combination of UDRT and the event calculus provide the framework where these
puzzles can be solved.
References
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1 Introduction
Our linguistic competence has two parts, that of being able to express what we want to say
and that of being able to understand what we are told. The point of the second part (and
indirectly therefore also of the first) is that understanding yields information which can
be put to further use. Almost always this further use takes the form of drawing inferences
that involve the new information as premise.
A good theory of language interpretation should tell a story about how this works. At
a minimum it should show not only how we extract interpretations from linguistic input,
but also that the interpretations we extract have the structural properties that allow them
to play their part as premises in human inferencing processes.
What such a theory should look like in detail will depend on what we assume about
the nature and forms of human reasoning. For example, someone who thinks of reasoning
along the lines of deduction systems for first or higher order predicate logic would want an
account of interpretation that transforms linguistic input into interpretations whose form
allows them to serve as premises in deduction systems of this sort. Such interpretations
should be like formulas of predicate logic (or, failing that they should be readily convert-
ible into such formulas). But of course, we need not think of the inference modules of
human cognition as deduction engines for predicate logic. In fact, we definitely shouldn’t
think of them as just that. Most of the inferences people draw in ordinary life are de-
feasible inferences: conclusions depending on implicit assumptions, statements on which
the premises only confer a high probability, abductions, educated guesses etc. There is
considerable latitude here for alternative conceptions. In particular, there seems room
for conceptions on which premises and conclusions come in forms that are very different
from predicate logical formulas. Someone who embraces an alternative conception of this
kind will also put different demands on the theory of interpretation. He will want a theory
of interpretation to show how natural language input can be converted into representa-
tions that are suitable as premises and conclusions in inferences that fit his conception of
inference.
In this paper we look at some implications of one such conception of human inferenc-
ing. This conception is based on the method of Constraint Logic Programming (CLP); a
detailed presentation of the approach can be found in van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005).
In this approach the premises of inferences are given as programs and constraints ex-
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pressed in a certain Constraint Logic Programming Formalism. The inferences that can
be drawn from such combinations of programs and constraints within the Constraint Logic
Programming framework are statements that are verified by models of the completions of
those programs. This gives an inference relation that is more powerful than classical de-
ductive validity, and it is non-monotonic1. The notion is particularly well adapted to deal
with inferences that people are prone to draw from narrative texts and other text types in
which chains of causally connected events, states and processes play a prominent role:
interpreters assume that events that are neither mentioned explicitly nor unequivocally
entailed by what is explicitly mentioned did not take place at all. Many of the inferences
we draw reflect this understanding in that they would not be true had such events actually
occurred. The CLP approach captures this aspect of human inferencing because the com-
pletions of the programs that represent narrative texts exclude the problematic events; in
the models of those completions no such events are present.
It is not easy to develop a theory of natural language interpretation that turns linguistic
input directly into suitable representations at CLP level. We have therefore been exper-
imenting with an indirect method, in which natural language inputs are first converted
into Discourse Representation Structures; in a second step these DRSs are then converted
into CLP level representations (Hamm et al., 2006). This two-stage procedure has several
advantages. A first practical advantage is the considerable coverage of natural language
constructions that has been accumulated within DRT in the course of the past few decades
(van der Sandt, 1992; Kamp and Roßdeutscher, 1994; Geurts, 1999; Roßdeutscher, 2000;
Kamp, 2003; Kamp and Roßdeutscher, 2010; Genabith et al., 2010; Kamp and Reyle,
2010). For a wide variety of sentences DRSs can now be built systematically (and even
generated automatically from NL text by machine, see e.g. Kamp and Reyle (1993),
Blackburn and Bos (2009). Furthermore, converting DRSs into CLPs is a more stream-
lined and therefore simpler procedure than going from natural language to CLPs directly.
But there is also a second advantage. As things stand, DRT has little to say on the topic
of defeasible inference. But all DRS formalisms come equipped with model theories and
thus with model-theoretic notions of valid inference. Moreover, first order fragments of
DRS-languages (as in Kamp and Reyle, 1993, Chs. 1,2) can be straightforwardly trans-
lated into first order predicate logic, and so can take advantage of the theorem provers for
first order logic that are currently on the market2. These classical inference relations and
their implementations fall short of giving us a credible account of human reasoning. But
even so they cover a substantial part of the inferences that human beings are able to draw,
and often do draw.
In a two stage interpretation system of the sort we have just described inferencing is
possible at two distinct levels, that of DRT and that of the CLP. This creates an opportunity
for two-pronged accounts of reasoning processes, in which some inferences happen at the
DRT- and some at the CLP-level.
Not only do we draw inferences from our interpretations of the linguistic input we
receive. We also have to rely on inferencing in order to get to those interpretations. Many
of those inferences are needed for resolving ambiguities, and a large majority of those
1There are some CLPs P1 that can be extended to CLPs P2 with the property that some of the models of
its completion are not models of the completion of P1.
2Kamp and Reyle (1996) presents a deduction system for first order DRT that is fitted to the distinctive
structural properties of DRSs.
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ambiguities are lexical ambiguities. The vocabularies of natural languages are rife with
ambiguity, both in that they contain large numbers of ambiguous words, and in that many
of those have more than two readings, often many more. One of the striking aspects
of the efficiency of natural language is that ambiguities are almost always resolved in
context. Moreover, for the resolution of lexical ambiguities usually not much contextual
information isl required; mostly the purely linguistic local context – the sentence in which
the ambiguous word occurs – is all that is needed.
When a word is multiply ambiguous, its full disambiguation may take several steps,
in which the readings that the given context excludes are successively eliminated. In such
cases each step may involve its own inferences and moreover, these inferences may belong
to different levels. The cases of disambiguation that we will consider here only involve
inferencing at the DRT level. This has to do with the special features of sortal ambiguity
resolution and does not generalise to ambiguity resolution in general. Moreover, even
in cases where disambiguation takes place at the level of DRS construction, processing
may requre further inferences that belong to the CLP level. In fact, part of the paper will
be devoted to a detailed treatment of an example for which inferences at the DRS level
(needed for the resolution of sortal ambiguities) are followed by a further inference at the
level of CLP.
The structure of the paper is as follows. (Don’t read this if you don’t want to, you will
find out in any case.)
Section 2 gives a brief account of our interest in -ung-nominalisation and in the am-
biguities of -ung nouns to which it gives rise. We then present the sentences that will
preoccupy us throughout the paper. Each of these sentences involves a transitive verb and
all of them have the same theme DP – die Absperrung der Botschaft (roughly: the fencing
off of the embassy) – in which our paradigm noun, the three ways ambiguous Absperrung.
is the lexical head.
Section 3 deals with the DRT part of our story. 3.1 presents lexical entries for Absper-
rung and for the verb Absperren from which it is derived, as well as a semantic represen-
tation for the DP die Absperrung der Botschaft. 3.2 presents lexical entries for most of the
verbs of the sentences of Section 2 and the DRS construction for some of these sentences.
These constructions show how a noun like Absperrung can get wholly or partly disam-
biguated in the course of sentence interpretation. (The length of this section is due to the
unusual semantic properties of the chosen verbs. These are outside the standard repertory
that has been studied in extant work in formal semantics and require careful discussion.)
With Section 4 we reach the second part of the paper. Section 4.1 reviews our reasons
for wanting a combined DRT-CLP architecture. Section 4.2 given a succinct introduction
to Logic Programming, emphasising the features that are important for the use that is
made of it here. Sections 4.3-4.5 the system of Constraint Logic Programming that is
used here - a CLP-based version of the Event Calculus, as developed in van Lambalgen
and Hamm (2005). Of special importance for our purpose are the integrity constraints
discussed in 4.4 - it is they, and not the Logic programs themselves, that correspond to
the DRSs of Section 3 - and the method of reification presented in 4.5.
In Section 5 the two halves of our proposal - the DRT half and CLP half - are at
last brought together. The general problem we are facing here is to define the transition
from DRSs to representations in the format of our version of the Event Calculus. As
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indicated already in Section 4, DRSs of episodic sentences and texts do not translate into
CL-programs but into integrity constraints. Constraint Logic programs also play a part,
but they arise as translations of lexical entries (most notably, as translations of the lexical
entries of verbs). The logic of semantic representations at this level is defined by the
CLP-behviour of integrity constraints that translate sentence and text DRSs against the
backgropund provided by the CL programs that serve as lexical entries for the verbs (and
other words) occurring in the given sentence or text.
Section 6 (the Conclusion) concludes.
2 German ung–Nominals
The word that will be central to this paper is the deverbal German noun Absperrung (from
the verb absperren, Engl. fence off, block off ; the meaning of the noun will be explained
below.) The choice of Absperrung reflects our general interest in the processes of “-ung-
formation”, a German word formation process in which nouns are derived from verbs by
attaching the suffix -ung. -ung-formation is a challenge to linguistic theory because
• there are many verbs that allow for the formation of -ung-nouns and many others
that do not
• the -ung nouns that exist vary in that some are ambiguous while others aren’t, and
the ambiguous ones vary in how they are ambiguous.
To a large extent these phenomena appear to be systematic und thus force two general
questions upon us:
1. What is responsible for the possibility of -ung-formation? and
2. What determines the range of possible readings of -ung-nouns that can be formed?
Finding answers to these questions is one of the principal tasks of the research project that
has also included the study reported here.
The general question of the present study is a different one. Our central concern is the
resolution of lexical ambiguity in context. But the connection with questions (1) and (2)
above is obvious enough. We too are concerned with aspects of -ung-nominalisation. But
rather than asking where the ambiguities of -ung-nouns come from we focus on when and
how those ambiguities disappear again when the nouns are used as parts of sentences.
The ambiguities of -ung-nouns we will be dealing with are ambiguities of a special
kind. They are what we call sortal ambiguities. To see what that means consider the word
Absperrung. Absperrung is ambiguous between describing
1. events of fencing off something (a building, a plot of land, a street);
2. the states which result from such actions, i.e. the state of the building, plot or
whatever having become inaccessible on account of such an action;
3. the fences or barricades that are erected in the course of Absperrung-actions.
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Thus, each of the three readings involves a different ontological category – the category
‘event’, the category ‘state’ and the category ‘physical object’ (or ‘entity’). Something
like this is true more generally: The sortal ambiguities of -ung-nouns come in different
‘patterns’, where each pattern is given by a set of ontological categories (or ‘sorts’, as
we will also call them). The ambiguity pattern of Absperrung is given by the set {event,
state, entity}. Other ambiguous -ung-nouns have patterns that are two element subsets of
this set. (The -ung-nouns whose ‘ambiguity patterns’ are given by singleton sets are the
ones that are not sortally ambiguous.)
Sortally ambiguous nouns allow for a form of disambiguation that is specific to this
type of ambiguity. When nouns occur in sentences, they do so mostly as the lexical heads
of noun phrases that occupy an argument position of some lexical predicate – a verb, a
preposition, an adjective or another noun. In such cases the predicate is referred to as the
container predicate (of the noun phrase and, by proxy, also of the head noun of that noun
phrase). As a rule, argument positions of lexical predicates impose selectional restrictions
on their arguments – conditions that delimit the sorts of entities that can fill them. One
way in which the selection restrictions for an argument position manifest themselves is
by excluding from it any argument phrase whose lexical head is incompatible with them.
And, by the same token, when the head of the argument phrase is ambiguous, it may be
that the selectional restrictions for the argument position are compatible with some of its
readings but not with others. In such cases the selectional restrictions will have a disam-
biguating effect; the head will become either fully disambiguated or else its ambiguity
will at least be reduced.
Prominent among the container predicates of noun phrases are verbs, and it is on
these that we will concentrate. (1) lists a few sentences in which the noun phrase die
Absperrung occurs in the theme position of different transitive verbs3.
(1) a. Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde abgebaut.
The blocking-off of the embassy was removed.
b. Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde behindert.
The blocking-off of the embassy was obstructed.
c. Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde verhindert.
The blocking-off of the embassy was prevented.
d. Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde unterbrochen.
The blocking-off of the embassy was interrupted.
e. Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde aufgehoben.
The blocking-off of the embassy was lifted.
f. Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde ignoriert.
The blocking-off of the embassy was ignored.
The sentences in (1) differ from each other in that the theme positions of their verbs
come with different selection restrictions. Each set of selection restrictions has a different
effect on the disambiguation of the head noun Absperrung. In what follows we will
3For reasons connected with the second part of the paper our sample sentences are passives, in which
the theme phrase plays the part of grammatical subject, and not that of direct object, as it would in the
corresponding active sentences.
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be looking carefully at these effects and at the ways in which they interact with other
disambiguating factors.
The constraints that the verbs in (1) impose on the interpretation of Absperrung can be
accounted for at the level of DRS-construction and that is where we will account for these
effects here. But in many instances the representations that result from DRS construction-
cum-disambiguation invite further processing at the level of CLP. Among the sentences
in (1) there is one, viz. (1)d with its verb unterbrechen (‘interrupt’), which illustrates
this possibility in an interesting way. In the second part of the paper we will use this
sentence as an illustration of howDRS construction can provide input to further inferential
processing at the level of CLP.
We will discuss the relevant features of the different sentences in (1) at our leasure
in Section 3. But as a foretaste of what is to come, we conclude this section with a few
informal remarks about the semantics of the verb unterbrechen. These should give a first
impression of what it is that makes (1)d particularly relevant to the two level inference
architecture we are proposing.
The theme arguments of unterbrechen are activities. unterbrechen says of such a
theme argument that it is stopped, but with a presumption that it will be resumed at a
later time. That the resumption part is only a presumption is shown by the coherence of
examples like (2).
(2) Die Absperrung wurde unterbrochen und dann nie wieder aufgenommen.
(Literally: The blocking was interrupted and then never taken up again.)
They stopped erecting the barricades and then never resumed the work.
But while the resumption can be cancelled, it is present as a presumption no less: only
explicit cancellation, as in (2), will make it go away.
That activities which are described as ‘unterbrochen’ (i.e. as ‘interrupted’) are subse-
quently resumed is, then, a default aspect of the meaning of unterbrechen. But in addition
to this we can observe in some cases a further, ‘secondary’ default effect. This arises
when the theme argument phrase of unterbrechen describes a goal-directed action. An
example is the phrase die Absperrung der Botschaftwhen understood in its event reading:
the events the phrase describes are actions that result in the embassy being inaccessible.
With such theme phrases unterbrechen not only carries an implication that the activity
which is meant to lead to the embassy’s being inaccessible is resumed after the interrup-
tion, but also that the activity is then eventually completed (so that the embassy is fenced
off and inaccessible).4
4It has been observed that this second implication – that of the embassy’s fencing off being completed
after resumption – is rather weak. (Our informants vary on how weak.) The implication appears to be
somewhat stronger, however, with a sentence like (ia), in which there is an explicit mention of how long the
interruption is meant to be for. As shown by (ib), the implication that the activity will be completed can be
cancelled just as well as in the case of (2).
(i) a. Die Absperrung wurde fu¨r einige Stunden unterbrochen.
They interrupted the erecting of the barricades for several hours.
b. Die Absperrung wurde fu¨r einige Stunden unterbrochen, aber dann nie wieder aufgenommen.
They interrupted the erecting of the barricades for several hours, but then never resumed the
work again.
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This second implication – that the fencing off will be completed after resumption –
is of a different sort. Unlike the implication it presupposes – that the activity will be
resumed – it is not part of the lexical meaning of unterbrechen, but an instance of the
general discourse principle referred to in Section 1: events that are neither mentioned in
the discourse nor follow from what is explicitly mentioned are not part of the episode
described. The second implication thus falls within the province of the Event Calculus.
This means that when all is told, (1)d involves, first, inferences at the level of DRT –
those needed for the disambiguation of Absperrung as well as the (default) inference that
the activity will be resumed – and a subsequent inference at our second level, one that
would not have been possible without the ones that precede it, but which could only be
drawn at the level where it is drawn. Here we see the synergetic effects of inferencing by
different modules that operate according to radically different principles.
3 DRS-Constructions for ung–Nominals and Container
Verbs
The first ingredients we need to account for the disambiguation effects in (1) are lexical
entries for the noun Absperrung and its container verbs. Since the account reconstructs
the disambiguations at the level of DRSs, the entries will have to be given in a form
suitable for DRS-construction. We will be using the format first introduced in (Kamp and
Roßdeutscher, 1994).
3.1 The Noun Absperrung
As noted in Section 2, Absperrung is three ways ambiguous. Its three readings emerge
naturally from the internal syntactic and semantic structure that Absperrung shares with
the verb absperren. (3) gives the lexical entry we assume for absperren.
(3)
(E0) absperren
absperren verb nom acc (mit-PP)
(i) e x y [ z ]
SEL.RESTR. event(e) agent(x)
[+z] region(y)
∨ [-z] utility(y)
barrier(z)
Semantic Representation
s0 s1 [s2] [s3]
s0 ⊃⊂e e ⊃⊂s1 [e ⊃⊂s2] [e ⊃⊂s3]
s0: accessible(y) s1: ¬ accessible(y)
CAUSE(e,s1)
Agent(e) = x [s2: present(z)] [s3: sperr(z,y)] [CAUSE(e,s2)] [CAUSE(e,s3)]
But in cases where it isn’t, the implcation that the resumption will be followed by completion appears to be
reasonably robust.
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Details of how such entries should be read and how they are used in the construction
of sentence representations will be explained in Section 3.2 in relation to the verbs that
occur in the sentences listed under (1). (For those familiar with the notation of Kamp and
Roßdeutscher (1994): the use of the square brackets around ‘z’, s2, s3 and the conditions
involving these discourse referents, which are novel here will be explained following the
entry for Absperrung below.)
What matters most at this point is that the argument structure of absperren, presented
in the top tier of (3), contains the three elements that can become the referential argument
of Absperrung: e, s and z.5
The lexical entry for Absperrung that we will be using derives from (3) in an obvious
fashion. We represent the referential argument of Absperrung as α and represent the
ambiguity of Absperrung via the disjunction
!
∨.
α = e
!
∨ α = s1
!
∨ α = z.
The symbol
!
∨ is used to list alternative interpretations. It is not to be confused with the
disjunction operator ∨. When A and B are formulas (or DRSs), then A ∨ B is a formula
(or DRS condition) which is true if at least one of the disjuncts is true. In contrast,
A
!
∨ B is not a formula (or DRS condition) in the usual sense. It is an instruction to
choose between A and B: the interpretation under construction will either have to be A
(or contain A in the position occupied by A
!
∨ B) or it will have to be or contain B. In other
words, before an interpretation can be considered complete, every
!
∨-disjunction should
be eliminated in favour of one of its disjuncts. Representations containing
!
∨-disjunctions
are thus underspecified interpretations, which can be turned into proper (fully specified)
representations only by eliminating all occurrences of
!
∨-disjunctions occurring in them
(Reyle et al., 2008).
Apart from its
!
∨-condition the semantic representation of the lexical entry for Absper-
rung is like that for absperren.
(4)
(E1) Absperrung
Absperrung noun (durch-PP) (DP-gen) (mit-PP)
(i) α x y [ z ]
SEL.RESTR. event(e) agent(x)
[+z] region(y)
∨ [-z] utility(y)
barrier(z)
Semantic Representation
5For an account of why only these three discourse referents from (3) are possible as referential arguments
of Absperrung see Kamp and Roßdeutscher (2010).
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s0 s1 [s2] [s3]
s0 ⊃⊂e e ⊃⊂s1 [e ⊃⊂s2] [e ⊃⊂s3]
s0: accessible(y) s1: ¬ accessible(y)
CAUSE(e,s1)
Agent(e) = x [s2: present(z)] [s3: sperr(z,y)] [CAUSE(e,s2)] [CAUSE(e,s3)]
α = e
!
∨ α = s1
!
∨ α = z
It is time for the promised explanation of the square brackets around z etc., which (4)
shares with in (3). The square brackets around ‘z’ in (3) indicate that there is a participant
z in the event structure described by absperren only under certain conditions, which are
reflected in the sort of the theme argument y: When y is a ‘region’ (a territory, a road, a
plot of land, a building, a part of a building etc.), then ‘absperren’ involves a barrier (a
fence, wall, barricade or the like), and, with it, the state s2 of the barrier being present
and the state s3 of its making y inaccessible; if the theme argument is a utility (water, gas,
electricity), then no barrier is involved. In this case none of z, s2, s3 and the conditions
in which they appear as arguments are relevant, and the entry is then to be treated as not
including them. This difference is made explicit in (3) by marking the first sortal option
for y as [+z] and the second option as [-z] and by placing those discourse referents and
conditions that are only relevant for the first option between brackets. This dependence
of the participation of z and what comes in its wake on the sort of y carries over to the
semantics of (4): When the theme of Absperrung (optionally realised by a genitive DP) is
a utility, then Absperrung allows for only two readings, viz. event and result state; when
y is a region, then the entity reading is possible a well.
We get a first glimpse of the role that the
!
∨-condition of (4) plays in the constructions
for expressions involving Absperrung by looking at the construction of a semantic rep-
resentation for the DP die Absperrung der Botschaft. Like its head noun when taken by
itself, this phrase is three ways ambiguous. This is a fact that merits explicit notice and a
brief discussion. The entries for all three readings specify an argument y that is option-
ally realised as a genitive DP. So the parser can use each of the three readings to assign a
structure to the complex DP in which the embedded DP ier Botschaft fills the y argument
slot of Absperrung. Moreover, in each of the three cases this structure is coherent since
the selectional restrictions of the theme argument of Absperrung, which are the same for
all three readings, are compatible with the head noun Botschaft of the embedded DP.6
To give a detailed account of how the ambiguous semantic representation of the NP
Absperrung der Botschaft results from the semantic representations of its parts we would
need a lexical entry for the noun Botschaft. This entry would have to be such that it would
enable us to detrermine its compatibility with the selectional restrictions on the theme
argument of Absperrung. In fact, we encounter here an instance of the same phenomenon
that will preoccupy us throughout Seection 3: The ambiguity reduction of the lexical
head of an argument phrase through the selectional constraints imposed by the container
predicate.
6Among the possible interpretations of the noun Botschaft there is one according to which it describes
the premises of the embassy in question or, alternatively, the building in which the embassy is housed.
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The ambiguities of Botschaft are of two sorts. First there is the distinction between
Botschaft in the sense of embassy and Botschaft in the sense of message. There is a fairly
obvious historical connection between these two meanings, but it is unlikely that this
connection plays any significant part in our current understanding of the word. Secondly
there is the polysemy that Botschaft, when taken in its embassy sense, shares with other
nouns that denote institutions We can use Botschaft to refer to the institution as such (a
branch of the ministry of foreign affairs), to the building where the institution is situated,
to its personnel and so forth.7
As regards the combination of die Botschaft with Absperrung the situation before us
is as follows: Botschaft can be used to denote a considerable range of different sorts,
but most of these are incompatible with the sortal restrictions that Absperrung imposes.
The one or two possibilities that remain belong to the family of polysemous meanings of
Botschaft in its sense of embassy: in Absperrung der Botschaft Botschaft can either stand
for the building or building part in which the embassy is housed or for the entire embassy
compound including the grounds. (Whether these should be counted as two possibilities
or one may be a matter for debate.)
It should be noted that for its part Botschaft also has a kind of disambiguating effect
on Absperrung. Since Botschaft cannot be used to refer to a utilitiy, it can be inferred
that Absperrung der Botschaft must involve the participant z. So in the representation of
Absperrung der Botschaft the square brackets that occur in the ledical entry of Absperrung
can be removed.
We do not present a lexical entry for Botschaft here and thus cannot present a detailed
account of the compositional semantics of (die) Absperrung der Botschaft. Instead, what
follows is a bit of a stopgap. We adopt a very much simplified representation for the DP
die Botschaft (see (5) below) and assume that when this representation is combined with
the entry for Absperrung the resulting representation is as in (6).
Before we present this representation one further point should be mentioned. It con-
cerns the two definite articles that occur in this DP. There is widespread agreement that
singular definite descriptions come with an existence presuppositon and a uniqueness
presupposition. The precise form and status of these presuppositions has been for many
decades the topic of a debate that remains unresolved to this day. For our own views on
this matter see Genabith et al. (2010) and Kamp (2008).
To go into this issue here would be counterproductive. So we will make do with the
assumption that the existence and uniqueness presuppositions of both DPs – die Botschaft
and die Absperrung der Botschaft – can be justified in context. Given this assumption,
the DPs can be treated as contributing their referential arguments in the form of discourse
referents that represent the unique satisfiers of their descriptive contents.
(5)〈
y
′
ref | botschaft(y’)
〉
7The apparently systematic character of this type of polysemy has been noted as long ago as Bierwisch
(1993). Other examples that manifest it are Schule (school), Ministerium (ministry), Krankenhaus (hospi-
tal), die Hypovereinsbank (a Bavarian Bank that made an exceptional mess of it even by current standards)
and so on.
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Combining (5) with the semantic representation from the entry for Absperrung takes
the form of substituting the referential argument y’ of (5) for the argument slot symbol y
in the semantic representation for Absperrung and merging the DRS of (5) with the result
of this substitution. Furthermore, the arguments of Absperrung that are not realised by ar-
gument phrases in Absperrung der Botschaft are also replaced by real discourse referents.
(In the representation (6) below we have retained the same symbols that appear in the top
tier of (4).) Of these the discourse referents that represent potential referential arguments
of Absperrung der Botschaft - viz. e’, s1 and z - are placed in the store of the new repre-
sentation, together with the ‘dummy’ referential argument α and the referential argument
y’ of the argument DP der Botschaft.8 The remaining discourse referents - those which
neither represent potential referential arguments nor are realised by an argument phrase -
are then existentially bound by entering them into the universe of the new (merged) DRS.
In the present instance there is just one such discourse referent, viz. the agent argument
x’.9
Lastly, the selection restrictions from the ‘container’ predicate Absperrung are in-
corporated into the representation of Absperrung der Botschaft, in the form of selection
presuppositions, which are collected into a presupposition set that is adjoined to the left
of the non-presuppositional component of the representation (Kamp and Reyle, 2010).10
The selectiomal restrictions for those arguments that are put into the store are encoded
as selection presuppositions, those for arguments that are entered into the universe of the
DRS are added as conditions of that DRS. We have chosen to keep the restrictions on the
different arguments separate, which gives us one presupposition for each argument in the
store. Moreover, in the representation below we have omitted the selection restrictions
associated with the argument y, since these have done their work already. (They have
been used in eliminating the ‘message’ reading of Botschaft, which is incompatible with
them. We do not offer a formal reconstruction of this process here). The result is that we
end up with three presuppositions, for the arguments e’, s1 and z.
It should be stressed that incorporation of the selectional restrictions as selection pre-
suppositions is to be seen as a general feature of the use of lexical entries of predicates in
the DRS construction for sentences in which they occur as container predicates. This ap-
plies in particular to the ‘container verbs’ of die Absperrung der Botschaft in the sentences
in (1). In the DRS constructions of the next section we will make use of this principle
without mentioning it again.
(6)
8Recall that the argument phrase die Botschaft disambiguates Absperrung to the interpretation in which
a physical barrier is involved.
9When at some later point the represented phrase Absperrung der Botschaft will become subject to
disambiguation, the discourse referent(s) corresponding to the discarded option or options will be bound in
the same way, by being transferred from the store to the universe of the non-presuppositional DRS. From
now on we will rely on this principle without mentioning it again explicitly.
10In the sequel we will sometimes be less strict on this last point, allowing ourselves to merge two
presuppositions into one, for easier reading or for reasons of grahical display.
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〈
αref e
′
s1 z y
′ |
〈

event(e’) ,
state(s1) ,
barrier(z)

 ,
x’ s0 s2 s3
s0 ⊃⊂e’
s0:accessible(y’)
s1 : ¬ accessible(y’)
s2: present(z)
CAUSE(e, s1)
s3:sperr(z,y’)
agent(x’)
Agent(e’) = x’
CAUSE(e’, s2)
CAUSE(e’, s3)
embassy(y’)
α = e’
!
∨
α = s1
!
∨
α = z
〉〉
(6) has been presented as representation of the NP Absperrung der Botschaft. How-
ever, since we have decided to ignore the complications connected with the definite article
of the DP die Absperrung der Botschaft our representation of the DP will also just have
the referential argument of the phrase in its store. Thus (6) will serve equally as represen-
tation for die Absperrung der Botschaft.
In the interest of easier readability we eliminate from (6) all reference to the states s2
and s3, as these will play no further part in our deliberations. So from now on we will use
(7) as representation for die Absperrung der Botschaft rather than (6).
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(7)
〈
αref e
′
s1 z y
′ |
〈

event(e’) ,
state(s1) ,
barrier(z)

 ,
x’ s0
s0 ⊃⊂e’
s0:accessible(y’)
s1 : ¬ accessible(y’)
CAUSE(e, s1)
agent(x’)
Agent(e’) = x’
embassy(y’)
α = e’
!
∨
α = s1
!
∨
α = z
〉〉
3.2 Verbs
3.2.1 abbauen
The first verb is abbauen (tear down/take down). abbauen is something that can be done
to physical objects, especially constructions erected for a temporary purpose, like tents,
stands for an open air performance, or – relevant here – fences, walls or barricades erected
to ensure the inaccessibility of something. These are not the only kinds of things to
which abbauen can be applied. Some other possible themes are non-physical entities
such as debts or surpluses – here the English equivalent would be ‘reduce’ rather than
‘take down’ – and there are other possibilities as well. But what matters for present
purposes is that abbauen never takes events or states as theme arguments. This entails
that in (1)a Absperrung can only have its third reading.
It is not all that easy to come up with an accurate and comprehensive statement of
the selectional restrictions on the theme argument of abbauen. A partial statement, which
includes some types of entities as possible themes and excludes certain other types, would
be enough to account for the disambiguation in (1)a, but we refrain from formalisation in
this case.
3.2.2 behindern
With regard to the selection restrictions for its theme, the verb behindern (obstruct, in-
terfere with) differs considerably from abbauen. The only possible theme arguments of
behindern are (i) activities and goal directed actions and (ii) the agents of actions or ac-
tivities. Moreover, its themes are restricted to intentional actions and activities – things
that are done by an agent with a conception of what he is doing or trying to do.
As regards the content of behindern, just a few observations will suffice for our needs.
(It is the selection restrictions that really matter.) In the lexical entry (E2) for behindern
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that is given below we hide all aspects of its meaning behind the constant ‘behindern’ of
the DRS language in which our semantic representations are couched.
Important for our present purposes is that in cases where its theme is a goal-directed
action, behindern carries no implications about the completion of that action: for all that
behindern says, the action may be completed – in which case the interference may have
been a nuisance but no worse. But it is also possible that the interference was so crippling
that it forced the agent to give up. Our entry (E2) captures this intuition by virtue of
omission: it simply doesn’t say anything about the completion prospects of actions that
occur as theme arguments of behindern. The effect of this omission is that when the DRS
for sentence (1)b has been built with the help of this entry and the underspecified DRS
for die Absperrung der Botschaft and is then converted into an integrity constraint, the
inference machinery of the Event Calculus will make it possible to infer that the action
did reach completion.
(E2) behindern
behindern verb nom acc
e x y
SEL.RES: event(e) agent(x) ∨ event(x) action(y) ∨ activity(y)
∨ agent-of-an-action-
or-activity(y)
SEMANT: e: behindern(x,y)
The lexical entries for Absperrung and behindern are the principal resources we need
to construct the DRS for (1)b. We assume that it is during the construction of this DRS that
the selectional restrictions of behindern exert their disambiguating effect on Absperrung.
To see how this might work in some detail is useful, we believe, in that it provides insight
into what must be involved even in the comparatively simple disambiguation procedures
that rest exclusively on selectional restrictions. As will become clear later on in this
section, the case of (1)b is simple even as cases of disambiguation via selection restrictions
go. It is a good first introduction not only to this kind of disambiguation but also to the
more general topic of online disambiguation in the course of DRS construction.
First, a minor complication arises from the fact that the sentences in (1) are passives.
We have chosen passive rather than active sentences in order to avoid certain irrelevant
complications we would otherwise have to deal with when we turn to semantic represen-
tation at the level of CLP. But a small price has to be paid for this decision, and it has
to be paid right here. The reason why it has to be paid here is simply that it hasn’t been
paid before: To our knowledge there exists no treatment of passives within DRT that suits
our present purposes.11 What suits our current interests best – even if it isn’t the best
possible account of passives from a theoretical perspective – is to assume a general rule
that transforms transitive verbs into the corresponding passive forms, which then behave
11Roßdeutscher (2000) discusses a compositional analysis of the passive as built transparently from past
participles and the verb werden (the German passive auxiliary). We think that such a deep analysis of
passives in German and other languages is probably the right way to go. See also Sternefeld (1995). But
to compute the DRS for (1)b from a syntactic structure which reflects such an in depth account of passive
formation would defeat the point of making things simpler for ourselves when we come to the transition
from DRSs to integrity constraints.
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syntactically like compound intransitive verbs. The transformation also carries informa-
tion relevant to ‘linking theory’: the argument of the verb that is realised as direct object
when the input verb is used in the active vioce is realised as subject of the output verb
(the passive form of the input verb), whereas the argument that is realised as grammatical
subject in active uses is optionally realised by a von- or durch-PP.12 We will not state the
rule which transforms verbs into their passive forms in general terms, but just show what
it does to the verb behindern of (1)b. The operation is given in (8).
(8)
behindern verb nom acc
e x y
⇒
behindert
werden
verb (von- or durch-PP) nom
e x y
We haven’t bothered to make specific in (8) how selectional restrictions and semantic
representation of behindern are transferred to behindert werden, but this is done in the
obvious way,
Passivisation of the other verbs that occur in (1) is assumed to follow the exact same
pattern. We will not mention passivisation again
The selection restrictions and the semantic representation of behindern are transferred
unaltered to behindert werden. This is a general feature of the passive transformation
which (8) exemplifies. Because of this general specification it is unnecessary to mention
selectional restrictions and semantic representation explicitly in any particular instance of
the general rule (such as (8)).
Since the syntax treats the output of (8) as an intransitive verb, it will analyse (1)c as
an intransitive sentence. We assume its syntactic structure to be as in (9).
(9)
12By ‘linking theory’ we understand that component of the grammar which assigns the phrases that
occur in a syntactically well-formed clause or phrase to argument slots of the main predicate of that clause
or phrase. As indicated earlier, we assume that the lexical entries of verbs mark which arguments of the
verbal predicate are obligatorily and which are optionally realised. Part of verifying a string as a well-
formed expression is to assign DPs and PPs in the string to argument slots such that each obligatorily
realised argument slot is assigned a phrase, (Optionally realised arguments can but need not be assigned a
phrase; phrases that are not assigned to any argument are identified and treated as adjuncts.) We rely on the
principle that a parser which verifies an input string as well-formed by assigning it a syntactic structure must
implement linking theory in any case. (It must establish, as part of verifying the string’s well-formedness,
the right correspondences between argument phrases and argument slots.) The links between phrases and
slots that are determined in the proicess can be included in the parser’s output and thus be made available
for the semantiic interpretation component.
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CP
TP
DP1
det
die
NP
N
Absperrung
DP
det
der
NP
Botschaft
T’
T
PAST
VP
V
behindert werden
The first step in the construction of the DRS for this syntactic structure consists in
replacing the occurrence of the verb behindert werden by its semantic representation (as
given in the lexical entry for behindern). Since for the next construction steps the selection
restrictions will be crucial, it is necessary to include these as part of the information that
is passed on for combining with the semantics of the subject phrase. In doing so we
rely once more on the intuitive principle that selection restrictions act as presuppositions
which are left-adjoined to the non-presupppositional component of the representation of
the sentences or sentence parts within which the presuppositions are triggered. In the
semantics which replaces behindert werden in (9) the presupposition set will consist just
of the selectional presuppositions contributed by the entry for behindert werden (including
the uniqueness presupposition concerning the theme argument y).
As in other recent work on DRS construction (Kamp, 2001; Genabith et al., 2010;
Kamp and Reyle, 2010), we assume that some of the discourse referents that are in-
troduced in the process of constructing the semantic representation need not be bound
instantly, but can be put into a store to await binding at some later stage of the con-
struction.13 In the representations we are using the store is presented to the left of the
presupposition set.
Lexical predicates such as verbs and nouns are assumed to have one referential argu-
ment and zero or more non-referential arguments. The referential argument is introduced
by the predicate word itself, and is never realised by an argument phrase. When the pred-
13If all types of binding are cast in the form of operations on lambda-abstracts, and these operations
always occur in the same, predictable order, then stores could be dispensed with in favour of lambda-
abstraction over discourse referents that are not bound instantly. But this is an assumption that seems to us
unwarranted even if it were technically possible to set the syntax-semantics interface up in a manner which
allows us to treat all cases of binding as operations of this particular form. On the other hand, the possibility
to put discourse referents into the store is only one half of the story. The other, much harder, half is to spell
out in precise detail when a discourse referent is to be taken out of the store again and how it may or must
be bound at that point. This is not the place to go into this part of the story, but at one or two points we
will refer to binding principles that would have to be part of it. (For the record we should mention that at
this point in time no comprehensive description of store retrieval for a substantial explicitly defined natural
language fragment exists).
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icate is a verb, the referential argument is the event or state described by it. The verb’s
non-referential arguments are those which in traditional treatments are simply called its
‘arguments’ – subject, direct object, indirect object, .. . According to the present account
of argument structure a verb or other kind of predicate word introduces its own referential
aregument (a discourse referent), but makes its non-referential arguments available only
in the form of argument slots. When a predicate word occurs as head of a well-formed
phrase or clause, then all its argument slots must eventually be filled by discourse ref-
erents. Those argument slots that are linked to argument phrases will be filled by the
discourse referents that act as referential arguments of these prhases. Slots without links
to argument phrases must be filled by same kind of default procedure‘implicit argument
interpretation’. For the construction of semantic representations the difference between
arguments and argument slots is important and needs to be marked explicitly. To this end
we distinguish between ‘real arguments’ (discourse referents) and argument slot symbols.
For the latter we are using underlined letters (e.g, x), while symbois for discourse refer-
ents are as usual plain letters (without underlining). In lexical entries this distinction is not
being enforced. There is no need for it here, since the relevant information can be directly
recovered from the form in which our entries for predicate words are specified. Lexical
entries of this form distinguish between the referential argument, which is presented di-
rectly below the entry’s lemma, and zero or more non-refrerential arguments, presented
to its right. When the semantic representation from the lexical entry of a predicate word
is inserted for the word in the course of constructing the representation for a sentence
in which the word occurs, then the referential argument from the entry is replaced by a
discourse referent (which is usually put into the store of the representation under con-
struction, as well as being inserted into the relevant argument slot), whereas the entry’s
non-referential arguments are replaced by argument slot symbols. (Eventually these slot
symbols will have to be eliminated through replacement by discourse referents.)
The representation that replaces behindert werden under the V-node in (9) is given in
(10).
(10)
〈
eref |
〈
 event(e) ,
agent(x)
∨ event(x)
,
action(y) ∨
activity(y)
∨ agent(y)

 , e: beh’ern(x,y)
〉〉
In the passage from V to VP nothing happens; in the transition from VP to T’ e
is located in the past of the utterance time n, via a location time t introduced by the
information attached to T. For reasons that we need not go into here, we assume that t
joins e in the store. Both will be bound existentially in the final construction step, the
transition from TP to CP. This gives (11) as representation associated with the T’ node.
(11)
〈
tref e |
〈
 ev’t(e) ,
agent(x)
∨ event(x)
,
action(y) ∨
activity(y)
∨ agent(y)

 , t < n e ⊆ t
e: beh’ern(x,y)
〉〉
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We now come to the decisive construction step, in which the representation of the
subject DP die Absperrung der Botschaft is combined with that of the T’ node. This step is
comparatively simple in that only one of the two representations (that for die Absperrung
der Botschaft) is ambiguous.14 But even so there is work to be done. The procedure that
combines the two part representations has to take each of the alternatives of the ambiguous
representation and try to combine it with the representation of its sister node (here the T’
node), test for sortal consistency and keep the combined representation if and only if the
test is positive. The result is either an aborted representation (when all combinations fail)
or else a new set of one or more alternatives (that or those which survive the consistency
test).
We have set up the representations in a way which makes sortal consistency testing
comparatively straightforward. Semantically, the combination of the representation of the
subject DP and the structure under T’ is a case of argument insertion. In this respect the
construction step before us resembles the combination of the DP die Botschaft with the
semantics of the noun Absperrung: the referential argument (α) of the argument phrase
gets substituted for the symbol that represents the slot of the container predicate with
which the phrase has been linked (y), whereupon the stores, presupposition sets and the
non-presuppositional DRSs of the two representations get merged. (This time both repre-
sentations have non-empty presupposition sets. The representation that results is shown
in (12).15
14In this respect the present case differs from that of Absperrung der Botschaft as discussed in Section 3.1,
where both constituent representations, the one for Absperrung and that for die Botschaft, were ambiguous.
Cases where both of two representations that have to be combined in the course of DRS construction are
ambiguous are common enough. Another example, which will be discussed below, is sentence (1)e.
15The semantic representation associated with the T’ node contains not only the information contributed
by the verb behindern but also that contributed by the past tense of (1)b. Tense has contributed the discourse
referent t, which at this point plays the role of referential argument (hence the subscript ref to its occurrence
in the store). None of this is of any direct concern to us here, so we do not elaborate. For a presentation of
the treatment of tense in DRT that we are assuming here, see Reyle et al. (2008) or Genabith et al. (2010).
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(12)
〈
tref e α e
′ s1 z y
′ |
〈


event(e’) ,
state(s1) ,
barrier(z) ,
event(e) ,
agent(x) ∨
event(x)
,
action(α) ∨ activity(α)
∨ agent(α)


,
s0 s1 x’
t < n e ⊆ t
s0 ⊃⊂e’ e’ ⊃⊂s1
s0:accessible(y’)
s1 : ¬ accessible(y’)
CAUSE(e, s1)
agent(x’)
Agent(e’) = x’
embassy(y’)
e: behindern(x, e’)
α = e’
!
∨
α = s1
!
∨ α = z
〉〉
The compatibility check that now has to be performed on (12) consists in determining
which of the options for α that are offered by the
!
∨-disjunction in the DRS on the right
in (12) is compatible with the selection restrictions that behindern imposes on α. (This
selecton restriction is the condition ‘action(α) ∨ activity(α) ∨ agent(α)’, which occurs as
one of the presuppositions in (12).) The effect of this check is that when α is identified
with one of e’, s1, z) and the selection constraint imposed on the chosen discourse referent
by trhe relevant presupposition in (12) is incompatible with those that (12) imposes on
α, then that choice is eliminated. Only choices which do not lead to incompatibility
are retained as possible options. It is clear that in the case at hand there is only one
compatible choice, viz. e’. So we infer that in (1)b die Absperrung der Botschaft is
fully disambiguated, with only the event reading remaining. In the DRS (13) for (1)b
the results of the compatibility check have been incorporated: the
!
∨ condition has been
discarded and all other occurrences of α have been replaced by e’.16
To obtain the DRS for (1)b from (12) some further operations are needed. First, the
discourse referents in the store need to be bound and the argument slot (x) must be filled
in some way. We assume that in cases like the one before us, where the remaining syn-
tactic transition is that from TP to the CP node of a main clause, both slot filling and
store binding are existential operations. For the discourse referents in the store existential
binding can be implemented by transferring them from the store to the universe of the non-
presuppositional DRS of the representation. The unfilled argument slot requires a double
16While it seems intuitively plain that the consistency check will discard the state reading and the object
reading of die Absperrrung der Botschaft, a word of caution is called for. What are the formal principles
behind these results - the two inconsistency and the one consistency result? Evidently, a formal reconstruc-
tion of these inferences must rely on some kind of formal ontology, which captures the logical relations –
of subsumption, incompatibility and so on – between such ‘onto-semantic’ primitives as ‘action’, ‘activ-
ity’, ‘event’, ‘physical object’ and the like. In other words, a strictly formal version of the account we are
presenting would have to include as one of it components a formal ontology, of the kind developed by, for
instance, the Trento group led by Nicola Guarino or the ontologies of systems like WordNet, Framenet or
Cyc. Guarino and Welty (2000); Lenat (2006). Whether any existing formal ontology will provide what is
needed here is a topic for further research.
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operation: first the slot must be filled with a fresh discourse referent, and this discourse
referent is then bound existentially through placement in the relevant DRS universe.17
The one remaning operation concerns the presuppositions of (12). Now that, as a
result of the compatibility check, the sortal presuppositions have been established as
consistent, they can be regarded as satisfied and incorporated into the representation of
the non-presupppositional content of the sentence. In accordance with this principle the
prsuppositions of (12) that have survived the consistency check have been incorporated
into th DRS (13) for the sentence (1)b.
(13)
e t x e’ x’ y’ z s0 s1
t < n event(e) e ⊆ t agent(x) ∨ event(x) Agent(e) = x
event(e’) action(e’) ∨ activity(e’) ∨ agent(e’)
s0 ⊃⊂e’ agent(x’) Agent(e’) = x’ fence(z) ∨ wall(z) ∨ barricade(z)
s0: accessible(y’) s1:¬ accessible(y’) CAUSE(e,s1)
embassy(y)
e: behindern’(x,e’)
3.2.3 verhindern
The verb verhindern (Engl. prevent) has certain features in common with behindern, but
in the light of our concerns the differences are at least as important as the similarities.
The first difference concerns the selection restrictions on the theme argument. behindern
selects for agents as well as actions and activities. (There is a sense in which activities
are the primary themes; even when the theme phrase refers to an action or an agent, it
is an associated activity - the preparatory activity that is part of the action or the activity
in which the agent is engaged - that is directly involved in behindern. But nevertheless,
theme phrases that describe goal-directed actions sound perfectly natural with behindern.)
verhindern differs in two ways. On the one hand it is more liberal with regard to its posible
themes in that it also admits theme phrases that denote states.18 But on the other hand it
17One problem with the existential default binding of unfilled slots is that the discourse referents that are
used in this process do not become available as antecedents for subsequent anaphoric pronouns. This is a
more pervasive problem in DRT, which arises for many extensions of the early DRS languages presented
in Kamp (1981) or Kamp and Reyle (1993), but is usually ignored. Various technical solutions have been
suggested for this problem, among them (i) creating sub-DRSs in whose universes the fillersof the slots
are placed, making them thereby inaccessible to subsequent pronouns later on, and (ii) the use of different
types of discourse referents. Here we follow a somewhat reprehensible tradition of paying the problem no
attenton after having pointed out that it exists.
18For instance, among the entities that can be themes of verhindern are water shortages, famines and
other disastrous conditions; in this respect verhindern is just like the English verb prevent. Actually, it is
hard in this connection to know where to draw the line between states and events. Is a case of torrential rain
fall an event or a state? If we classify it as a state, what about the shower that caught me just as I stepped
outside, but was over half a minute later; if we classify it as an event, what about the drought that preceded
it? There is, we believe, an ineliminable element of ambivalence here, which is closely connected with the
choice between an internal and an external viewpoint that often presents itself to us as an option when we
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seems to admit theme phrases that denote persons only marginally, and to the extent that
it does, it treats them as non-agents.19 Connected with the fact that a properly agentive
interpretation does not seem possible for theme phrases of verhindern is the way we
interpret theme phrases that denote activities. The combination of verhindern with such
a theme phrase means that the activity did not take place at all; it cannot mean that the
activity was started but then cut short.
As far as the agent argument is concerned agent behindern and verhindern seem to
behave alike. Both admit as ‘agents’ conscious agents (individuals or groups of people)
as well as events (both natural events: rains, storms, floods, and man made ones: demon-
strations, decisions by governing boards) and also rules, laws and regulations. Important
in connection with our next verb, unterbrechen, is that the ‘agent’ of behindern and ver-
hindern must always be distinct from the agent of the action or activity that is being
interfered with or prevented, or from the bearer of the prevented state. Both behindern
and verhindern describe interference from the outside. For instance, though it is perhaps
not inconceivable that someone should prevent his own action, the verb verhindern just
isn’t made to describe such a situation.20
What matters most for the disambiguation of Absperrung in (1)c is that verhindern
accepts both events and states as theme arguments. This means that Absperrung in (1)c
can be interpreted both as the event of fencing off and as the state of being fenced off.
Thus, unlike in (1)b, disambiguation is partial - only the physical object interpretation of
Absperrung is excluded.21
But although (1)c is still ambiguous in that die Absperrung der Botschaft can be read
either as referring to an event or to a result state, this ambiguity is of no great consequence,
since in either case we end up with the same truth conditions for (1)c. In order to secure
the truth-conditional equivalence of these two interpretations of (1)c, our semantics must
make explicit what the connection is between preventing states and preventing the events
that lead to them. We propose to state this connection in the form of a Meaning Postulate
(see (14) below). But before we are in a position to formulate this postulate there is
another matter about the entry for verhindern that must be sorted out first.
This brings us to what is for us the most important respect in which verhindern differs
from behindern. This difference has to do with what might be called the ‘privative’ di-
give a verbal description of an given episode. (For the distinction between internal and external viewpoint
see Smith, 1991).
19Sie haben Lafontaine verhindert (lit.: ‘They prevented Lafontaine’) can be used to say that they pre-
vented Lafontaine from becoming prime minister, but could hardly be used to describe a situation in which
he is forced to abandon some goal-directed activity, such as the painting of his garden fence, in mid-stream,
so that the painting job remains incomplete.
20In English you can say ‘He prevented himself from ...’. But no corresponding construction is possible
for verhindern.
21Arguably, even the physical object interpretation is not fully excluded in (1)c. It seems just about
possible to say ’Sie verhinderten den Zaun’ (‘They prevented the fence.’) with the intended meaning that
they prevented the planned erection of the fence. This is similar to the case of Lafontaine mentioned in the
one but last footnote.
We believe that the interpretation of theme phrases of verhindern of the sorts at issue here (those that
denote neither events nor states) are best dealt with via coercion of the kind discussed in Pustejovsky
(1995). We haven’t included a module that deals with coercions of this kind from the proposal we make
here. As a consequence the physical object reading of Absperrung in (1)c is excluded. This would change
if a coercion module were added.
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mension of the meaning of verhindern. The concept denoted by verhindern is ‘privative’
in the sense that ‘x verhinderte α’ entails that there was no α.22 The privative character
of verhindern brings a new complication to the formulation of this verb’s lexical entry.
The combination of verhindern with a theme argument phrase α, we have just noted, as-
serts that the event described by verhindern produces the effect that there was no token
eventuality instantiating the description provided by α. This means that the verb cannot
be treated as involving a relation between its referential argument (the event it describes)
and a token eventuality (described by its theme argument phrase); for there is no such
token eventuality. Rather, we must treat verhindern as denoting a relation between the
event that it describes and the eventuality type described by its theme argument phrase -
a relation that hold between the described event e and an eventuality type EV when e has
the effect that EV is not instantiated.23
The way we implement this ‘second order’ analysis of the theme argument of verhin-
dern is as follows. We represent verhindern as a relation between its referential argument
e and an event or state type A which obtains iff e results in the non-instantiation of A.
When verhindern occurs as part of a sentence S that is used in a context C, A must be re-
trieved from sentence and/or context. In a sentence like (1)c, in which the theme argument
is a description, it will be the descriptive content of the phrase that furnishes A. (Thus in
the case of (1)c it is the type described as ’Absperrung der Botschaft’.) Formally, the
descriptive part of the description will yield a DRS K and A can then be identified with
the λ-term λev.K, where ev represents the ‘fence off’ event or ‘fenced off’ state that Ab-
sperrung is taken to describe in the given context. But the theme argument phrase of
verhindern isn’t always a DP with an explicit descriptive content - for instance, it could
be a pronoun - and in such cases the mechanism for retrieving A will be more indirect.
We represent the need for A to be retrieved from the context in the form of an ‘anaphoric
presupposition’ (Genabith et al., 2010). (The underlining of A in the universe of the DRS
representing this presupposition indicates that resolution of the presupposition must yield
a specific type denoting term that can replace A - see the entry E3 for verhindern be-
22That ‘x verhinderte α’ can be true only if no α was realised is uncontroversial when α is of the sort
of an activity or a state. But the principle also holds, we claim, when α describes a telic event. For
example, consider the action description die Botschaft absperren (‘to fence off the embassy’). verhindern
can be used correctly in combination with this verbal description – for instance in the form of the infinitival
complement construction Sie verhinderten das Absperren der Botschaft (‘They prevented the fencing off of
the embassy’) or, alternatively, that of the corresponding -ung-noun, as in (1)c – even in a situation where a
start has already been made with the fencing off but where a decisive intervention then puts an end to it, so
that the state of the embassy being fenced off is not reached. In this case there will have been an instance
of the activity that is associated with the action type denoted by the theme phrase. But that token activity is
not an instance of the action type itself. (It is not an event that results in the embassy being fenced off.) So
here too verhindern entails that the description that is used to characterise its theme is not instantiated.
23Our proposal for dealing with the semantics of verhindern is reminiscent of that of for the treatment
of intensional verbs such as suchen (‘seek’). Zimmermann analyses such verbs as relations between the
subject and a property. (Thus the relation denoted by suchen holds between agent x and property P iff
(roughly) x wants to find a token that instantiates P.) Our analysis of verhindern is like Zimmermann’s
analysis of suchen except that in our case the subject is not concerned to find a token of the type provided
by the theme phrase but instead prevents a token from coming into existence.
A discussion of privative verbs like prevent can be found in Condrovadi et al. (2001). This paper makes
the same central point that emphasized in our discussion: the argument of prevent needs some form of
second order analysis. The details of their proposal and ours, however, are, due to differences in the general
representational/logical form formalisms employed quite different.
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low.) Our statement of this presupposition will be incomplete in that it fails to articulate
what mechanisms are availble for the retrieval of A in the different contexts in which
verhindern can occur.24
One constraint that verhindern imposes on A is that A be uniquely instantiated, in
the sense that it can have no more than one instance. When the theme phrase is a sin-
gular definite description and A is extracted from it in the way indicated above, then the
existence-and-uniqueness presupposition associated with the descriptive phrase will guar-
antee uniqueness of A. But the constraint seems to hold generally, and we have built it
into the anaphoric presupposition for A.
(E3) verhindern
verhindern verb nom acc
(i) e x A
SEL.RES: event(e) agent(x) ∨ event(x) event type(A)
∨
state type(A)
SEMANT:
〈


A
z z’
A(z) A(z’)
⇒ z = z’
z
A(z)
⇒ ¬ x = Agent(z)


,
¬
ev
A(ev)
e < ev
〉
Among the event types that can be theme arguments to verhindern there are, we noted,
in particular goal-directed actions and also result-oriented non-agentive event types. Such
action and event types are sometimes described as ’target state’ types: with the event type
E is associated a state type S such that whenever E is instantiated by a token event e, there
is an instance s of S that is the result of e. We denote the target state relation between
event types and state types as ‘TARGETST’. Thus ‘TARGETST(E,S)’ says that every
instance e of E results in an instance s of S. We will assume that uniqueness of E entails
uniqueness of S: if there can be at most one instance of E, then TARGETST(E,S) entails
that there also can be at most one instance of S, so if e is the unique instance of E, then
the unique instance of S will be the state that e results in.
The predicate ‘TARGETST’ enables us to state the Meaning Postulate that connects
interpretations of verhindern in which the theme argument is a ‘target state event type’
with interpretations in which the theme argument is the corresponding result state type.25
24This is a general shortcoming that can be found in most current presupposition accounts: little if any-
thing is said about the ‘accommodation’ available possibilities for presuppositions that cannot be resolved
in the context as is. An exception is the extensive work on the limited accommodation options for anaphoric
pronouns.
25Stating this postulate in DRS notation is a bit awkward. But the content of the postulate is simple
enough: for the given E and S it is the case for any instance e of E and subject x that: ‘e: verhindern’(x,E)
if and only if e: verhindern’(x,S)’.
Here ‘e: verhindern’(x,A)’ is short for something like ‘Cause(x,K)’, where K is the DRS
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(14) a.
e x
TARGETST(E,S)
e: verhindern’(x,E)
⇒ e: verhindern’(x,S)
b.
e x
TARGETST(E,S)
e: verhindern’(x,S)
⇒ e: verhindern’(x,E)
(14) guarantees that it won’t make any difference to the truth conditions that get as-
signed to (1)c whether Absperrung is taken in its state or its event sense. Using (14) we
can deduce the sentence representation that results from the first choice from the one that
results from the second, and vice versa.
3.2.4 Shifting die Absperrung der Botschaft
The entry of verhindern can be used to construct a DRS for (1)c in much the same way as
we constructed the DRS for (1)b using the entry for behindern. But there is one crucial
difference. The theme argument y specified in the entry for behindern is of the type of
an (activity, action or agent) token. But in the case of verhindern we saw that it was
necessary to interpret the theme argument (A) to be an (event or state) type. This theme
argument specification leads to a clash with the referential argument of die Absperrung
der Botschaft and it is one that arises irrespective of which reading of Absperrung we
choose. Clashes of this kind - let us refer to them as ‘type-token clashes’ - are no reason
for dismissing the combination as incoherent. Rather, they trigger instances of legitimate
type shifting in the spirit of e.g. Partee (1987), Partee and Rooth (1983) – or, as we
will call this operation here in order to forestall terminological confusion, token-to-type
shifting
In the case before us the only permissible token-to-type shifts that restore compatibil-
ity between argument phrase and argument slot are those that lift the token category of
the entity denoted by the argument phrase to the corresponding type category.26 We will
(i)
¬
ev
A(ev)
e < ev
Note well: the relation ‘Cause’ is different from the relation ‘CAUSE’ that can be found in the DRSs we
have shown up to this point. ‘Cause’ is not a relation between token eventualities, but between ‘causers’
(token eventualities or agents) and facts. Here we understand by ‘fact’ something like ‘that which is re-
sponsible for the truth of a proposition’ (formalisable for instance as a pair consisting of a possible world
and a proposition that is true in it). The logical connection between the predicates ‘CAUSE’ and ‘Cause’ is
a non-trivial matter, but it is not one that we want to go into here.
26Our use of the term ‘category’ in this paper may need some elucidation. We are using ‘category’ strictly
in the sense of ‘semantic category’ and in fact interchangeably wth the term ‘sort’. Both terms are to be
understood as relating to what one tries to capture in conceptual hierarchies like those of Wordnet or Cyc
(Fellbaum, 1998; Lenat, 2006). In particular, selectional restrictions for argument slots are constraints on
the categories or sorts – as we use the terms – of the arguments that may fill those slots, and the expression
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assume that this operation is always possible in case an argument slot of a predicate word
is specified (in the lexical entry for that word) as being of a certain type category and the
argument phrase linked with that slot is of the corresponding token category. In all such
cases the argument phrase is lifted to the corresponding type level (i.e. to the level of the
type of its token category) and it is the referential argument of the raised argument phrase
that is then inserted into the argument slot. It is only after this token-to-type shift has taken
place that compatibility checks between argument category and selection restrictions on
the slot come into play.
For the construction of the DRS for (1)c the implications are clear: In order to combine
the representation of the subject DP with that of the T’ node we first need to subject the
DP to token-to-type shifting. To describe the general procedure for this will be our next
task.
The task is straightforward when the representation that presents its referential argu-
ment for slot insertion is not ambiguous and has no presuppositions. In such cases the
representation will consist of a store followed by a DRS K; the store will contain the ref-
erential argument - let us assume this is the discourse referent y - as one of its elements
(possibly as its only element). The new representation, of the type, which is to replace the
old representation of the token, is obtained as follows:
1. form the λ-abstract of K with respect to y; this results in a λ-term which we denote
as ‘λy.K’.27
2. replace y in the store by ‘λy.K’ with the subscript ‘ref’ to indicate that this term
now functions as referential argument.28
‘sortal’ ambiguity’ as it applies to nouns like Absperrung is also used in this sense. Exactly what ‘sorts’, or
‘categories’ in this sense of the terms are – by what criteria they are identified, how many of them there are,
what subsumption relations (and other structural relations perhaps) obtain between them – is an important
but difficult conglomerate of questions: we do not address these here, even though they are clearly relevant
to the disambiguation issues that are our central concern here.
What matters in particular about sorts/categories at this point of our discussion is that for us the hier-
archical organisation of sorts/categories that endeavours such as Wordnet and Cyc try to capture is in a
certain sense orthogonal to the type-token distinction that is alluded to in the term ‘token-to-type shifting’.
Both sorts/categories and types, as we use the terms here, are properties of individuals/tokens. But ‘type’
is the more general term. For instance, λ-abstraction with respect to a variable (or discourse referent) for
individuals over a formula (or DRS) always yields a term which denotes a type, but not necessarily all of
these are sorts. In what follows we will need not only token sorts (those that populate sortal hierarchies like
those of Wordnet of Cyc) but also ‘type sorts‘– higher order sortal predicates that apply to types rather than
to tokens. Thus, corresponding to the token sort predicate ‘event’ we will need a type predicate ‘event type‘
which is true of a type E iff all instances of E necessarily satisfy ‘event’. (More about this below.)
A simple and proper way of expressing these various distinctions can be given within a framework of
Higher Order Many Sorted Logic. But that is not for here.
27The possibility of abstracting over DRSs is central to λ-DRT (Kohlhase et al., 1995; Kuschert, 1996).
See also Blackburn and Bos (2009). For a modest use of λ-abstraction within DRT, which is commensurable
with the use we make of λ-abstraction here, see Genabith et al. (2010).
28The new representation differs from those we have seen so far in that its store contains not only dis-
course referents; to construct DRSs for a sentence like (1)c we also need to be able to put certain λ-terms
there. However, the only reason for putting a λ-term into the store is to have it available as referential
argument of the represented phrase, so that it can be inserted into the argument slot with which the phrase
is linked when the time for this has come. We observe in this connection that the denotation of a λ-term is
fully determined by its structure. So there is no further need for binding, in the sense in which a discourse
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3. replace the DRS K by the empty DRS ∅.
These operations transform the initial representation λy.K into one of the form
‘〈λy.Kref | K
′ 〉’, where (in this case, but see below) K’ = ∅.
Note that, as was assumed implicitly in the last footnote, argument insertion after
token-to-type shifting of the argument phrase involves substitution of a λ-term and not of
a plain discourse referent.
The token-to-type problem we are facing differs in two respects from the case de-
scribed above: the semantic representation that needs lifting – representation (7) for the
phrase die Absperrung der Botschaft – is (a) ambiguous and (b) it has presuppositions.
First consider the ambiguity disjunction ‘α = e’
!
∨ α = s1
!
∨ α = z’. Since the token-level
referential argument α is now going to be lifted and replaced by a new argument term of
the form ’λα.K of the corresponding type, the ambiguity condition has to lifted accord-
ingly - it now is to get the form: ‘λα.K = E’
!
∨ λα.K = S1
!
∨ λα.K = Z’, where E’, S1 and Z
are discourse referents representing types corresponding to the token discourse referents
e’, s1 and z. These type discourse referents replace e’, s1 and z in the store, while e’, s1
and z are transferred from the store to the universe of the non-presupositional DRS K.
Moreover, conditions which say that e’, s1 and z are instances of the types represented by
the new discourse referents - viz the conditions ‘E’(e’)’, ‘S1(s1)’ and ‘Z(z)’ – are added
to the condition set of K.
The selection presuppositions that involve e’, s1 and z also need lifting to selection
presuppositions pertaining to the corresponding types E’,S1 and Z. (This is crucial since
the selectional restrictions on the theme argument of verhindern are constraints on types
(rather than constraints on tokens) and it is against these that the presupopopsitonal con-
straints on the referential argument of die Absperrung der Botschaft have to be checked
for consistency.) Lifting of these presuppositions requires sortal predicates of types cor-
responding to the sortal predicates in the original presuppositions (those given in (7)).
Consider for instance the presuppositioon ‘event(e’)’. Its sortal predicate ‘event’ is now
to be replaced by a predicate of types. We call this predicate (which by the way has al-
ready been used in the lexical entry for verhindern) ‘event type’. So the presupposition
‘event(e’)’ gets replaced by the condition ‘event type(E’)’.
There is an obvious connection between the prediates ‘event’ and ‘event type’ that
we already alluded to in footnote 24: the latter predicate is true of those types which
are necessarily instantiated only by tokens of which the former predicate is true. This
connection is expressed in the Meaning Postulate (15).29
referent occurring in the store has to be bound at some point. (In this sense λ-terms are ‘costants’ whereas
discourse referents are ‘variables’.) This means that when a λ-term occurring in the store of an argument
phrase is inserted into the relevant argument slot, it can be simply removed from the store - its denotation
will be secure in any case. It also follows from this that λ-terms occurring in stores always play the part of
referential arguments; so they always bear the subscript ‘ref’.
29Meaning Postulates like (15) are relevant in that they enter into the consistency checks that are responsi-
ble for the cases of sortal disambiguation discussed here. For instance, the incompatibility of the constraints
‘event type’ and ‘state type’ derives, via the Meaning Postulates for ‘event type’ and ‘state type’, from the
incompatibility between the predicates ‘event’ and ‘state’; and so forth. These Meaning Postulates show
their real use only in conjunction with a formal ontology, in which the incompatibility of, for instance, the
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(15)
E
event type(E)⇒ 2
e
(E(e))(e)
∀
e
event(e)
The presuppositional conditions ‘state(s1)’ and ‘barrier(z)’ are litfed in analogous
fashion to the conditions ‘state tpye(S1)’ and ‘barrier type (Z)’.
This completes our informal description of the operations involved in the token-to-
type shifting of (7). We summarise the different operations for a better overview of what
is necessary,
Consistent with our description above of lifting unambiguous representations without
presuppositions, let K be the non-presuppositional DRS of (7). Before we perform λ-
abstraction over K with respect to α K has to be subjected to the changes specified in
(a)-(c):
(a) the
!
∨-condition is removed from K.
(b) the discourse referents that are mentioned in the
!
∨-condition - e’, s1 and z - are
transferred from the store to the universe of K0.
(c) added to the condition set of K are conditions that relate the discourse referents
e’, s1 and z to the corresponding type discourse referents E’, S1 and Z by stating
that the former are instances of the latter. We express these conditions as ‘E’(e’)’,
‘S1(s1)’ and ‘Z(z)’.
Next the following operations must be performed:
1. form the λ-term λα-K”, where K” is the DRS obtained from K via the operations
(a)-(c), and place this term, with the subscript ref, in the store of the new represen-
tation;
2. enter the new type discourse referents E’, S1 and Z into the new store;
3. enter the new ambiguity disjunction ‘λα-K” = E’
!
∨ λα-K” = S1
!
∨ λα-K” = Z’ into
the condition set of the new non-presuppositional DRS K’ (which is thus non-empty
in this case).
For easier readability we drop the primes from ‘K” ’; so we will write ‘K’ where just
now we have been writing ‘K” ’. (But keep in mind that ‘K’ now stands for the result of
applying (a)–(c) to the non-presuppositional DRS of (7).)
When we apply this modified token-to-type shifting procedure to (7), we obtain the
structure in (16).
predicates ‘event’ and ‘state’ is explicitly encoded, but not that of ‘event type’ and ‘state type’.
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(16)
〈
λα.Kref E
′ S1 Z y
′ |
〈{
event type (E’)
state type (S1)
, barrier type(Z)
}
,
λα.K = E’
!
∨
λα.K = S1
!
∨
λα.K = Z
〉〉
where K is the DRS (17).
(17)
e’ s1 z x’ s0
s0 ⊃⊂e’
s0:accessible(y’)
s1 : ¬ accessible(y’)
CAUSE(e, s1)
agent(x’)
Agent(e’) = x’
embassy(y’)
E’(e’) S1(s1) Z(z)
3.2.5 Completing the DRS construction for (1)c
At last we return to the DRS construction for (1)c. (18) gives the representation for the T’
node of the syntactic tree for this sentence.
(18)
〈
tref e |
〈{
event(e) ,
agent(x)
∨ event(x)
,
event type(A) ∨
state type(A) )
}
, t < n e ⊆ t
e: verh’rn’(x,A)
〉〉
Argument insertion now involves substitution of the referential argument term λα.K
from (16) for the slot symbol A in (18). The result is given in (19).
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(19)
〈
E′ S1 Z y
′ tref |
〈


event-type(E’) ,
state-type(S1) ,
agent(x’) ,
barrier type(Z) ,
event(e) ,
agent(x) ∨
event(x)
,
event type(τ ) ∨
state type(τ )


,
t < n e ⊆ t
e: verhindern’(x,τ )
τ = E’
!
∨
τ = S1 ∨
τ = Z
〉〉
Here ‘τ ’ is short for ‘λα.K’, with ‘K’ asa in (17).
Consistency must now be checked between the different presuppositional constraints
on τ that result when τ is identified with E’, S1 or Z, respectively. It should be intuitively
clear that identification with E’ and identification with S1 both yield consistency and
that identification with Z does not. Elimination of this last possibility means that the
!
∨-
condition is now reduced to the binary disjunction τ = E’
!
∨ τ = S1, which means that
the sentence representation we end up with for (1)c is still ambiguous. To obtain this
representation we once again take the presuppositions as satisfied and bind the discourse
referents in the store existentially by transferring them to the universe of the DRS. The
result is given in (20).
(20)
t e E’ S1 Z y’ x
t < n e ⊆ t
e: verhindern’(x,λα.K’)
event-type(E’) state-type(S1)
barrier type(Z)
agent(x) ∨ event(x)
λα.K’ = E’
!
∨
λα.K’ = S1
Here K’ is just like the K of (17), except that the slot symbol x has been replaced by
the discourse referent x. For a full appreciation of what (20) says it is important to keep
the actual form and content of K’ in mind.
We note for later use that the local ambiguity of (20) can also be ‘multiplied out’
into a
!
∨-disjunction of two complete representations, each representing one of the two
remaining readings of die Absperrung der Botschaft. The first of these, representing the
event reading, is obtained from (20) by:
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1. replacing the second argument of ‘verhindern’ (viz. ‘λα.K) by ‘λe’.K”) where K”
is like K except that the conditions ‘E’(e’)’, ‘S1((s1)’ and ‘Z(z)’ have been removed;
2. eliminating from the universe of (20) the discourse referents E’, S1 and Z and from
its condition set all conditions involving these discourse referents.
3. adding to the condition set of (20) the condition ‘E’(λe’.K”)’.
The second disjunct of the new representation is obtained in the same way, except that
this time the argument term ‘λα.K’ is replaced by ‘λs1.K” and the new condition is ‘state
type(λs1.K’). The resulting disjunction is given in (21).
(21)
t e y’ x
t < n e ⊆ t
e: verhindern’(x,λe’.K”)
agent(x) ∨ event(x)
event type(λe’.K”)
!
∨
t e y’ x
t < n e ⊆ t
e: verhindern’(x,λs1.K”)
agent(x) ∨ event(x)
state type(λs1.K”)
We already noted that (1)c is formally speaking ambiguous according to the analysis
which yields (20) or (21) as output, but that this ambiguity is of no consequence because
the two alternatives of (20)/(21) assign equivalent truth conditions. The reason for this
is that verhindern is true of a goal-directed action type iff it is true of the corresponding
result state type. So, in particular, verhindern is true of the action type described by die
Absperrung der Botschaft on its event reading iff it is true of the state type described by
die Absperrung der Botschaft on its state reading.
3.2.6 unterbrechen
We now come to the verb unterbrechen. unterbrechen is of particular importance for us,
since it is the verb that occurs in our illustration of how inferences at the CLP level can
build on inferences at the DRS level. unterbrechen shares some of its salient features with
verhindern and some others with behindern. In common with behindern are the selection
restrictions for the theme argument: the theme can be an activity, a goal directed action or
an agent. However, in the case of unterbrechen there is a notable lack of parity between
these three categories. When you interrupt an action (such as fencing off the Embassy,
writing a letter to the President etc) then what you interrupt is strictly speaking the ac-
tivity that the agent is engaged in while trying to reach the goal of his action. Likewise,
when you interrupt an agent, you interrupt an activity in which he is engaged. Here too,
you might say, the activity is the ‘primary’ sort. One way to account for this asymmetry
would be to adopt selection restrictions that only admit the category ’activity’ as theme
of unterbrechen, while supplementing our theory of lexical and supra-lexical semantics
with a coercion module. This module would let arguments of other categories in through
the back door: for instance, the module would license an agent as theme of unterbrechen
provided the context would allow one to see this agent as engaged in a certain activity,
and to take this activity as the ’true’ theme of the verb, i.e. as the activity that is actually
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interrupted. Likewise, a goal-directed action can often be seen as determining an associ-
ated activity - the activity that is being performed in order to achieve the goal of the action
– and can thus be justified as theme of unterbrechen because the predication expressed
by verb and theme phrase can be understood as expressing interruption of the associated
activity.
On closer reflection, however, the agent case and the action case do not really seem
all that similar. Associating with an agent a particular activity that this agent is currently
engaged in is a process that tends to be situation-dependent and ad hoc. In contrast, the
relation between actions and the activities that agents engage in as part of performing
those actions is a systematic one – one doesn’t need to know much about a given situation
to feel entitled to the assumption that an agent who is trying to perform a goal-directed
action in that situation must be engaging in some sort of ‘preparatory’ activity that should
eventually lead to the action’s goal. These considerations have led us to the decision
to treat actions, like activities, as a ‘primary’ theme category of unterbrechen. Thus in
the lexical entry for unterbrechen we have adopted selection restrictions for the theme
argument which admit both activities and goal-directed actions. On the other hand, cases
in which the ostensive theme argument of unterbrechen is an agent seem the kind for
which a coercion account is more appropriate.30
One feature that unterbrechen shares with verhindern is that it selects for theme argu-
ments that are types rather than tokens. However, the reasons why this is so are different
for the theme category ‘activity’ and the theme caegory‘goal-directed action’. First con-
sider the case of activities. Interruption of an activity is always interruption of something
that is actually in progress – of an individual activity – and it carries an implication of
resumption: the activity that was interrupted for some time is taken up again at the end
of the interruption. But what is to count as a resumption? How are we to distinguish be-
tween a case where the initial activity can be said to have been resumed and one in which
one would rather have to say that the agent engaged on a new activity some time after the
first one was terminated, which may resemble the original activity in some ways but does
not qualify as a resumption of it? That should depend, we think, on the way in which
the activity is being conceived. If the original activity and the later one, which starts after
the interruption, are both instances of this conception, then we have a case of resumption,
otherwise not.
If this is the correct explication of what we understand by resumption, then an activity
concept, or activity type, must be part of our understanding of the meaning of unter-
brechen. Thus, if the theme of unterbrechen is an activity, then it must be available as an
activity type and not just as an activity token.31
30We are convinced that coercion is a genuine aspect of natural language interpretation, and we are
among those who believe that a coercion component will have to be introduced as part of any viable theory
of lexical and supra-lexical semantics eventually. But to add such a component to the framework we are
using in this paper would be a major undertaking and it wouldn’t help us with the issues that this paper is
about. In this case, it wouldn’t make any difference to what can be said about the interpretation of (1)d.
Adding a coercion component would make agents admissible as themes for unterbrechen. But since agents
are not among the possible readings of Absperrung, whether agent themes are admitted or not is not going
to make any difference to the disambiguation of Absperrung by its container verb unterbrechen.
31There is the further question whether in cases of resumption the activity before and the one after the
interruption are the same token activity. (This would be an activity stretching from the start of the activ-
ity before the interruption all the way to the end of the activity after the interruption and which has the
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When the theme is a goal-directed action, the considerations which indicate that it
must be understood as a type are quite different. The argument for this case closely re-
sembles the one we gave to establish that the themes of verhindern are types. As already
observed in Section 2, when an action is said to be interrupted, then there is a kind of de-
fault implication that it will be resumed, and a further (if perhaps rather weak) implication
that it will be completed after resumption. But we saw that the implication that the action
will be completed is easily overwritten. So, while unterbrechen differs from verhindern
in that interruption doesn’t entail that the action won’t be completed, non-completion is
certainly a possibility: It is perfectly coherent, and even natural, to use unterbrechen in
order to speak of a situation in which the action described by the theme argument phrase
is not completed. And in such a situation there is, as we explained in our discussion of
verhindern, no token action that instantiates the action type. In other words, predications
involving unterbrechen and a goal-directed action as theme are compatible with there be-
ing no individual action that instantiates the theme description. Thus we find ourselves
driven, just as we were in the case of verhindern, to the conclusion that action themes of
unterbrechen cannot simply be tokens, but that they must be types.
When the theme of unterbrechen is an action type, then there must be an actual ac-
tivity connected with that type that the interruption puts a (temporary) end to. To capture
this aspect of the meaning of unterbrechen we assume that with each action type A is
associated an activity type A’ the tokens of which are activities that are performed as part
of attempts to perform actions that instantiate A. We call this relation between A and A’
‘PREP’ (for ‘Preparatory’); ‘PREP(A’,A)’ means that A’ is an acticvity type whose in-
stances qualify as attempts to realise A – i. e. as activities that will grow into, or might
have grown into, complete actions that are instances of A. We assume that it is a general
property of goal-directed action types A that there is an activity type A’ which stands to
A in the relation PREP. So when unterbrechen is used with A as theme, there will be an
actual instance a’ of the associated activity type A’ that is terminated by the described
interruption.
As far as we can tell, the action and activity types that serve as themes to unterbrechen
come with a requirement of unique satisfaction, just as we assumed in connection with
verhindern. In particular we assume that when the theme is a goal-directed action type A
and A’ is the associated activity type, then A’ also satisfies this uniqueness requirement.
As we argued in Section 2, the implication of a subsequent resumption that seems to
be part of the meaning of unterbrechen is a defeasible implicature, and one that is defeated
easily. Still, this implicature is part of the lexical meaning of unterbrechen, so it must be
included in the semantics of its lexical entry. But because it is a defeasible part, it should
not simply be amalgamated with the non-defeasible parts of the meaning of the word.
We do this by marking the defeasible part of the meaning with the label ‘DEFEAS’ (for
‘defeasible’).
In the course of our discussion of verhindernwe observed that the agent of the event e
that verhindern describes cannot be at the same time the agent of what e prevents. unter-
brechen, we said there, has the opposite property. Here the agent of the described event
e must be identical with the agent of the interrupted action or activity.32 Concomitant
interruption as a hole somewhere in its middle.) We do not know how to settle this question.
32Actually, put in terms as general as this the claim is not quite true. For there is one salient exception,
where one speaker interrupts another. (Entschuldige, dass ich Dich unterbreche, aber .. (‘Excuse me for
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with this identity requirement are stricter selection restrictions on the subject and object
of unterbrechen. The subject must be a true agent and the object can only be an activity
or an action (i.e. an eventuality that has a true agent).
Whether the theme argument phrase of an occurrence of unterbrechen contains the
description of an activity or a goal-directed action, the predication expressed by unter-
brechen is essentially the same: in each case what gets interrupted is an activity, either
the activity that the argument phrase describes directly or an activity that can be seen as
‘preparatory’ to an action of the kind the phrase describes. In principle these two pos-
sibilities could be captured by an entry that treats the theme argument as having to be
an activity, together with a principle that allows for coercion of action descriptions into
descriptions of the corresponding preparatory activities. Here we have opted instead for
an entry in which the two possibilities are treated separately: the theme can be either an
activity type or an action type, but with the qualification that in the latter case it is really
an instance of the associated activity type that gets interrupted properly speaking.
The way in which we have represented these two options in our entry E4 below is
somewhat informal. The selection restrictions for the theme argument A mentions two
possibilities: A can be an activity type or a goal-directed action type, and for each of these
possibilities the entry specifies a separate semantic representation. It should be clear how
an entry of this form is used in sentence representation: depending on the theme argument
phrase with which unterbrechen is being combined, the appropriate representation is to
be inserted for the given occurrence of the verb. We defer the question whether a better
notation could be found that captures what is common to the two options in a more elegant
and insightful manner.
The time has come to present the entry we propose for unterbrechen.
(E4) unterbrechen
unterbrechen verb DP:nom DP:acc
e x A
event(e) agent(x)
g-dir.action type(A) ∨
activity type(A)
Semantic Representation:
interrupting you, but ..’). As far as we can tell this possibility is specific to the use of unterbrechen in
relation to conversation. It is not covered by ur entry for unterbrechen.
While we are at it, we might as well mention onoe further possibility that our entry for unterbrechenmight
be accused of having missed, and that could be relevant to the disambiguation potential of unterbrechen vis-
a-vis Absperrung. It might be thought that unterbrechen not only admits the event reading of Absperrung
but also its physical object reading. After all we can say things like (i) to mean that there were several
breaches in the fence around the embassy (or several parts of the embassy’s perimeter that the fence did not
cover).
(i) Die Absperrung der Botschaft war an mehreren Stellen unterbrochen.
(The fencing of the embassy was interrupted in several places.)
However, we ourselves cannot get such a physical object reading for (1)d, on which the sentence would
mean that people made openings in the fence. Exactly why there is this difference between unterbrechen
and its past participle unterbrochen we do not know. But whatever the reason, we just do not think that
the transitive verb unterbrechen can be used this way in the active voice. Hence we haaven’t included the
possibility in our lexical entry.
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(i) activity type(A)
〈


A
a a’
A(a) A(a’)
⇒ a = a’
x = Agent(a)
,
a
A(a) a ⊃⊂e
,


s
e ⊃⊂s
s:¬
e’
A(e’)
e’⊆ s
, DEFEAS :
e”
A(e”)
s ⊃⊂e”
〉
(ii) goal-directed action type(A)
〈


A
a a’
A(a) A(a’)
⇒ a = a’
,
A’ a
PREP(A’,A)
A(a) a ⊃⊂e
Agent(a)
,


〉
,
〈
,
s
e ⊃⊂s
s:¬
e’
A’(e’)
e’⊆ s
, DEFEAS :
e”
A’(e”)
s ⊃⊂e”
〉
We state the principle that when PREP(A’,A), then unique instantiation of A implies
as unique instantiation of A’ in the form of a Meaning Postulate.
(22)
A A’
PREP(A’,A)
a a’
A(a) A(a’)
⇒ a = a’
⇒
a a’
A’(a) A’(a’)
⇒ a = a’
The construction of the representation for (1)d proceeds in much the same way as that
for (1)c. The main difference is that this time the compatibility check will retain only
the event reading of Absperrung. This means that the
!
∨-disjunction reduces to the single
disjunct τ = E’ where again τ is short for λα.K and λα.K is constructed as described in
our discussion of (1)c. We can simplify the resulting interpretation by removing the oc-
currence of E’ in the universe and by replacing all other occurrences of E’ by τ . Moreover
we can also remove, without substantial loss of information, all occurrences of ‘S1’ and
of ‘Z’ together with the conditions involving them (‘S1(s1)’, ‘Z(z)’,‘state type(S1)’ and
‘barrier type(Z) ’).
One difference with the representation for (1)c is that the new representation consists,
like the component of the entry E4 from which it is in part derived, of a non-defeasible and
a defeasible part. It is easy to see, however, that this does not change much. In particular,
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the token-to-type shifting of the representation of die Absperrung der Botschaft is in no
way affected by it. The resulting representation is shown in (23).
(23)
〈
t e x A’ a s
t < n e ⊆ t
Agent(e) = x
PREP(A’, τ )
A’(a) Agent(a) = x a ⊃⊂e e ⊆ s
s: ¬
e’
A’(e’)
, DEFEAS
e”
A’(e”)
s⊃⊂e”
〉
For easy reference in the second half of the paper we summarise the salient properties
of this representation and its potential for use in further processing.
1. The distinction between the non-defeasible DRS on the left and the defeasible DRS
on the right (marked ‘DEFEASIBLE’) manifests itself when (1)d occurs embedded
within a wider discourse context. If this discourse context contradicts the right
hand DRS but not the left hand one, then the right hand one is dropped while the
left hand one is retained. When there is no contradiction, then the right hand side
DRS is retained as well. (That is, the marker ‘DEFEAS’ is dropped and the DRS it
marked is merged with the non-defeasible DRS.) When the context contradicts the
left hand DRS then the discourse is prima facie incoherent; if no context repair is
possible either, it wll have to be dismissed as incoherent.
2. The condition ‘PREP(A’,τ )’ in the left hand DRS indicates that the subject phrase
die Absperrung der Botschaft has been interpreted as denoting a goal-directed ac-
tion (or, more accurately, since token-to-type shifting is involved, as denoting the
type of a goal-directed action). This means that A’ now stands for the correspond-
ing activity type, the type of an activity that is preparatory to the culmination of an
action instantiating τ (i.e. of an action that results in the embassy being properly
fenced off).
3.2.7 aufheben
The penultimate verb of those in (1) is aufheben. aufheben has a number of different
readings. Two of these correlate with uses of the English verb lift: a ‘concrete’ meaning
– that of lifting a physical object, in the sense of physically moving it to a higher position
– and an ‘abstract’ meaning, in which the theme is not a physical object, but some kind of
state, typically a state of prohibition or ban.33 In addition, aufheben has a third meaning
that has no obvious connection with its two ’lift’ meanings. This meaning is captured
33When used in this second way aufheben appears to be somewhat more liberal than lift in that it can
be applied to laws - something like ’they lifted the law on taxation of luxury goods’ sounds awkward in
English but its literal German translation is perfectly acceptable. These are subtleties that our analysis is
not designed to capture.
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approximately by the English verb ’keep’, but only in its inchoative use, when a decsion
is made to keep something, as when I say ‘We keep that for later’ to you who are intent
on throwing it out right now. (aufheben cannot be used as a state verb.) Like the ’concrete
lift’ meaning, the ’keep’ meaning selects for themes that are physical objects. (These may
be of pretty much any kind, as long as they are the sorts of things that can be moved and
put or stowed away.)34
This classification leads to an analysis for aufheben according to which it is 3-ways
ambiguous, with the readings:
(i) ’concrete lift’;
(ii) ‘abstract lift’;
(iii) ‘keep’.
Of these, (i) and (iii) require the theme to be a physical object, while (ii) restricts it
to states. (The states must be of a fairly specific kind, but the kind includes the states
that can be described by Absperrung.) This means that between its different readings
aufheben allows for two of the three possible interpretations of Absperrung, excluding
only the event reading. In this respect the disambiguation of the selectional restrictions in
(1)e resembles that in (1)c: Disambiguation of Absperrung is partial; of the three possible
readings only one is eliminated while two remain. But apart from this similarity the
disambiguation problems presented by the two sentences are very different. In (1)c, we
saw, the remaining ambiguity of Absperrung is of no consequence, since irrespective of
which of the two readings of Absperrung is chosen we obtain the same truth conditions for
the sentence. With (1)e that is clearly not so. Taking Absperrung in its state sense in (1)e
leads to a clearly different sentence interpretation from what we get when we interpret
Absperrung as describing a physical object. Moreover, when this second interpretation is
chosen for Absperrung, then we are facing a new ambiguity, between the ‘lift’ reading of
aufheben and its ‘keep’ reading. So after the selection restrictions have done their work
we are still stuck with a 3-way ambiguity, but now at the sentence level.
The case of (1)e is interesting in particular because it involves the confrontation of
ambiguities that come from opposite sides - both the representation of the subject DP and
that of the T’ node are ambiguous. In all likelihood the way in which these ambiguities
interlock in this case is just one of many different forms such interactions can take. In
fact, the comparison with the only other case of this sort that we have encountered in
this paper - that of combining the lexical semantics of Absperrung with the semantics of
die Botschaft - is instructive. Both in that case and in the present one the main disam-
biguating effect is that of the container predicate on its argument phrase. In Absperrung
der Botschaft Absperrung disambiguates Botschaft while its own ambiguity remains un-
affected. (Except that the selected meaning of Botschaft confirms the entity reading of
Absperrung as a genuine possibility; this, one might say, is resolving a ‘second order am-
biguity’, between Absperrung as twofold and as threefold ambiguous.) The case of (1)e
is similar in that here too it is the argument phrase die Absperrung der Botschaft that gets
34Apparently the historical connection between the third meaning of aufheben and its second meaning is
that ‘lifting’, in the sense of physically taking away, (as in Engl, ‘shoplifting’) often leads to, and presumably
is done for the purpose of, keeping what was taken (in a safe place). (Grimms Wo¨rterbuch).
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(partially) disambiguated, while the container predicate aufheben remains strictly speak-
ing just as ambiguous as it was: each of the three readings we have distinguished remains
an option.
However, strict reduction of ambiguity is only one aspect of ambiguity resolution. For
even when die Absperrung der Botschaft doesn’t reduce the ambiguity of aufheben in an
absolute sense, surely the probabilities have shifted. True, you can lift and/or keep a fence
or wall or barricade. But that is just one way in which a blockade can be lifted, and it is
not the way that would most naturally come to mind - it is not a ‘prototypical’ way of
lifting a blockade (although what is perceived as prototypical here may vary somewhat
as a function of cultural context or individual experiences, in the way prototypicality
often does). In any case, the reading of (1)e according to which its direct object is the
embassy’s inaccessibility is - we conjecture - for most people its default interpretation.
(There probably is also some stacking of the deck when Absperrung is combined with die
Botschaft, though as far as we can tell the effects are much less dramatic in that case.)
We suspect that the probabilistic effects of disambiguation are at least as important in
the practice of actual language use as disambiguation of the strict, logically based kind
that we are investigating in this paper. As things stand we have little idea of the methods
that could be developed and used to deal with probabilistic disambiguation (in large part
because this is not our area of expertise), but we see the exploration of such methods as
both conceptually important and potentially of great value in NLP applications.35
The disambiguation examples discussed in this paper were chosen more or less at
random.36 If so much variation can be found in so few examples, collected in such a
haphazard manner, surely the full range of ambiguity and disambiguation patterns must
35Weighting of ‘soft disambiguation factors’ – factors which alter the likelihoods of different readings
of an expression without eliminating any one of them definitively – has been used in a project closely re-
lated to the one within which we have been doing the work reported here. (Both projects are part of the
Sonderforschungsbereich 732 ‘Incremental Specification in Context’ at the University of Stuttgart.) In this
project – Disambiguierung von Nominalisierungen bei der Datenextraktion aus Korpora: Morphologisch
verwandteWo¨rter’ (Engl. ‘Disambiguation of nominalisations as part of data extraction from corpora: mor-
phologically related words’) – has been investigating disambguation phenomena that are very similar to the
ones we have been considering here. The disambiguation equally concerns -ung nouns that are sortally am-
biguous. An example of the nouns studied is Behauptung (‘assertion’), which, like its English counterpart,
is ambiguous betweeen an event reading (the event of making an assertion) and a ‘proposotiional object
reading’ (the assertion as entity, which continues to exist after the event has come to its end and is identified
largely in terms of its content). The container predicate for nouns of this sort that has thus far been consid-
ered is the preposition nach rather than a verb. nach is itself ambiguous between a temporal reading (‘after’)
and a ‘propositional ’ reading (‘according to’) and these two readings correlate in an obvious way with the
event reading and the propositional object reading of nouns like Behauptung when they are the heads of
noun phrases governed by nach. The project has looked at many more factors that affect the interpretaton of
such nach-PPs than we have done here, but what we have just noted about the disambiguating influence of
Absperrung on aufheben gives a inkling of the direction of some of those factors. See in particular Eberle
et al. (2009a) and Eberle et al. (2009b).
36Our starting point for this investigation was the decision to look at a few cases in which Absperrung (as
a salient three ways ambiguous -ung noun) can get wholly or partly disambiguated through the selectional
restrictions contributed by a container verb. The verbs - those of the sentences in (1) - were chosen just
for the different ways in which they do this, with no attention to their further properties. It was only when
we set about working out the details of the semantics of the sentences in (1) that we became aware of the
complexities that are connected with the verbs in these sentences. And the ambiguity of Botschaft was
another twist whose interest we came to recognise only well after we had settled on die Absperrung der
Botschaft.
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be vastly richer. To find more of them we only have to keep looking and be prepared to
dig deeper.
As far as (1)e is concerned, the details of the construction of its (multiply ambiguous)
semantic representation will, just as in the cases we have already looked at in detail,
depend to a large extent on the content and form of the lexical entries of its words, and
the entry of aufheben is evidently a major player in this. Here is one proposal for the
organisation of the information about aufheben that we have already discussed above. It
involves a major division of the entry into the case were the theme is a state (or prohibition,
regulation or law) on the one hand and the two cases in which the theme is a physical
object on the other. A second division is then made between the last two cases - that
where aufheben means ‘lift’ and the one where it means ‘keep’. The first division is a
matter of selection restrictions, the second one of semantic representation.
Characterising the actual semantic content of a word is always a delicate matter, to
which we haven’t devoted much commentary so far. In one case, behindern, we have sim-
ply used the verb itself (more precisely: a constant of our DRS language that is assumed
to denote the same content and that we have conveniently given the same orthographic
shape). In the other cases - verhindern and, especially, unterbrechen - we have made an
effort to analyse at least some of the semantic structure of the denoted concept with the
help of independently grounded terms. The entry for aufheben that is given below is a
mixture in this respect. The ‘lift a physical object’ reading is not analysed at all; here the
English verb ‘lift’ is used as a mnemonic for the intended concept; but that of course isn’t
what one could call semantic analysis. The other two readings, however, are so unequiv-
ocally inchoative that an analysis in terms of the result states brought about by the events
they describe quasi imposes itself. When aufheben combines with an abstract theme (such
as a prohibition) the result is that the theme is no longer in force. The conceptual analysis
of ‘being in force’ belongs to the province of deontic logic and lies beyond the horizons
of this paper. So we allow ourselves the use of the predicate ‘in force’ without attempts
at further elucidation. The third reading, that according to which the decision is made
to keep the theme, leads to a state of the agent ‘keeping’ the theme. We use ‘keep’ to
characterise this state, but here too we are relying on an intuitive understanding – shared
by competent speakers of English – of what concept is meant.
We conclude our discussion of aufheben with our proposal for its lexical entry. We
leave it to whosoever (including ourselves) to use this entry in a detailed description of
the semantic representation of (1)e.
(E5) aufheben
(i)
aufheben verb nom acc
e x y
event(e) agent(x) prohibiton(y)
∨ event(x) ∨ state(y)
SEMANT:
s
s: ¬ in-force(y)
CAUSE(e,s)
(ii)
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aufheben verb nom acc
e x y
SEL.RES: event(e) agent(x) physical obj(y)
SEMANT: e: lift(x,y)
!
∨
s
s: keep(x,y)
CAUSE(e,s)
3.2.8 ignorieren
Our final verb, ignorieren (ignore, not pay attention to), has been included as a reminder
that there are also verbs that do nothing towards resolving sortal ambiguities like those
of Absperrung. As far as we can tell, ignorieren imposes no selection restrictions on its
theme argument. (And even if there is something we have missed and its possible themes
are restricted in some way, it is certain that those restrictions won’t exclude any of the
three readings of Absperrung.) In this regard, ignorieren is like other attitude verbs. Many
attitude verbs, such as denken an (think of), and also ‘referring verbs’ such as erwa¨hnen
(mention), exemplify an apparently complete absence of categorical restrictions on their
theme arguments. This shouldn’t come as a surprise, for pretty much anything can be
made into an object of thought, or into an object of mention. ignorieren belongs also to
this group of verbs. What it means is roughly to the effect that the subject is not paying
attention to something or other in the context of a certain train of thought or deliberation.
Here too, the something or other that is being ignored can be pretty much anything.
Because of the negative character of the meaning of ignorieren – the not taking ac-
count of the theme in the context of a certain train of thought, deliberation or argumen-
tation - coming up with a satisfactory representation of its meaning is a non-trivial chal-
lenge. (What needs to be represented is what it is for someone to not include an object
of thought in a given thought or thought process.) The challenge is an interesting and
important one - one of many that confront us when we extend the study of attitude verbs
beyond the narrow horizon of the small collection - know, believe, want and a few more
– to which semanticists have by and large restricted their attention for far too long. But
this is not the place to go into such matters. For no matter how diligently we represent the
lexical content of ignorieren, it won’t alter the fact that in a sentence like (1)f ignorieren
cannot make any contribution to the disambiguation of Absperrung.
No lexical entry, therefore, for ignorieren.
4 Event–Calculus and DRT
Before we start to develop integrity constraints and programs for the DRSs introduced
so far we will give a short informal introduction to the event calculus. For a much more
comprehensive introduction the reader is referred to van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005).
The event calculus was originally developed on the basis of McCarthy’s situation calculus
(McCarthy and Hayes, 1969) by Kowalski and Sergot 1986 and Shanahan 1997 and used
for high level control of mobile robots. The theoretical aim pursued with this calculus
was the solution of the frame problem in Artificial Intelligence.
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4.1 Linguistic Motivation
Consider the following short piece of discourse:
(24) It was hot. Jean took off his sweater.
We naturally understand that the eventuality expressed by the second sentence is included
in the temporal profile of the eventuality expressed by the first sentence. In order to
establish this temporal overlap one could intuitively argue as follows:
(25) World knowledge contains no link to the effect that taking off one’s sweater
changes the temperature. Since it is hot at some time before now, the state hot
must either hold initially or must have been initiated at some time t. The latter
requires an event, which is however not given by the discourse. Therefore hot
holds initially. Similarly no terminating event is mentioned, so that hot extends
indefinitely, and it follows that the event described by the second sentence must
be positioned inside the temporal profile of hot.
The event calculus is meant to formalize this kind of argumentation. Note the follow-
ing important feature of the above argument. Several steps use a non–monotonic inference
scheme. For instance the conclusion that the state hot holds initially is derived from the
observation that the discourse does not mention an initiating event. From this observation
we conclude that there is no initiating event, leaving only the possibility that hot holds
initially. A second feature of this reasoning involves the principle of inertia. If a state –
hot in our example – is not forced to change under the impact of an event it is assumed to
remain unchanged. This is the principle of inertia, which is axiomatized by the axioms of
the event calculus.
This specific kind of non–monotonicity is intimately linked to the event calculus as
a planning formalism. Planning is defined as setting a goal and devising a sequence of
actions that will achieve that goal, taking into account events in the world, and properties
of the world and the agents. Now given a goal G and circumstances C under which G can
be achieved it does not follow in a strict sense that G can be achieved under C plus some
additional circumstances D. In this sense a planning system requires a non-monotonic
formalism.
A close connection between planning and linguistic processing is established by as-
suming that a sentence S is considered as a goal (make S true) to be achieved by updating
the discourse model. This means that we can model understanding a sentence in a dis-
course as such a goal. The goal is to make a sentence – as part of a discourse – true by
accommodating those facts necessary for establishing the truth of the sentence. This is
one of the leading ideas of DRT. In example (24) the first sentence provides a discourse
model which is updated to make the second sentence true unless it is forced to give up
essential parts by explicit information incompatible with it.
We will now procceed to describe the event calculus a bit more formally. We start
with the language of the event calculus.
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4.2 The language of the event calculus
Formally the event calculus is a many-sorted first order logic. The sorts include event
types, fluents (time-dependent properties, such as activities), real numbers, and individu-
als. We also allow terms for fluent-valued and event type-valued functions.
The event calculus was devised to formally model two notions of change, instantanous
change – such as two balls colliding – and continuous change – for instance the acceler-
ation of a body in a gravitational field. A first series of primitive predicates is used for
modelling instantaneous change.
(26) Initially(f)
(27) Happens(e, t)
(28) Initiates(e, f, t)
(29) Terminates(e, f, t)
The intended meaning of these predicates is more or less self-explanatory. The pred-
icate Initially(f) takes as its argument a fluent and says that f holds at the beginning
of a scenario. Happens(e, t) holds if event type e happens at time point or interval t.
The event calculus allows to interpret t as a point or as an interval. Initiates(e, f, t) says
that event type e causes f to be true strictly after t; i.e. f does not hold at t. Finally
Terminates(e, f, t) expresses that f holds at t and that e causes f not to hold after t.
The next two predicates are used to formalize continuous change.
(30) Trajectory(f1, t, f2, d)
(31) Releases(e, f, t)
The 4–place predicate Trajectory(f1, t, f2, d) measures the change of f2 under the
force f1 in the interval from t to t + d. Linguistically it is very close to the notion of
incremental theme (see for instance Krifka, 1989; Dowty, 1991). One may think of f1
as an activity which acts on f2. Dowty uses mowing a lawn in order to explicate the
notion incremental theme. In Dowty’s example f1 is the mowing activity and f2 the
changing state of the lawn under this activity. The fluent f2 should therefore be considered
a parameterized partial object; in Dowty’s example the state of the lawn after d time
steps of the ongoing activity mowing. The axioms of the event calculus then provide
the homomorphism between the ongoing activity and the resulting (partial) state – the
partially mowed lawn – as required by Dowty.
The Releases(e, f, t) predicate is necessary for reconciling the two notions of change
formalized by the event calculus. Without this predicate the axioms would immediately
produce an inconsistency. Intuitively the Releases–predicate says that after event e hap-
pened f is no longer subject to the principle of inertia. This allows f to change continu-
ously. Consider a scenario of filling a bucket with water. Event type tap–on releases the
parametrized fluent height(x) that measures the continously changing level of the water
in the bucket from the principle of inertia.
The Clipped–predicate of the calculus expresses that an event either terminating fluent
f or releasing this fluent from the principle of inertia occurred between times t1 and t2.
(32) Clipped(t1, f, t2)
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The last predicate states that fluent f is true at time t.
(33) HoldsAt(f, t)
‘HoldsAt’ should be considered a truth predicate although the axioms of the event calculus
don’t contain the characteristic truth axiom, i.e.
HoldsAt(φ, t)↔ φ(t)
where φ is a name for formula φ. More formal machinery is necessary to transform
HoldsAt into a truth predicate satiyfying the cahracteristic truth axiom. We will resume
the discussion of this topic in section 4.5.
In the next section we will introduce the axioms of the event calculus in an informal
way and motivate their use by way of the above reasoning example (25). Appendix I
contains a complete (formal) list of the axioms.
4.3 Axiomatization
In this section we will show how the axioms of the event calculus constrain the meanings
of the basic predicates and how they formalize the principle of inertia. Moreover we will
illustrate how the concept of the completion of a program helps to implement the intutive
idea that events that are not required to happen by a narrative are assumed not to occur.
We will demonstrate that this strategy forces the reasoning to be non–monotonic. Let us
start with an informal example.
(34) If a fluent f holds initially or has been initiated by some event occurring at time
t and no event terminating f has occurred between t and t′ > t, then f holds at t′,
(here > indicates the temporal precedence relation).
It is clear that this axiom embodies a law of inertia since if no f -related event occurs
then f will be true indefinitely. In the reasoning of example (25) this axiom was used for
instance when we concluded from the fact that no terminating event for hot is mentioned
that this state holds indefinitely with regard to the story told so far. But this was not
the only reasoning principle we applied. From the fact that no terminating event was
mentioned in the short discourse we conclude that none occurred. The axioms of the
calculus per se don’t allow such a conclusion. We want a strengthening of the assumptions
in which only those events occur which are explicitly mentioned in the discourse. In this
sense understanding discourses is closely linked to closed world reasoning37. There are
many techniques for formalizing this kind of reasoning; one is circumscription (for a good
overview see Lifschitz, 1994). In this paper, however, we use the notion of the completion
of a logic program. The advantage of logic programming is that these techniques allow
us to compute discourse models via fix point constructions.
Let us be slightly more formal. The informal principle (34) is given by the combina-
tion of the following two axioms. These are axioms 1 and 3 of the official axiomatization
in Appendix I.
37A typical example of this kind of closed world reasoning is provided by (train) schedules. If the
schedule mentiones the departure of a train from Stuttgart to Tu¨bingen at 10.15 and the next at 11.01 one
assumes that there will be no train leaving Stuttgart between 10.15 and 11.01.
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1. Initially(f) → HoldsAt(f, 0)
2. Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) ∧ t < t
′
∧ ¬Clipped(t, f, t
′
)→ HoldsAt(f, t
′
)
The most important feature to notice here is that the head – the part to the right of
the implication sign – consists of a simple atom, and the body – the part to the left of the
implication sign – of a combination of formulas from two languages. The first language
is the language of the event calculus and the second language is the first order language
of the reals, i.e. of the structure (R, 0, 1,+, ·, <). This means that the axioms are clauses
of a constraint logic program. The formulas of the second language, such as t < t
′
, are
the constraints of the constraint logic program. They are used to compute the time profile
of the predicates of the event calculus. All variables in the clauses of logic programs are
supposed to be universally quantified.
The completion of a program is a strengthening of it which explicitly expresses that the
predicates occurring in the program have extensions that are as small as possible. Before
we apply the method of completion to the examples on which we focus in this paper, we
indicate how it works at the hand of a very simple program taken from Nienhuys-Cheng
and de Wolf (1997).
(35) a. Prof(confucius) (Confucius is a professor.)
b. Prof(socrates) (Sokrates is a professor.)
c. ¬Prof(y) → Student(y) (Every person who is not a professor is a stu-
dent.)
The program involves two predicates, professor and student. The programming for-
malism is set up in such a way that it is only possible to make positive statements about
the extensions of predicates. Thus (35) states about the predicate professor that confucius
belongs to its extension (35a) and also that sokrates belongs to its extension (35b); and
these are all the definite claims the program makes about the extension of this predicate.
The completion of the program ought to make this intuition concrete by stating explicitly
that the extension of professor consists just of these two individuals. We accomplish this
by forming the disjunction of the formulas x = confucius and x = socrates, where x is
a new variable, which intuitively plays the role of an arbitrary member of the extension of
professor, and making this disjunction into the antecedent of the following implication:
(36) x = confucius ∨ x = socrates→ Prof(x)
In the next step we universally quantify over the variable x and strengthen the implication
to a bi–implication. The result is:
∀x(x = confucius ∨ x = socrates↔ Prof(x))
This formula now says that the set of professors just consists of Confucius and Socrates.
Under the assumption that Confucius and Socrates are the only individuals in the model
we get that the set of students is empty. But assume now that the language in which
the program is formulated contains an additional individual constant plato interpreted by
an element of the universe of discourse. Assume further that socrates 6= confucius 6=
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plato
38. Then (36) implies that plato is not a professor. Now consider the third clause of
program (35). A similar procedure applied to this clause yields:
(37) ∀x(Student(x) ↔ ¬Prof(x))39
Formula (37) implies that Plato is a student. The conjunction of (36) and (37) is the
completion of program (35). This completion implies that Confucius and Socrates are
the only professors and that Plato is a student. The program itself does not support such
strong conclusions. A similar observation applies to certain extensions of (35) that bring
additional entities into play. For instance suppose that we add to (35) the fact beard(plato),
which states that Plato has a beard. A minimal model for the completion of the extended
program will have the universe {confucius, socrates, plato}. In this model Plato is not
a professor, but the only student and the only one with a beard.
Let us now give a simple example with events. Consider a description of a situation
where the light is switched on at 1 in the night and switched off at 7 in the morning and
given by the following program:
(38) a. Happens(switch-on, 1)
b. Happens(switch-off , 7)
The uncompleted program does not yet imply that the light wasn’t switched off at 2
in the night and switched on at 3 in the night and so on. However, these events should not
occur in the minimal model of program (38). The completion of the program is given by
∀e(Happens(e, t)↔ (e = switch-on ∧ t = 1) ∨ (e = switch-off ∧ t = 7))
This formula means the same as:
∀e(Happens(e, t)↔ (Happens(switch-on, 1) ∨ (Happens(switch-off , 7))
Any intervening events are thereby excluded.
This illustrates how the concept of the completion of a program helps to implement
the intuitive idea that events that are not required to happen by a narrative are assumed
not to occur. Note that this strategy forces the reasoning to be non–monotonic. We could
easily enrich program (38) with clauses Happens(switch-off, 2) and Happens(switch-on,
3). From the modified program the conclusion that there are no events happening between
Happens(switch-on, 1) and Happens(switch-off, 7) are now no longer derivable.
To sum up: Understanding a sentence in a discourse is like computing a minimal
model of the discourse in which the sentence is true. This computation is based on the
completion of a constraint logic program for the discourse under discussion. In the next
section we will see, however, that this aim cannot be achieved by the technical means
inroduced so far.
38This is an instance of the uniqueness of names assumption.
39This is technically not quite correct. The formula produced by the official algorithm for computing the
completion of a program is:
∀x(Student(x) ↔ ∃y(x = y ∧ ¬Prof(y)))
But for the simple example discussed above this difference does not matter. The official formula and (37)
are equivalent.
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4.4 Integrity Constraints
As pointed out above, the variables in the clauses of logic programs are universally quan-
tified. Therefore logic programs are restricted to provide universal information only. This
is clearly not sufficient for our purpose. For example tense requires existential informa-
tion (see the example below) and DRSs in general introduce existential information. We
will use here a device from database theory – integrity constraints – to obtain the required
additional information. In database theory integrity constraints are means to ensure that a
database stays consistent under updates. In this paper we will use integrity constraints in
a slightly different way; we employ them as means to update a discourse model. Let us
explain this idea with a simple example, of an English sentence in the perfect.
(39) I have caught the flu.
This sentence says that I have the flu now and world knowledge tells us that there was
an infection event in the past. Let flu be the fluent corresponding to having the flu and
let e be the infection event. Our knowledge is thus formalized by the following program
clause.
Initiates(e, f lu, t)
As already said we view a sentence S as a goal (make S true) to be achieved by
updating the discourse model. In general it isn’t possible, however, to simply add this
information to the discourse model without further ado. There are two reasons for this.
First, we would like the updated discourse model to include explicitly all the events that
must have occurred in order for the total information represented by it to be true. And,
second, when spelling out what that comes to reveals a conflict, then that should mean
that the new sentence cannot make a coherent contribution to the discourse as the starting
model represents it. It is therefore important that we do not just add the condition that
I have the flu now, but also the event that must have led to this state of affairs. The
formalisation of the event calculus given earlier offers a systematic way of doing this. In
the present instance what needs to be inferred from HoldsAt(flu, now) is that there was
an earlier event e initiating flu, something that is expressed in the present formalism by
the clauses Initiates(e, f lu, , t), Happens(e, t) and t < now.
We will now show how this reasoning applies to example (39). For this purpose as-
sume that a discourse model is given as a collection of facts concerning events and fluents
and assume that sentence (39) is formalized as HoldsAt(flu, now). We do not take this
formula as a program clause but as an instruction to construct a minimal adaptation of the
discourse model in which HoldsAt(flu, now) is true. In order to detect the events that
must have occurred for HoldsAt(flu, now) to be true we apply abductive reasoning us-
ing the basic program constituted by the axioms of our formulation of the event calculus,
as well as, possibly, additional axioms that capture aspects of world knowledge. To this
end we use HoldsAt(flu, now) as the trigger that sets this reasoning process in motion.
Informally the reasoning is as follows. We know that fluent flu is initiated by some event
e. No terminating event has been mentioned. Therefore we conclude by closed world
reasoning that no such event occurred. Consider again axiom (34) repeated here as (40).
(40) If a fluent holds initially or has been initiated by some event occurring at time t
and no event terminating f has occurred between t and t′ > t, then f holds at t′.
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According to this axiom, to establish the truth of HoldsAt(f, now) there is only one
fact missing. We have to addHappens(e, t), t < now and its logical consequences to the
discourse model. This is sufficient to guarantee the truth of HoldsAt(flu, now)40.
Let us now be a little bit more formal and see how this update is steered by the proof
system of logic programming, which is called resolution. Resolution can be regarded as a
species of abductive reasoning in which a premise is matched with the heads of all clauses
with which it can be matched and the abductive inference is then drawn that the matching
instantiation of at least one of the bodies of those clauses must hold. Note the obvious
connection between this type of inference and the concept of program completion. We
start with the query ?HoldsAt(flu, now). Applying Axiom 3 – repeated below as (41) –
the query reduces to the new query
?Initiates(e, f lu, t)
¬Clipped(t, f lu, t
′
)
Happens(e, t), t < now
(41) Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) ∧ t < t
′
∧ ¬Clipped(t, f, t
′
)→ HoldsAt(f, t
′
)
The first clause can be resolved, since Initiates(e, f lu, t) is given. For the second
query we have to use a form of resolution for negated queries. This means that we set up
a new derivation with the positive query
? Clipped(t, f lu, t
′
).
Since we have no matching clauses this query fails and therefore the negated query suc-
ceeds (This is the proof–theoretic version of negation as failure.). We are left with the last
query
?Happens(e, t), t < now.
Since we don’t have a matching clause for this query ?HoldsAt(flu, now), interpreted
as query, would fail (finitely). However, HoldsAt(flu, now) interpreted as an integrity
constraint leads to an update of the discourse model with the missing clause. In this
updated modelHoldsAt(flu, now) is clearly satisfied. This integrity constraint is written
as
?HoldsAt(flu, now), succeeds
40There is a subtle difference between (39) and sentence (i)
(i) I have the flu.
Given general world knowledge, these two statments can be said to convey the same information: Anyone
who has the flu must have caught it at some earlier ime. But in (39) the occurrence of such an event e is
an inalienable part of the content, whereas (i) entails it only in conjunction with the relevant piece of world
knowledge. When our CLP version of the event calculus is combined with DRT, this difference manifests
itself in that the DRS constructed from (39) will contain the flu–catching event already. So if the integrity
constraints contributed by (39) are derived from the DRS, the abductive reasoning we are discussing isn’t
needed. More precisely, it will lead to constraints that are already in the given constraint set. This is
different for (i). The DRS for (i) only contains a representation of the current state of the speaker. So in this
case the abductive process reveals a constraint that isn’t present yet, and which therefore has to be added to
the discourse context with the conditionHoldsAt(flu, now).
Ontology and Inference: The Case of German ung–Nominals 47
A more general description of this procedure is as follows: Given a program P con-
taining the clauses below and an integrity constraint q we want to conclude that q can only
be the case because one of the φis is the case.
φ1 → q
φ2 → q
...
φn → q
This is a strengthened form of closed world reasoning.
A second type of integrity constraint occurs when the top query must fail. This is
important for sentences about the past.
(42) Max arrived.
This sentence tells us that Max’s arrival was situated entirely in the past, and thus is not
going on any more at the present. The positive query
?Happens(e, t), t < now
expresses just the first part. The second part can only be expressed by the negative con-
straint, which can be represented as
?Happens(e, now), fails
Since the resolution process also accepts queries beginning with a negation we can reduce
this negative query to the positive query
¬Happens(e, now)
Since both positive and negative constraints are admitted and the latter are identified by
the term fails, it is natural to introduce a similar term to flag the positive queries. We use
succeeds. So the constraints contributed by (42) can be given as
?Happens(e, t), t < now, ¬Happens(e, now) succeeds
We will say that an integrity constraint IC is satisfiable if it can be made to succeed in
case it is positive, and can be made to fail in case it is negative.
4.5 Reification
DRSs will in general contain not only (discourse referents for) events, but also for states.
The version of CLP we have presented so far differs in that it has variables for events but
not for states. This gap can be filled by expanding our version of CLP with a reification
component. This component makes it possible to associate a ‘res’ with each condition.
In particular, it will enable us to associate with each condition of the form HoldsAt(f, t)
an entity that can be regarded as the state of the fluent f obtaining41. The reification
procedure is based on a method due to S. Feferman.
41Reification can be put to many other uses as well, but this is the one for which we need it here.
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We will explain briefly how this works. For this purpose we will enrich the event
calculus with a specialization of the theory of truth and abstraction in Feferman (1984)42.
Consider the predicate burn(x, y, t) where t is a parameter for time. Feferman’s sys-
tem allows to form terms from this predicate in two different ways. The first possiblity
is to existentially bind t and construct the term ∃t.burn[x, y, t]. The square brackets are
used here as a notational device to indicate that ∃t.burn[x, y, t] is a term and not a predi-
cate any more. The second possibility is to abstract over the temporal parameter and form
the term burn[x, y, tˆ]. Informally burn[x, y, tˆ] should be understood as the set of times
at which burn(x, y, t) is true. But note that burn[x, y, tˆ] is a term and therefore denotes
an object. Feferman’s system thus provides two different kinds of structured abstract ob-
jects. Intuitively we want to think of ∃t.burn[x, y, t] as the event type corresponding to
x’s burning of y and of burn[x, y, tˆ] as the fluent or state corresponding to x’s burning
y43. However nothing in the formal set up so far tells us that ∃t.burn[x, y, t] is an event
type and burn[x, y, tˆ] is a fluent. In order to make sure that burn[x, y, tˆ] behaves as a
fluent HoldsAt has to be turned into a real truth predicate. The following theorem from
Feferman (1984) provides the necessary technical result.
Theorem 1 Any system that is consistent – in the sense that it has a model – can be
extended to a system with truth axioms44. The extension is conservative over the original
system.
For the special theory under discussion here we need just one truth axiom, which reads
as follows:
HoldsAt(φ[tˆ], s)↔ φ(s)
The specialization for burn[x, y, tˆ] therefore is:
HoldsAt(burn[x, y, tˆ], s)↔ burn(x, y, s)
This shows that burn[x, y, tˆ] behaves like a fluent. Moreover, ∃t.burn[x, y, t] cannot
be substituted as an argument of the HoldsAt–predicate, but it can be substituted as an
argument of the Happens–predicate. Hence, with regard to the axioms of the event calcu-
lus, abstract terms like ∃t.burn[x, y, t] function as event types and terms like burn[x, y, tˆ]
as fluents.
To see what this process of reification adds to the representations developed so far
consider again sentence (39), here repeated as (43).
(43) I have caught the flu.
The structure of this sentence was represented by the simple fluent flu in the derivation
of Section 4.4. For the purposes of this section this representation was sufficient. How-
ever, we would like to have access to the internal structure of sentence (43) as well. For
simplicity we will assume that the personal pronoun I is represented by the individual
42For the most recent version of this theory see Feferman (2008).
43For an analysis of these different types of English gerunds see van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005),
chapter 12.
44A model for the event calculus was constructed in van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005).
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constant i. Under this assumption sentence (43) can be formalized as the structured fluent
flu[i, tˆ]. This representation allows us to have access to the subject of the sentence. We
will see in a moment that the possibility to structure fluent and event type objects is an
indispensible prerequisite for the transformation of DRSs to integrity constraints.
5 Programs and Integrity Constraints for DRSs
5.1 An Integrity Constraint for a Simple DRS
In this section we will outline the connection between DRT and EC with the simplest
example from Hamm et al. (2006). Consider again sentence (44).
(44) Max arrived.
The DRS for this sentence is:
m t e
Max(m) t < n e ⊆ t
e : arrive(m)
Since DRSes introduce existential presuppositions which have to be accommodated
integrity constraints are the appropriate means to represent their inferential potential. First
we assume that predicatesmax(x, t) and arrive(x, t) are given. These predicates will be
used in their reified forms. The first possibility for reification derives the fluent term
max[x, sˆ] and the second the event type ∃s.arrive[x, s].
It has often been observed that the simple past uttered out of the blue is infelicitous.
This tense requires that the context provides additional information such somethin like a
‘reference time’. We will represent the context here with a new fluent constant f and the
clause HoldsAt(f, t). This constant can then be unified with further contextually given
information.
The discourse referentm and the conditionMax(m) corresponds toHoldsAt(max[x, sˆ], t);
discourse referent e to ∃s.arrive[x, s], which introduces the clauseHappens(∃s.arrive[x, s], t);
n is set to now and t correspond to the context fluent f. In this way the DRS for sentence
(44) is turned into integrity constraint (45).
(45) ?HoldsAt(f, t), HoldsAt(max[x, sˆ], t), Happens(∃s.arrive[x, s], t), t < now,
¬Happens(∃s.arrive[x, s], now), succeeds
Since in the rest of this paper we will not be concerned with tense, we will simplify in-
tegrity constraints as much as possible. First we will drop the clause for the context fluent
and the negative integrity constraint. Moreover we will skip over the internal structure
of fluent and events whenever this does not lead to confusion. For instance we will sim-
ply write f for max[x, sˆ] and e for ∃s.arrive[x, s]. Given these assumptions integrity
constraint (45) now reads:
(46) ?HoldsAt(f, t), Happens(e, t), t < now, succeeds
This is certainly not completely adequate but the topics to be discussed in the rest of
this paper will not be affected by this simplification.
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5.2 Scenarios and Hierarchical Planning
In this section we will start our discussion of more complex examples. The first one is the
verb absperren. So far nothing was said about Aktionsart. According to van Lambalgen
and Hamm (2005) every Aktionsart determines a specific ‘scenario’. A scenario should
be considered as a local program in contrast to the global program given by the axioms
of the event calculus. These local programs provide the additonal information for the
Aktionsarten in question, in this case the information specific to accomplishments. In
order to formulate this local program we need the following terms in the language of the
event calculus.
• construct is an activity fluent.
• barrier(x) is a parameterized fluent indicating the construction state x of the bar-
rier.
• m a real constant indicating the construction stage at which the barrier is considered
finished. Thus barrier(m) may be considered the completed object.
• 0 is a real constant indicating the state at which the construction of the barrier starts.
• start is an event initiating constructing.
• finish is the event terminating the constructing activity when the barrier is finished.
• a fluent accessible(b) represententing the state in which the embassy is accessible,
where b is a constant denoting the embassy.
• g is a function relating the constructing activity to the construction stage of the
barrier. To keep things simple we assume that g is monotone increasing.
These terms allow us to write the following set of clauses as one possible scenario for
the accomplishment verb absperren.
(47) a. Initially(barrier(0))
b. Initially(accessible(b))
c. HoldsAt(barrier(m), t) ∧HoldsAt(construct, t)→
Happens(finish, t)
d. Initiates(start, construct, t)
e. Initiates(finish, barrier(m), t)
f. Terminates(finish, accessible(b), t)
g. Terminates(finish, construct, t)
h. HoldsAt(barrier(x), t)→
Trajectory(construct, t, barrier(x+ g(d)), d)
i. Releases(start, barrier(0), t)
The scenarios for the Aktionsarten are not determined uniquely, but every scenario
is required to include information specific to the Aktionsart of the verb under considera-
tion. For the example above this means that every scenario has to include clauses about
the starting and finishing events, about the activity constructing, the state accessible(b),
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and clauses relating this activity to the state of the partial object barrier(x). Together
with the axioms of the event calculus these clauses determine inferences triggered by the
Aktionsart of absperren and the lexical content of this verb.
We are primarily interested in the noun phrase Absperrung der Botschaft. We will first
concentrate on the event reading; the result state reading will be discussed later.
The first step consists in establishing an event type corresponding to the event read-
ing of Absperrung der Botschaft. Using Feferman coding we can transform the predicate
absperren(x, b, t) into the abstract event type a = ∃t.absperr[x, b, t]. Here b is again
an individual constant representing the embassy. This is a possible denotation for Ab-
sperrung der Botschaft, but so far this event type is not related to the verb from which
Absperrung is derived.
In order to link the nominal to the semantics of the base verb given by its scenario
we introduce an event definition by hierarchical planning. The intuitive idea is that hi-
erarchical planning allows to abstract from certain details of the verb’s eventuality while
maintaining the most important features of the verb’s time profile. Formally hierarchical
planning is given by program clauses defining an event occurring in the head atom of a
clause. The following definition is from van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005):
Definition 1 Suppose a scenario for the fluent f is given. In the context of this scenario,
the event e is interpreted using f by hierarchical planning if Happens(startf , s) ∧ s <
r < t ∧ HoldsAt(f, r) ∧ Happens(finishf , t) → Happens(e, r)
For present purposes, however, this definition lacks the needed flexibility. We see this
when we try to make use of it in the interpretation of a sentence like (1c) which we repeat
here as (48).
(48) Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde verhindert.
The blocking-off of-the embassy was prevented.
When we use Definition 1 in its interpretation we get a contradiction. The details are as
follows. The purport of Definition 1 is that it applies generally to uses of accomplishment
verbs in the past tense: If e is the event described by such a verb on a given occasion,
then e satisfies that instantiation of the programming clause schema presented in Defini-
tion 1 which we obtain when the (schematic) constants of the schema are replaced by the
corresponding constants of the scenario that defines the lexical meaning of the verb (in
the way in which (47) specifies the lexical meaning of absperren). Let us suppose, more-
over, that the event reading of an ung–noun like Absperrung, which is derived from an
accomplishment verb, inherits both the semantics given by the scenario for the underlying
verb and the relevant instantiation of the clause schema in Definition 1 which reflects that
the verb is an accomplishment. Then the trouble that we get into with (48) is this. The
integrity constraint to which (48) gives rise concern on the one hand the denotation of
the phrase die Absperrung der Botschaft and on the other the predication that involves
both this phrase and the verb verhindern of which it is the theme argument. In order to
calculate the minimal model of the underlying program (consisting of the Event Calculus
together with the lexical entries for thw words occurring in the sentence) that satisfies
the integrity constraints, the constraints are made into queries that trigger the kind of ab-
ductive reasoning that will eventually lead to the entities that the minimal model must
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contain. When we apply this procedure in the given situation to the integrity constraint
concerning die Absperrung der Botschaft, then only the head of the instantiation of the
clause of Definition 1 will match the conjunct of the integrity constraint which says that
the event ∃t.absperr[x, b, t] happens at some time s. This will lead to the conclusion that
the event was finished, which directly contradicts the contribution that is made by the
integrity constraint that reflects the predication involving verhindern.
We therefore choose the following weaker definition (49) for the event type represent-
ing the ung–nominal Absperrung der Botschaft. This definition allows for instantiations
that do not involve attainment of the goal.
(49) Happens(startconstruct, s) ∧ s ≤ r ≤ t ∧HoldsAt(construct, r)→
Happens(∃t.absperr[x, b, t], r)
From now on we will simply write a for the defined event type ∃t.absperr[x, b, t]. Given
this event type we can now write integrity constraints for the DRSs constructed so far
showing how the ung–nominal Absperrung der Botschaft behaves as argument of verbs
with differing semantic properties. We will discuss the verbs behindern, verhindern, ab-
brecchen, unterbrechen and finally aufheben.
Let us assume that an event type valued function behindern is given. Then we arrive
at the following integrity constraint45:
?−Happens(a, t), Happens(behindern(a), t), t < now succeeds
This is certainly too simple. An event type like behindern requires its own scenario.
At the moment we are not able to write a precise scenario for the verb behindern. We
think that for behindern to be applied successfully the cordoning-off activity must have
been initiated and behindern supplies the additional information that this activity does
not proceed in a smooth way. However, we think that although the cordoning-off activity
is hampered in more or less serious ways, nevertheless the goal – the sealing off of the
embassy – will eventually be achieved (non-monotonically).
This changes when one considers our next verb, verhindern. Data from anaphora
resolution suggest that the result state is not initiated in this case. Consider the examples
in (50).
(50) a. Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde vorgestern von Demonstranten behin-
dert. Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhalten.
The cordoning-off of the town hall was disturbed by protesters the day be-
fore yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it is maintained today as well.
b. Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde vorgestern von Demonstranten ver-
hindert. *Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhal-
ten.
The cordoning-off of the town hall was prevented by protesters the day be-
fore yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it is maintained today as well.
Clearly in (50a) the pronoun sie in the second sentence refers to the target state of being
cordoned off introduced by the first sentence. The impossibility of such an interpretation –
45This is a simplification: The scenario for behindern plus hierarchical planning triggered by past tense
introduces an event type e which has to be unified with a.
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this is what * is meant to signal – suggests that due to the meaning of the verb verhindern
such a target state is not available in (50b).
An integrity constraint like
?−Happens(a, t), Happens(verhinder(a), t), t < now succeeds
is therefore inadequate, since it does not imply that the barrier was not completed in the
minimal model.
From integrity constraint (51) however, we can deduce that in the case of verhin-
dern, in contrast to behindern, barrier(m) – the completed barrier – does not come into
existence and that the embassy is still accessible, since the constraint requires that the
canonical event finish from the accomplishment scenario doesn’t happen and therefore
barrier(m) is not initiated. From the axioms of the event calculus and closed world rea-
soning we derive ¬HoldsAt(barrier(m), now). Similarily it follows that the embassy is
still accessible.
(51)
?−Happens(a, t), Happens(finish, t), t < now fails
5.3 Programs and Integrity Constraints for DRSs:
unterbrechen
Before we discuss the rather complicated example unterbrechen let us first consider the
somewhat simpler verb abbrechen in example (52).
(52) Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde abgebrochen.
The blocking-off of-the embassy was stopped.
Since abbrechen in contrast to verhindern presupposes that the cordoning-off activity has
been started and was going on for some time before this activity was stopped we have to
write a program clause which captures this additional information. Clause (53) defines
these semantic features of the verb abbrechen.
(53) Happens(start, s) ∧ Initiates(start, f, s) ∧ s < r ≤ t ∧
¬Happens(finish, r) ∧Happens(e′, t) ∧ Terminates(e′, f, t)→
Happens(abbrechen(e), t).
Integrity constraint (54) now computes a minimal update of the given discourse model in
which all the information required by the antecedent of clause (53) is satisfied.
(54)
?−Happens(a, t), Happens(abbrechen(a), t), t < now succeeds
We will now turn to the more complicated verb unterbrechen. As in the case of abbrechen
we have to write a program which specifies the meaning of this verb and then use this
clause to write an integrity constraint for (55).
(55) Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde unterbrochen.
The blocking-off of-the embassy was interrupted.
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A first candidate which comes to mind is:
(56) Happens(start, s) ∧ Initiates(start, f, s) ∧ s < r ≤ t ∧
¬Happens(finish, r) ∧Happens(e′, t) ∧ Terminates(e′, f, t)
∧ t < t′ ∧Happens(e′′, t′) ∧ Initiates(e′′, f, t′)
→ Happens(unterbrechen(e), t′).
Informally the time profile this clause defines may be paraphrased as follows: The start–
event initiates at some time an activitiy fluent – in our case the cordoning–off activity –
which is stopped after a certain amount of time. Again after an indefinite amount of time
a further event e′′ happens which causes the stopped activity to be resumed again.
With this intuitive interpretation in mind we can now write integrity constraint (57)
for (55).
(57)
?−Happens(a, t), Happens(unterbrechen(a), t), t < now succeeds46
But now we run into a problem. To illustrate the problem recall sentence (58). As
noted in Section 3.2.6 that there is nothing odd with this sentence and it receives a natural
interpretation, which says that the blocking-off of the embassy was stopped for good.
(58) Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde unterbrochen und nie wieder aufgenom-
men.
The blocking-off of-the embassy was interrupted and never taken up again.
However, the update of the given discourse model integrity constraint (57) computes will
be empty for this sentence; i.e. integrity constraint (57) together with sentence (58) pro-
duces an inconsistency. The reason for this is simple. The antecedent of clause (56) forces
a stopped activity to be resumed again by an event e′′, but sentence (58) denies exactly
this possibility. A way out is to weaken the clause defining the verb unterbrechen. As one
possibility consider clause (59)
(59) Happens(abbrechen(e), t′) ∨
Happens(start, s) ∧ Initiates(start, f, s) ∧ s < r ≤ t ∧
¬Happens(finish, r) ∧Happens(e′, t) ∧ Terminates(e′, f, t)
∧ t < t′ ∧Happens(e′′, t′) ∧ Initiates(e′′, f, t′)
→ Happens(unterbrechen(e), t′)
In order to facilitate the reading of formula (59) let us write unterbrechenstrong for the
antecedent of clause (56). Then we get the following simplified clause for unterbrechen.
(60) Happens(abbrechen(e), t) ∨Happens(unterbrechenstrong(e), t)→
Happens(unterbrechen(e), t)
46From this constraint it does neither follow monotonically that the construction of the barrier was com-
pleted nor that it wasn’t. However, non–monotonically, i.e. in the minimal model, we get the result that the
construction process was successfully finished. The proof of this result follows the argumentation on pages
62ff of van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005). We also get the result that the embassy is inaccessible after the
construction process has been finished.
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Interpreting integrity constraint (57) by updating with clause (60) solves the above men-
tioned problem. To be slightly more precise: There are now two possibilities to update a
discourse model. If we choose the strong disjunct of clause (60) for a situation described
by sentence (58) we will still produce an inconsistency, but now we can also use the first
disjunct which then derives that in a situation described by sentence (58) the meaning of
unterbrechen collapses into that of abbrechen. This seems intuitively correct. But now
we run into a further problem. This time the problem is caused by the updating strategy
of the logic programming approach.
Remember that an integrity constraint always computes a minimal update of a given
discourse model. A model update satisfying the defining clauses for abbrechen, i.e.
the antecedent of (53), requires fewer clauses to be satisfied than a model update for
unterbrechenstrong, i.e. the antecedent of clause (56). The consequence is that in general
the update will only satisfy the clauses for abbrechen und not the additional information
for unterbrechenstrong. This in turn means that we predict that in general the meanings
of abbrechen and unterbrechen are the same. This is clearly wrong.
However, in order to remedy this situation we can use information contained in DRS
(23), which we repeat here as (61).
(61)
〈
t e x A’ a s
t < n e ⊆ t
e: unterbrechen(x, τ )
PREP(A’, τ )
Agent(e) = x
A’(a) Agent(a) = x
a ⊃⊂e e ⊆ s
s: ¬
e’
A’(e’)
, DEFEAS
e”
A’(e”)
s⊃⊂e”
〉
with τ = λα.K’ (See Section 3.2.6).
The DRS contains the feature DEFEAS. What does this feature mean? Let us first say
what we don’t want this condition to mean. DEFEAS is not a new logical operator in the
sense that it gives rise to new inferences that would be absent without it. It is rather a
kind of test. The operational meaning of DEFEAS as a marker in the DRS for sentence
(55) may be paraphrased as follows: Take the strong disjunct in the antecedent of the
clause defining unterbrechen(e) and check whether this leads to an inconsistency in the
updated discourse model47. If no inconsistency can be derived, use the strong clause as
a definition of unterbrechen(e) and add the component marked DEFEAS to the main
DRS. The result in this case is:
47This can be done by the resolution machinery of logic programming.
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(62)
t e x A’ a s e”
t < n e ⊆ t
e: unterbrechen(x, τ )
PREP(A’, τ )
Agent(e) = x
A’(a) Agent(a) = x
a ⊃⊂e e ⊆ s
s: ¬
e’
A’(e’)
A’(e”)
s⊃⊂e”
However, if a contradiction is derived, as in the case of example (58), the weaker
disjunct in clause (60) is selected, which then specifies the inferential potential of the
following DRS (63).
(63)
t e x A’ a s
t < n e ⊆ t
e: unterbrechen(x, τ )
PREP(A’, τ )
Agent(e) = x
A’(a) Agent(a) = x
a ⊃⊂e e ⊆ s
s: ¬
e’
A’(e’)
Since these two DRSs are the most important ones occurring in this paper we will
explain briefly how the conditions they contain relate to the logic programs that are meant
to capture their inferential potential48. Some of the entries like e < t, e ⊆ t are self-
explanatory, but remember our provisos concerning past tense on Page 65. The condition
e: unterbrechen(x, τ ) corresponds to the event type unterbrechen(e) defined by clause
(60). The condition PREP(A’, τ ) relateso two closely related components of the CLP
system. The activity type A’ relates to the construct fluent (type) of the scenario of the
verb absperren (47). The fact that this is a preparatory activity – as explained in the
entry for absperren in Section 3.2.6 – is accounted for by the Trajectory–predicate in
which this fluent occurs as the first argument. The event type τ which is the second
argument of PREP is mapped to the event type a introduced by hierarchical planning
(49). The next two conditions Agent(e) = x and Agent(a) = x which tell us that the
agents of the interrupt–activity and cordoning–off–activity have to be the same, are not
represented explicitly in the clauses given so far. In order to account for this information
in the CLP approach we have to be more explicit about the internal structure of fluents
and events. This can be accomplished by Feferman coding. Consider the scenario for the
48A systematic translation of a DRT-fragment into integrity constraints is contained in Appendix 2.
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verb absperren (47) again. This scenario contains the activity–fluent construct. The agent
of this activity appears when we write this fluent in the form construct[x, tˆ]. A similar
notation reveals the agent of the event type unterbrechen(e) defined by clause (60), for
which we write ∃t.unterbrechen[y, e, t]. In minimal models the variables x and y will
then be automatically unified be a (generalisation) of the unification algorithm. When
we want to have different agents for the interrupt- and the cordoning-off-activity49 we
have to write additional integrity constraints which forbid the unification of the respective
variables.
Finally, program clause (60) reflects the DRT–entry for the verb unterbrechen, in
which the first disjunct corresponds to the non–defeasible part of the entry and the second
disjunct to the non–defeasible part plus the defeasible resumption component.
To sum up: We claim that the time profile of the verb unterbrechen is roughly as given
by the following picture:
−−−−−−−−−−−− −−−−−−−−−−− ↓
goal
By the law of inertia embodied in the axioms of the event calculus the goal-directed
activity will, after having been interrupted and then resumed, eventually attain its goal
in the computed minimal model. As explained, this is a defeasible conclusion. But in
contrast to a verb like behindern this is not the only defeasibility aspect involved in the
semantics of unterbrechen. The other aspect was discussed at length in Section 3: unter-
brechen defeasibly implies that what is interrupted will be resumed. The reader will recall
that we have represented this defeasible part of the meaning of unterbrechen by using the
marker ‘DEFEAS’. The ‘DEFEAS’ part of the meaning of unterbrechen can be overwrit-
ten, we have seen, by further information in the sentence or discourse, as in (58). In the
absence of such defeating information, however, the ‘DEFEAS’ past of unterbrechen is
incorporated into the semantics of the sentence just like the part that is not marked ‘DE-
FEAS’. That then constitutes defeasible inference number one; in our reconstruction it
takes place at the level of DRS construction. Once this defeasible inference has occurred,
minimal model construction in the sense of the event calculus then adds goal completion
as a second defeasible inference.
The conclusion of the above discussion is that the combination of DRT and event
calculus that we propose in this paper solves the empirical problems we encountered with
the semantics of the verb unterbrechen and relates the representational and the inferential
potential of DRT in an effective way.
5.4 Programs and Integrity Constraints for DRSs:
aufheben
The last verb we consider in this paper is aufheben as in (64).
(64) Die Absperrung der Botschaft wurde aufgehoben.
The blocking-off of the embassy was lifted.
49As mentioned in Section 3.2.6, there are such exceptions.
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We noted in Section 3.2.7 that the verb aufheben can be used in the sense of lifting a
physical object – for instance a crane lifting the fence which is used for blocking off the
embassy – or in the sense of lifting a state – in our case the state of the embassy being
inaccessible. At this point we are primarily interested in the second reading. To model
this reading we cannot use our defined event type a which was introduced in Section 5.2
for the event reading of Die Absperrung der Botschaft, but we have to find something
else. For this purpose let us consider the scenario for the verb absperren again.
1. Initially(barrier(0))
2. Initially(accessible(b))
3. HoldsAt(barrier(m), t) ∧HoldsAt(construct, t)→
Happens(finish, t)
4. Initiates(start, construct, t)
5. Initiates(finish, barrier(m), t)
6. Terminates(finish, accessible(b), t)
7. Terminates(finish, construct, t)
8. HoldsAt(barrier(x), t)→
Trajectory(construct, t, barrier(x+ g(d)), d)
9. Releases(start, barrier(0), t)
Assume that the cordoning-off of the embassy was successfully finished at some
time s0. This is clearly presupposed by the verb aufheben, when this presupposition
is not fulfilled, the verb cannot be applied. We then derive HoldsAt(barrier(m), s) and
¬HoldsAt(accessible(b), s) for all s > s0 on the assumption that there are no intervening
events.
The fluent barrier(m) is a material object which came into existence as a result of
the constructing activity. Therefore we can choose this fluent as the denotation for the
object reading of the DP Die Absperrung der Boschaft. Since – as already pointed out
above – we are primarily interested in the state reading we will abstain from formalising
this reading precisely here.
Consider now the formula ¬HoldsAt(accessible(b), s). Using the Feferman system
we can transform this formula into the fluent ¬HoldsAt[accessible(b), sˆ], which we take
as the denotation of Die Absperrung der Botschaft in its state reading. The structured ob-
ject ¬HoldsAt[accessible(b), sˆ] is an adequate candidate for this denotation since it en-
codes the period of time in which the embassy is not accessible. Let us therefore abbrevi-
ate this fluent in the following way: ¬HoldsAt[accessible(b), sˆ] := inaccessible(b). We
can now write an integrity constraint for sentence (64) this time not using the Happens–
predicate but the HoldsAt–predicate of the event calculus.
(65) ?HoldsAt(inaccesssible(b), t),
HoldsAt(aufheben(inaccessible(b)), t), succeeds
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This integrity constraint does not yet capture the specific inference due to the verb aufheben.
We want to conclude that after the state characterized by the embassy not being accessible
has been cancelled the embassy is accessible again. To achieve this we have to write a
meaning postulate for aufheben.
(66) HoldsAt(aufheben(f), t) ∧ t < t′ → ¬HoldsAt(f, t′)50
Assume now thatHoldsAt(aufheben(inaccessible(b)), t) is correct for some time t.
Clause (66) allows us to derive ¬HoldsAt(inaccessible(b), t′) for times t′ > t. Substi-
tuting the definition of inaccessible(b) in this formula we get:
¬HoldsAt(¬HoldsAt[accessible(b), sˆ], t′)
which reduces to HoldsAt(accessible(b), t′). This is exactly the result we want. We
therefore are now able to express the inferential potential of the following DRS 51.
50Strictly speaking this meaning postulate is not a formally correct program clause, since negated atoms
are not allowed in the head of a clause. But instead of ¬HoldsAt we can useHoldsAt which intuitively is
the antonym ofHoldsAt in contrast to its classical negation. We will have to use antonyms anyway because
we will iterate the HoldsAt–predicate in the following. Iterated HoldsAt–predicates necessarily lead to
an antonymic interpretation of negation. Readers interested in the formal details are referred to chapter 6 of
van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005).
51This DRS is obtained from the first reading of the entry (E5) for aufheben. The selection restrictions
which this reading imposes on the theme argument are compatible only with the result state reading of
die Absperrung der Botschaft. If the discourse referent s1 which represents this reading in (7) is substi-
tuted for y in the Semantics of (E5,i), we obtain, as part of the resulting representation, the pair of conditions
(c.i) s: ¬ in force(s1)
(c.ii) s1: inaccessible(b)
We take it to be a Meaning Postulate connected with the predicate ‘in force’ that this pair of conditions
can be simplified to a single condition, which says that s is a state to the effect that ‘inaccessible(b)’ does
not hold. In fact, this is one half of a double-headed Meaning Postulate which covers both the case where
the first condition predicates ‘in force’ and the case where it predicates ‘¬in force’. The general form of
the postulate is as follows:
(i) a.
s s’
s: inforce(s’)
s’: X
⇒ s:X
b.
s s’
s: ¬ inforce(s’)
s’: X
⇒ s: ¬X
An application of i.(b) and subsequent dropping of the conditions (c.i) and (c.ii) yields the DRS in the text.
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(67)
s0 s1 e x y b
Absperrungs(y,b)
Botschaft(b)
Agent(x)
e: aufheben(x, Absperrungstate(y,b))
CAUSE(e, s1)
s1:¬ inaccessible(b)
Note, however, that the theory predicts that the fluents corresponding to accessible(b)
and inaccessible(b) are related by the antonym relation, not by classical negation (see
Footnote (50)).
Let us conclude this section with a remark about the kind of reasoning formalized by
the event calculus. Meaning postulate (66) allows us to derive:
¬HoldsAt(inaccessible(b), t′)
for time t′ > t. Since we may assume that at t the fluent inaccessible(b) held for the first
time (the completion of) Axiom 2 of the event calculus here repeated as (68)
(68) HoldsAt(f, r) ∧ r < t ∧ ¬∃s < rHoldsAt(f, s) ∧
¬Clipped(r, f, t)→ HoldsAt(f, t)
allows us to derive that ¬Clipped(r, f, t) fails for some interval. Therefore Clipped must
be true for this interval. The completion of Axiom 5 here repeated as (69)
(69) Happens(e, s) ∧ t < s < t
′
∧
(Terminates(e, f, s) ∨ Releases(e, f, s)) → Clipped(t, f, t
′
)
allows us to derive that there is an event happening which either releases the fluent inac-
cessible(b) from the law of inertia – Relases(e, inaccessible(b), s) – or terminates that
this fluent holds – Terminates(e, inaccessible(b), s). This seems to be intuitively cor-
rect.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented reconstructions of two forms of inferencing that are part
of the interpretation of certain natural language sentences. The proposals we have made
give rise to two questions. First, there is the question whether our reconstructions are
right, and in what sense. Do the proposals generalise in a natural way to other cases of the
same sort - other selection-based resolutions of sortal ambiguities and other inferences
based on minimal models? And do the proposals capture what actually goes on in the
minds of human interpreters, and in what way and to what extent? To the first half of this
question the paper says all that we can say to it at this moment, and about the second half
we can do no more than speculate; we - and in this we are not alone - simply do not have
a framework that allows us to formulate or check interesting answers to it.
Ontology and Inference: The Case of German ung–Nominals 61
The second question is more general. The . inferential phenomena we have discussed
are just two of many that play a part in language interpretation. But how many such infer-
ence mechanisms are involved in interpretation of natural language input generally? This
is a question which can and should be asked not just in relation to German, but also to
other human languages. But even in relation to German alone it is one about which we
still know comparatively little. Relevant information is becoming available gradually but
slowly, for instance in studies of the inferences that may be involved in resolving certain
anaphoric expressions or the presuppositions generated by certain presupposition triggers
in certain contexts. But as contributions to the question what is the range of different infer-
ence mechanisms that interpreters may have to resort to when dealing with linguistic input
these studies can only be regarded as fragmentary and anecdotal. A general overview and
classification of such inference mechanisms, and of the ‘inference’ problems they can be
used to solve, is urgently needed – as part of an account of a semantics-pragmatics inter-
face that can serve as component of a comprehensive theory of linguistic meaning, as a
necessary foundation to the powerful NLP systems we want to be able to build eventually,
and, lastly, as a step towards a better understanding of the role that inference plays in
human information processing.
With this we declare the paper to be concluded.
7 Appendix I: Axioms of the Event Calculus
Axiom 1 Initially(f) → HoldsAt(f, 0)
Axiom 2 HoldsAt(f, r) ∧ r < t ∧ ¬∃s < rHoldsAt(f, s) ∧
¬Clipped(r, f, t)→ HoldsAt(f, t)
Axiom 3 Happens(e, t)∧ Initiates(e, f, t)∧ t < t
′
∧¬Clipped(t, f, t
′
)→ HoldsAt(f, t
′
)
Axiom 4 Happens(e, t)∧Initiates(e, f1, t)∧ t < t
′
∧ t
′
= t+d ∧Trajectory(f1, t, f2, d)∧
¬Clipped(t, f1, t
′
)→ HoldsAt(f2, t
′
)
Axiom 5 Happens(e, s) ∧ t < s < t
′
∧ (Terminates(e, f, s) ∨ Releases(e, f, s)) →
Clipped(t, f, t
′
)
8 Appendix II: The 1981 DRT Fragment
Since in the main part of this paper we didn’t develop an algorithmwhich transform DRSs
into integrity constarints we will show in this appendix how to combine the original DRT
fragment of Kamp (1981) systematically with integrity constraints and thus with the CLP
formalism. We don’t know yet whether such algorithms exist for DRT in general. The
many existing varieties of DRT render a general answer nearly impossible, but we will
hint at an extension of the DRT fragment of 1981 at the end of this appendix.
Definition 2 states which conditions and DRSs are syntactically well formed52.
52For an introduction the reader is advised to consult Gamut (1991).
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Definition 2 [DRT-Syntax]
1. If P is a n–place predicate constant and s1, . . . , sn are terms, then P (s1, . . . , sn) is
a condition.
2. If s and s′ are terms, then s = s′ is a condition.
3. If Φ is a DRS, then ¬Φ is a condition.
4. If Φ and Ψ are DRSs, then (Φ→ Ψ) is a condition.
5. If Φ and Ψ are DRSs, then (Φ ∨Ψ) is a condition.
6. If x1, . . . , xn are reference markers (n ≥ 0) and φ1, . . . , φm are conditions (m ≥
0),then
< {x1, . . . , xn}, {φ, . . . , φm} >
is a DRS
Since the predicates of the event calculus all contain argument slots for time variables
or constants we first map every n-place predicate mentioned in clause (1) of definition 2
to an n+ 1-place predicate P ∗ as follows:
P (s1, . . . , sn) 7→ P
∗(s1, . . . , sn, t)
Here t is a parameter for time. We then transform the new predicate via Fefermann coding
into a fluent. The result is:
P
∗[s1, . . . , sn, tˆ]
The equality relation in clause (2) of Definition 2 is translated analogously.
Assume now that an arbitrary temporal constant w is given. Neglecting complex con-
ditions for the moment, i.e. clauses (3), (4), (5) of definition 2, we can translate DRSs
containing only atomic conditions into integrity constraints in the following way: Given
DRS
D =< {x1, . . . , xn}, {φ, . . . , φm} >
we write φ∗i [x1, . . . , xn] for the reified translation of atomic condition φi (as explained
above). It is understood that the discourse markers occurring in φi are among x1, . . . , xn.
The integrity constraint correponding to DRS D is then:
HoldsAt(φ∗1[x1, . . . , xn], w), . . . , HoldsAt(φ
∗
m[x1, . . . , xn], w), succeeds iff
HoldsAt((φ∗1[x1, . . . , xn] ∧ . . . ∧ φ
∗
m[x1, . . . , xn]), w), succeeds
We still have to explain how to deal with the complex conditions (3), (4) and (5). Let
us first consider a negated DRS ¬Φ.
Assume that HoldsAt(φ∗, w) is the clause contained in the integrity constraint corre-
sponding to DRS Φ in ¬Φ. Let us write ¬(that(φ∗) for ¬HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ]. The integrity
constraint for DRS ¬Φ now is:
(70)
?HoldsAt(¬(that(φ∗), w), succeeds
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From this integrity constraint we get: ?HoldsAt(¬(that(φ∗), w), succeeds iff (by defini-
tion) ?HoldsAt(¬HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ], w), succeeds iff (becauseHoldsAt is a truth predicate)
?¬HoldsAt(φ∗, w), succeeds iff ?HoldsAt(φ∗, w), fails.
Let us now consider condition (4). We take again clause HoldsAt(φ∗, w) from the
integrity constraint for DRS Φ and further clauseHoldsAt(ψ∗, w) from the integrity con-
straint for DRSΨ. We will writeHoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ]→ HoldsAt[ψ∗, tˆ] for¬HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ]∨
HoldsAt[ψ∗, tˆ] (see lemma 5 on page 216 in van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005)). Condi-
tion (4) of definition 2 then contributes integrity constraint (71).
(71)
HoldsAt(HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ]→ HoldsAt[ψ∗, tˆ], w), succeeds
This integrity constraint allows us to derive:
?HoldsAt(HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ]→ HoldsAt[ψ∗, tˆ], w), succeeds iff
?HoldsAt(φ∗, w)→ HoldsAt(ψ∗, w), succeeds iff
IF ?HoldsAt(φ∗, w), succeeds THEN ?HoldsAt(ψ∗, w), succeeds
The last line is in accordance with the general definition of integrity constraint from
van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005) on page 101.
Condition (5) of definition 2 can be handeled in a similar way. Let againHoldsAt(φ∗, w)
and HoldsAt(ψ∗, w) be the clauses from the integrity constraints for DRSs Φ and Ψ re-
spectivly. This time we form HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ]∨HoldsAt[ψ∗, tˆ]. Clause (5) of definition 2
then contributes the following integrity constraint:
(72)
?HoldsAt(HoldsAt[φ∗, tˆ] ∨HoldsAt[ψ∗, tˆ], w), succeeds
From (72) we derive
IF ?HoldsAt[φ∗, w), fails THEN ?HoldsAt(ψ∗, w), succeeds
Again this is in accordance with the general definition of integrity constraint from van
Lambalgen and Hamm (2005).
It is clear that the computational semantics provided by these integrity constraints does
not coincide with the standard embedding semantics for the original DRT-fragment53. The
models which are computed by the integrity constraints are minimal models of the DRSs
in the sense of logic programing. These models are computed as the least fixpoints of the
monotone consequence operator54. For instance given the following short discourse and
its DRS55 (74)
(73) No author writes a poem. James writes a novel. Sam writes a short story.
53For precise statments of the semantics of the DRT fragment see Kamp (1981) or Gamut (1991).
54For an introduction to the semantics of logic programs the reader is advised to consult Doets (1994),
Nienhuys-Cheng and de Wolf (1997) or Ja¨ger and Sta¨rk (1998) for an overview article.
55We omit the analysis of the direct objects since this does not add anything that is relevant here.
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(74)
j s
¬
x
author(s)
writes-poems(x)
writes-a-novel(j)
writes-a-short-story(j)
the computed minimal modelM is:
M = {writes− a− novel(j,w),writes− a− short− story(s,w)}
This is certainly not an interesting model. For instance it does not contain the infor-
mation that James and Sam are authors.
However, this can be easily changed by adding the program clauses in (75).
(75) a. HoldsAt(writes-a-novel(x), t)→ HoldsAt(author(x), t)
b. HoldsAt(writes-a-short-story(x), t)→ HoldsAt(author(x), t)
Providing such additional information is the task of scenarios (local programs) which
we used in the body of this paper to describe e.g. the semantics of the verb absperren.
But we used much more. For example the DRSs contained events and conditions of the
form e : absperren(x, b). But again it is not hard to see how to formulate a fixpoint
semantics for a DRT-fraagment extended with events. Let us consider just the example
e : absperren(x, b). We first introduce an event type ∃s.absperren[x, b, ] supplied by
Feferman coding and then use clauses of the form Happens(∃s.absperren[x, b, s], t) to
express the respective integrity constraints.
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Abstract Starting off from common assumptions on the relationship between ambiguity and the process
of disambiguation with regard to the technique of underspecification, we argue that disambiugation may be
viewed as non-monotonic in nature in certain cases involving anaphora resolution. We then go on to present
a formal analysis framed in a coupling of Discourse Representation Theory and Constraint Logic Program-
ming. Concluding the paper, we also discuss some consequences of our proposal for formal discourse
semantics in general.
1 Introduction
Lexical ambiguity and its resolution is mostly only approached from an inter-sentential
perspective. Thus, when analyzing the ambiguity and disambiguation of a lexical item,
one mostly studies (i) the behaviour of other lexical items that modify or select the lexical
item in question, as witnessed by the first paper in this collection (Hamm and Kamp this
volume). Broadening this perspective in the present paper, we will argue that there are im-
portant insights to be gained with regard to disambiguation by studying more closely how
disambiguated expressions behave in contexts spanning more than one sentence. More
specifically, we will study cases of anaphora resolution involving antecedents which are
disambiguated and anaphora which refer to one of the possible readings of the antecedent
which was not selected in the disambiugating antecedent context. We will argue that such
cases call for what we term a reambiguation of the antecedent expression, reintroducing
an interpretation which was originally excluded.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss properties of ambigu-
ity, underspecification and disambiguation. We also provide an informal overview of our
approach, including a discussion of the notion of reambiguation. In Section 3, the for-
mal basis of our analysis is presented. In Section 4, we present the analysis and discuss
the consequences of our approach for formal discourse semantics in general. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Disambiguation and Underspecification
Formally, ambiguities are often represented by means of underspecification, which is by
many thought to be a more efficient way of handling the interpretational variance of ex-
pressions in the case of e.g. both scopal and lexical ambiguities. Thus, if no disambigua-
tion can take place, for instance in cases where insufficient information is present to make
an informed decision on which interpretation to choose, the underspecified representation
Antje Roßdeutscher (ed.): Reambiguation and Disambiguation (SinSpec06)
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allows us to defer interpretational decisions to a later point at which information helping
us in our interpretational decision may be available. In this paper, however, we will focus
on another aspect of underspecification, namely its role in the relation between ambiguous
and disambiguated expressions.
One standard for representing lexical (or scopal) ambiguities by means of underspec-
ification is to formalize the range of interpretations of an expression by means of dis-
junction (Reyle, 1996) or conjunction (Poesio, 1996). In the Underspecified Discourse
Representation Theory (UDRT) approach of Reyle, for instance, underspecification is
represented by means of the disjunctive operator
!
∨, cf. the simplified representation of the
two-way ambiguous deverbal nominalization delivery in (1):
(1)
〈
α
empty
α = e
!
∨ α = y
e: deliver(x,y)
AGENT(e)=x
THEME(e)=y
〉
More specifically, the representation in (1) shows the semantic representation for delivery
at NP level. In (1), α represents the referential argument of the noun phrase which is
assumed to be bound at DP level. As indicated in the first line of the condition part of this
representation, the referential argument α of delivery may either be an event or an object,
the latter corresponding to the theme of the verb deliver.
Assuming a disjunct or conjunct representation of ambiguous expressions, disam-
biguation is often viewed as a process of disjunct or conjunct deletion. Thus, the dis-
ambiguating contexts for delivery in (2) are often thought to lead to a deletion of the first
or second disjunct in the DRS condition in (1).1
(2) a. the damaged delivery (α = e
!
∨ α = y)
b. the quick delivery (α = e
!
∨ α = y)
In (2), damaged is assumed to combine only with the object reading of delivery, whereas
quick selects only the event reading.
Our data will mainly involve German deverbal nominalizations. More specifically,
we will present a study of nouns derived by means of the suffix -ung (comparable both to
-tion and -ing nominalizations in English, cf. Ehrich andRapp, 2000; Rossdeutscher and
Kamp, 2010). While all productively derived -ung nouns have an event reading, quite a
few -ung derivations additionally have state and/or object readings, cf. the examples in
(3), involving Absperrung (from absperren ‘cordon off’), which is three-way ambiguous:
(3) a. Die
the
Absperrung
barrier
wird
will be
morgen
tomorrow
abgebaut.
dismantled
‘The barrier will be dismantled tomorrow.’
b. Die
the
Absperrung
cordoning-off
des
the
Gebiets
area
wird
is
noch
still
aufrecht erhalten.
sustained
‘The cordoning-off of the area is still sustained.’
1Similar remarks may be made for Poesio’s 1996 disambiguation inference mechanism.
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c. Die
the
Absperrung
cordoning-off
des
the
Gebiets
area
wurde
was
von
by
den
the
Demonstranten
protesters
behindert.
hampered
‘The cordoning-off of the area was hampered by the protesters.’
All noun phrases headed by Absperrung in (3) are disambiguated in context: the predicate
abbauen ‘dismantle’ (3a) is assumed to select for object interpretations, aufrecht erhalten
‘sustain’ (3b) for states and behindern ‘hamper’ (3c) for event interpretations (for details
see Hamm & Kamp this volume). A simplified, underspecified semantic representation
covering all three readings is provided in (4):
(4)
〈
α
z
α = e
!
∨ α = s
!
∨ α = y
e CAUSE s
s: HAVE(y,z)
FUNCTION AS BARRIER(y)
AGENT(e)=x
〉
Briefly stated, Absperrung involves an event e leading to a state s in which the (incre-
mental) theme y blocks access to some region z. Again, the topmost condition of the
representation provides information on the possible referential arguments of the noun: it
may be an event (e), a state (s) or an object (y). For details on the logic and ontology of
disambiguiation, the reader is referred to Hamm & Kamp (this volume).
Taking the above disambiguating contexts of Absperrung as a starting point, one can
show that for anaphora resolution, a naive deletion approach to disambiguation makes the
wrong predicitions, cf. the sequence in (5):
(5) Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde vorgestern von Demonstranten behindert.
Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhalten.
‘The cordoning-off of the town hall was disturbed by protesters the day before
yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it [the state of being cordoned off] is sustained
today as well.’
In (5), the anaphora sie ‘it’ is clearly coreferential with the noun phrase headed by Ab-
sperrung in the first sentence. As just stated, the predicate behindern ‘hamper’ restricts
the ambiguity of Die Absperrung des Rathauses and fixes an event reading of the noun
phrase. However, the matrix predicate in the second sentence, aufrecht erhalten ‘sustain’,
only allows the referential argument of the anaphora sie to be a state. But if the fixation
of the event reading, i.e. the disambiguation of Absperrung, involves the irreversible dele-
tion of its other possible referential arguments, there should be no appropriate discourse
referent for sie to pick up, contrary to intuitions.
Attempting to preempt some of the most obvious arguments against granting examples
such as (5) any special status, let us briefly remark that a sloppy approach within centering
theory (cf. e.g. Hardt, 2003) does not seem to offer a straightforward solution, since center
shifting is not available if the relevant discourse referent has been elided in the preceding
context. Attempting to avoid the problem by assuming that disambiguation does not
involve any deletion whatsoever is no option (this is the “lazy” option discussed also
by Hardt), as this would predict that every possible discourse referent of a noun is always
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available in subsequent sentences. The following example, which we will discuss below,
shows that this is not the case:
(6) #Die Absperrung wurde heute versta¨rkt. Sie war am Vortag massiv behindert wor-
den.
Intended: ‘The barrier was fortified today. It [the cordoning-off] had been mas-
sively hampered the day before.’
Before turning to the formal details of our analysis, we would like to give its main
characteristics in informal terms. To account for the acceptability of examples such as
(5), we reconstruct the required result state which the anaphora sie makes reference to.
We show that such a reconstruction is possible even under the assumption that behindern
erases the result state reading of the first sentence in (5). This is achieved in a process
of reambiguation, which involves a three-step procedure of inference, reification (turning
a predicate into a term) and unification. This reconstructed result state then serves as a
suitable antecedent for the anaphoric pronoun sie of the second sentence in (5). More
specifically, the procedure may be described as follows: Although there is no semanti-
cally suitable antecedent – in terms of semantic types – for the pronominal anaphora sie
in (5), one can certainly assume that the discourse referent of the anaphor may be identi-
fied with the referent of the DP die Absperrung des Rathauses, based on the constraints
on referential identification for the discourse referent introduced by sie, taking gender
(which excludes the referent of Rathaus) and number (which excludes the referent of
Demonstranten)) into consideration. These constraints trigger a mapping from the event
denotation of die Absperrung des Rathauses to the result state, involving a non-monotonic
inferential process. The following pieces of information are of relevance for this process:
• The semantics of Absperrung, which derives from the verb absperren, involves an
object (y), which incrementally constructed in order to block access to a region (z),
i.e. the agent of the event causes a state (s) of inaccessibility of the region (z).
• The referential argument of the predicate aufrecht erhalten is of result state type,
while the one of behindern is of event type.
• The properties of the pronoun sie – its referent needs to be identified with one which
is introduced by a DP – requires a mapping from the event referent of the DP die
Absperrung des Rathauses to the result state of being cordoned off. This state is
accessible via the semantics of the predicate absperren. The mapping from the
event to the state consists in an abstraction over the times for which the predicate
holds (from absperr(e,t) to the reified absperr[e,tˆ]). This set of times
can in principle both be that for which the process of cordoning-off holds as well
as the one for which the result state holds. In our analysis, we only exploit the
latter possibility, since we assume that the predicate aufrecht erhalten ‘sustain’ only
applies to result states.
• Consequently, a non-monotonic inferential process is initiated, in which the coming
about of the result state of being cordoned off is inferred from the occurrence of the
process of cordoning-off.
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Moreover, the inference which is triggered by behindern and blocked by verhindern
respectively (cf. Hamm & Kamp this volume) allows an explanation of the difference
concerning the possibility of anaphora resolution in (5) versus (7).
(7) #Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde vorgestern von Demonstraten verhindert.
Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhalten.
‘The cordoning-off of the town hall was prevented by protesters the day before
yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it [the state of being cordoned off] is sustained
today as well.’
The problematic case in (8) is accounted for under the assumption that objects are
represented by predicates without temporal parameter. In this case, anaphora resolution
is correctly blocked, since the above depicted three-step procedure involving inference,
reification and unification is not applicable for predicates without temporal parameters.
(8) #Die Absperrung wurde heute versta¨rkt. Sie war am Vortag massiv behindert wor-
den.
Intended: ‘The barrier was fortified today. It [the cordoning-off] had been mas-
sively hampered the day before.’
Concerning the notion of reambiguation, it should be noted that the process of ream-
biguating may involve a complete recovery of all readings which were deleted in previous
context, cf. (9), where ignorieren allows sie to have a referential argument of all three
possible types (object, event and result state), whereas the Absperrung-DP in the first
sentence clearly only has an event reading:
(9) Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde von Demonstranten behindert. Spa¨ter haben
sie alle ignoriert.
We now turn to a formalisation of the above description.
3 Event Calculus
Before we start to develop integrity constraints and programs for DRSs, we will give a
short informal introduction to the event calculus. For a much more comprehensive intro-
duction the reader is referred to van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005). The event calculus
was originally developed on the basis of McCarthy’s situation calculus (McCarthy and
Hayes, 1969) by Kowalski and Sergot (1986) and Shanahan (1997) and used for high
level control of mobile robots. The theoretical aim pursued with this calculus was the
solution of the frame problem in Artificial Intelligence.
3.1 Linguistic Motivation
Consider the following short piece of discourse:
(10) It was hot. Jean took off his sweater.
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We naturally understand that the eventuality expressed by the second sentence is included
in the temporal profile of the eventuality expressed by the first sentence. In order to
establish this temporal overlap one could intuitively argue as follows:
(11) World knowledge contains no link to the effect that taking off one’s sweater
changes the temperature. Since it is hot at some time before now, the state hot
must either hold initially or must have been initiated at some time t. The latter
requires an event, which is however not given by the discourse. Therefore hot
holds initially. Similarly no terminating event is mentioned, so that hot extends
indefinitely, and it follows that the event described by the second sentence must
be positioned inside the temporal profile of hot.
The event calculus is meant to formalize this kind of argumentation. Note the follow-
ing important feature of the above argument. Several steps use a non–monotonic inference
scheme. For instance, the conclusion that the state hot holds initially is derived from the
observation that the discourse does not mention an initiating event. From this observation
we conclude that there is no initiating event, leaving only the possibility that hot holds
initially. A second feature of this reasoning involves the principle of inertia. This princi-
ple, which is axiomatized by the axioms of the event calculus, states that if a state – hot
in our example – is not forced to change under the impact of an event, it is assumed to
remain unchanged.
This specific kind of non–monotonicity is intimately linked to the event calculus as
a planning formalism. Planning is defined as setting a goal and devising a sequence of
actions that will achieve that goal, taking into account events in the world, and properties
of the world and the agents. Now given a goal G and circumstances C under which G can
be achieved, it does not follow in a strict sense that G can be achieved under C plus some
additional circumstances D. In this sense a planning system requires a non-monotonic
formalism.
A close connection between planning and linguistic processing is established by as-
suming that a sentence S is considered as a goal (make S true) to be achieved by updating
the discourse model. This means that we can model the understanding of a sentence in
discourse as such a goal. The goal is to make a sentence – as part of a discourse – true
by accommodating those facts necessary for establishing the truth of the sentence. This is
one of the leading ideas of DRT. In example (10), the first sentence provides a discourse
model which is updated to make the second sentence true unless it is forced to give up
essential parts due to explicit information incompatible with it.
We will now proceed to describe the event calculus a bit more formally. We start with
the language of the event calculus.
3.2 The language of the event calculus
Formally, the event calculus is a many-sorted first order logic. The sorts include event
types, fluents (time-dependent properties, such as activities), real numbers, and individu-
als. We also allow terms for fluent-valued and event type-valued functions.
The event calculus was devised to model formally two notions of change, instanta-
neous change – such as two balls colliding – and continuous change – for instance the
acceleration of a body in a gravitational field. A first series of primitive predicates is used
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for modelling instantaneous change.
(12) Initially(f)
(13) Happens(e, t)
(14) Initiates(e, f, t)
(15) Terminates(e, f, t)
The intended meaning of these predicates is more or less self-explanatory. The pred-
icate Initially(f) takes as its argument a fluent and says that f holds at the beginning
of a scenario. Happens(e, t) holds if event type e happens at time point or interval t.
The event calculus allows to interpret t as a point or as an interval. Initiates(e, f, t) says
that event type e causes f to be true strictly after t; i.e. f does not hold at t. Finally,
Terminates(e, f, t) expresses that f holds at t and that e causes f not to hold after t.
The next two predicates are used to formalize continuous change.
(16) Trajectory(f1, t, f2, d)
(17) Releases(e, f, t)
The 4–place predicate Trajectory(f1, t, f2, d) measures the change of f2 under the
force f1 in the interval from t to t + d. Linguistically, it is very close to the notion
of incremental theme (see for instance Krifka, 1989; Dowty, 1991). One may think of
f1 as an activity which acts on f2. Dowty uses mowing a lawn in order to explicate
the notion incremental theme. In Dowty’s example f1 is the mowing activity and f2 the
changing state of the lawn under this activity. The fluent f2 should therefore be considered
a parameterized partial object; in Dowty’s example the state of the lawn after d time
steps of the ongoing activity of mowing. The axioms of the event calculus then provide
the homomorphism between the ongoing activity and the resulting (partial) state – the
partially mowed lawn – as required by Dowty.
The Releases(e, f, t) predicate is necessary for reconciling the two notions of change
formalized by the event calculus. Without this predicate the axioms would immediately
produce an inconsistency. Intuitively, the Releases predicate says that after event e hap-
pened, f is no longer subject to the principle of inertia. This allows f to change continu-
ously. Consider a scenario of filling a bucket with water. Event type tap–on releases the
parametrized fluent height(x) that measures the continously changing level of the water
in the bucket from the principle of inertia.
The Clipped–predicate of the calculus expresses that an event either terminating fluent
f or releasing this fluent from the principle of inertia occurred between times t1 and t2.
(18) Clipped(t1, f, t2)
The last predicate states that fluent f is true at time t.
(19) HoldsAt(f, t)
‘HoldsAt’ should be considered a truth predicate although the axioms of the event calculus
do not contain the characteristic truth axiom, i.e.
HoldsAt(φ, t) ↔ φ(t)
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where φ is a name for formula φ. More formal machinery is necessary to transform
HoldsAt into a truth predicate satisfying the characteristic truth axiom. We will resume
the discussion of this topic in section 3.5.
In the next section we will introduce the axioms of the event calculus in an informal
way and motivate their use by way of the above reasoning example (11).
3.3 Axiomatization
In this section we will show how the axioms of the event calculus constrain the meanings
of the basic predicates and how they formalize the principle of inertia. Moreover we will
illustrate how the concept of the completion of a program helps to implement the intutive
idea that events that are not required to happen by a narrative are assumed not to occur.
We will demonstrate that this strategy forces the reasoning to be non–monotonic. Let us
start with an informal example.
(20) If a fluent f holds initially or has been initiated by some event occurring at time
t and no event terminating f has occurred between t and t′ > t, then f holds at t′,
(here > indicates the temporal precedence relation).
It is clear that this axiom embodies a law of inertia since if no f -related event occurs
then f will be true indefinitely. In the reasoning of example (11), this axiom was used
for instance when we concluded from the fact that no terminating event for hot is men-
tioned that this state holds indefinitely with regard to the story told so far. But this was
not the only reasoning principle we applied. From the fact that no terminating event was
mentioned in the short discourse we concluded that none occurred. The axioms of the
calculus per se do not allow such a conclusion. We want a strengthening of the assump-
tions in which only those events occur which are explicitly mentioned in the discourse. In
this sense understanding discourses is closely linked to closed world reasoning.2 There
are many techniques for formalizing this kind of reasoning; one is circumscription (for a
good overview see Lifschitz, 1994). In this paper, however, we use the notion of the com-
pletion of a logic program. The advantage of logic programming is that these techniques
allow us to compute discourse models via fix point constructions.
Let us be slightly more formal. The informal principle (20) is given by the combina-
tion of the following two axioms:
1. Initially(f) → HoldsAt(f, 0)
2. Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) ∧ t < t
′
∧ ¬Clipped(t, f, t
′
) → HoldsAt(f, t
′
)
The most important feature to notice here is that the head – the part to the right of
the implication sign – consists of a simple atom, and the body – the part to the left of the
implication sign – consists of a combination of formulas from two languages. The first
language is the language of the event calculus and the second language is the first order
language of the reals, i.e. of the structure (R, 0, 1,+, ·, <). This means that the axioms
2A typical example of this kind of closed world reasoning is provided by (train) schedules. If the
schedule mentiones the departure of a train from Stuttgart to Tbingen at 10.15 and the next at 11.01 one
assumes that there will be no train leaving Stuttgart between 10.15 and 11.01.
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are clauses of a constraint logic program. The formulas of the second language, such as
t < t
′
, are the constraints of the constraint logic program. They are used to compute the
time profile of the predicates of the event calculus. All variables in the clauses of logic
programs are supposed to be universally quantified.
The completion of a program is a strengthening of it which explicitly expresses that the
predicates occurring in the program have extensions that are as small as possible. Before
we apply the method of completion to the examples on which we focus in this paper, we
indicate how it works at the hand of a very simple program taken from Nienhuys-Cheng
and de Wolf (1997).
(21) a. Prof(confucius) (Confucius is a professor.)
b. Prof(socrates) (Socrates is a professor.)
c. ¬Prof(y) → Student(y) (Every person who is not a professor is a stu-
dent.)
The program involves two predicates, professor and student. The programming for-
malism is set up in such a way that it is only possible to make positive statements about
the extensions of predicates. Thus (21) states about the predicate professor that confucius
belongs to its extension (21a) and also that socrates belongs to its extension (21b); and
these are all the definite claims the program makes about the extension of this predicate.
The completion of the program ought to make this intuition concrete by stating explicitly
that the extension of professor consists just of these two individuals. We accomplish this
by forming the disjunction of the formulas x = confucius and x = socrates, where x is
a new variable, which intuitively plays the role of an arbitrary member of the extension of
professor, and making this disjunction into the antecedent of the following implication:
(22) x = confucius ∨ x = socrates→ Prof(x)
In the next step we universally quantify over the variable x and strengthen the implication
to a bi–implication. The result is:
∀x(x = confucius ∨ x = socrates↔ Prof(x))
This formula now says that the set of professors just consists of Confucius and Socrates.
Under the assumption that Confucius and Socrates are the only individuals in the model
we get that the set of students is empty. But assume now that the language in which
the program is formulated contains an additional individual constant plato which is in-
terpreted as an element of the universe of discourse. Assume further that socrates 6=
confucius 6= plato.3 Then (22) implies that plato is not a professor. Now consider the
third clause of program (21). A similar procedure applied to this clause yields:
(23) ∀x(Student(x) ↔ ¬Prof(x))4
3This is an instance of the ‘uniqueness of names’ assumption.
4This is technically not quite correct. The formula produced by the official algorithm for computing the
completion of a program is:
∀x(Student(x) ↔ ∃y(x = y ∧ ¬Prof(y)))
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Formula (23) implies that Plato is a student. The conjunction of (22) and (23) is the
completion of program (21). This completion implies that Confucius and Socrates are
the only professors and that Plato is a student. The program itself does not support such
strong conclusions. A similar observation applies to certain extensions of (21) that bring
additional entities into play. Suppose for instance that we add to (21) the fact beard(plato),
which states that Plato has a beard. A minimal model for the completion of the extended
program will have the universe {confucius, socrates, plato}. In this model Plato is not a
professor, but the only student and the only one with a beard.
Let us now give a simple example with events. Consider a description of a situation
where the light is switched on at 1 in the night and switched off at 7 in the morning and
given by the following program:
(24) a. Happens(switch-on, 1)
b. Happens(switch-off , 7)
The uncompleted program does not yet imply that the light wasn’t switched off at 2
in the night and switched on at 3 in the night and so on. However, these events should not
occur in the minimal model of program (24). The completion of the program is given by
∀e(Happens(e, t) ↔ (e = switch-on ∧ t = 1) ∨ (e = switch-off ∧ t = 7))
This formula means the same as:
∀e(Happens(e, t) ↔ (Happens(switch-on, 1) ∨ (Happens(switch-off , 7))
Any intervening events are thereby excluded.
This illustrates how the concept of the completion of a program helps to implement
the intuitive idea that events that are not required to happen by a narrative are assumed
not to occur. Note that this strategy forces the reasoning to be non–monotonic. We could
easily enrich program (24) with clauses Happens(switch-off, 2) and Happens(switch-on,
3). From the modified program the conclusion that there are no events happening between
Happens(switch-on, 1) and Happens(switch-off, 7) is now no longer derivable.
To sum up: Understanding a sentence in a discourse is like computing a minimal
model of the discourse in which the sentence is true. This computation is based on the
completion of a constraint logic program for the discourse under discussion. In the next
section we will see, however, that this aim cannot be achieved by the technical means
introduced so far.
3.4 Integrity Constraints
As pointed out above, the variables in the clauses of logic programs are universally quan-
tified. Therefore logic programs are restricted to provide universal information only. This
is clearly not sufficient for our purpose. For example, tense requires existential informa-
tion (see the example below) and DRSs in general introduce existential information. We
will use here a device from database theory – integrity constraints – to obtain the required
additional information. In database theory integrity constraints are means to ensure that a
But for the simple example discussed above this difference does not matter. The official formula and (23)
are equivalent.
Anaphora resolution and reambiguation 79
database stays consistent under updates. In this paper we will use integrity constraints in
a slightly different way; we employ them as means to update a discourse model. Let us
explain this idea with a simple example, involving an English sentence in the perfect.
(25) I have caught the flu.
This sentence says that I have the flu now and world knowledge tells us that there was
an infection event in the past. Let flu be the fluent corresponding to having the flu and
let e be the infection event. Our knowledge is thus formalized by the following program
clause.
Initiates(e, f lu, t)
As already said we view a sentence S as a goal (make S true) to be achieved by
updating the discourse model. In general it is not possible, however, to simply add this
information to the discourse model without further ado. There are two reasons for this.
First, we would like the updated discourse model to include explicitly all the events that
must have occurred in order for the total information represented by it to be true. And,
second, when the spelling out of what that comes to reveals a conflict, it should mean that
the new sentence cannot make a coherent contribution to the discourse as the initial model
represents it. It is therefore important that we do not just add the condition that I have the
flu now, but also the event that must have led to this state of affairs. The formalisation
of the event calculus given earlier offers a systematic way of doing this. In the present
instance what needs to be inferred from HoldsAt(flu, now) is that there was an earlier
event e initiating flu, something that is expressed in the present formalism by the clauses
Initiates(e, f lu, , t), Happens(e, t) and t < now.
We will now show how this reasoning applies to example (25). For this purpose, as-
sume that a discourse model is given as a collection of facts concerning events and fluents
and assume that sentence (25) is formalized as HoldsAt(flu, now). We do not take this
formula as a program clause but as an instruction to construct a minimal adaptation of the
discourse model in which HoldsAt(flu, now) is true. In order to detect the events that
must have occurred for HoldsAt(flu, now) to be true, we apply abductive reasoning us-
ing the basic program constituted by the axioms of our formulation of the event calculus,
as well as, possibly, additional axioms that capture aspects of world knowledge. To this
end, we use HoldsAt(flu, now) as the trigger that sets this reasoning process in motion.
Informally, the reasoning is as follows. We know that fluent flu is initiated by some event
e. No terminating event has been mentioned. Therefore we conclude by closed world
reasoning that no such event occurred. Consider again axiom (20) repeated here as (26).
(26) If a fluent holds initially or has been initiated by some event occurring at time t
and no event terminating f has occurred between t and t′ > t, then f holds at t′.
According to this axiom there is only one fact missing to establish the truth ofHoldsAt(f, now).
We have to add Happens(e, t), t < now and its logical consequences to the discourse
model. This is sufficient to guarantee the truth of HoldsAt(flu, now).5
5There is a subtle difference between (25) and sentence (i)
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Let us now be a little bit more formal and see how this update is steered by the proof
system of logic programming, which is called resolution. Resolution can be regarded as a
species of abductive reasoning in which a premise is matched with the heads of all clauses
with which it can be matched and the abductive inference is then drawn that the matching
instantiation of at least one of the bodies of those clauses must hold. Note the obvious
connection between this type of inference and the concept of program completion. We
start with the query ?HoldsAt(flu, now). Applying the axiom in (27), the query reduces
to the new query
?Initiates(e, f lu, t)
¬Clipped(t, f lu, t
′
)
Happens(e, t), t < now
(27) Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) ∧ t < t
′
∧ ¬Clipped(t, f, t
′
) → HoldsAt(f, t
′
)
The first clause can be resolved, since Initiates(e, f lu, t) is given. For the second
query we have to use a form of resolution for negated queries. This means that we set up
a new derivation with the positive query
? Clipped(t, f lu, t
′
).
Since we have no matching clauses this query fails and therefore the negated query suc-
ceeds (This is the proof–theoretic version of negation as failure.). We are left with the last
query
?Happens(e, t), t < now.
Since we do not have a matching clause for this query ?HoldsAt(flu, now), interpreted
as query, would fail (finitely). However, HoldsAt(flu, now) interpreted as an integrity
constraint leads to an update of the discourse model with the missing clause. In this
updated model HoldsAt(flu, now) is clearly satisfied. This integrity constraint is written
as
?HoldsAt(flu, now), succeeds
A more general description of this procedure is as follows: Given a program P con-
taining the clauses below and an integrity constraint q we want to conclude that q can only
be the case because one of the φi’s is the case.
(i) I have the flu.
Given general world knowledge, these two statments can be said to convey the same information: Anyone
who has the flu must have caught it at some earlier time. But in (25) the occurrence of such an event e is
an inalienable part of the content, whereas (i) entails it only in conjunction with the relevant piece of world
knowledge. When our CLP version of the event calculus is combined with DRT, this difference manifests
itself in that the DRS constructed from (25) will contain the flu–catching event already. So if the integrity
constraints contributed by (25) are derived from the DRS, the abductive reasoning we are discussing is
not needed. More precisely, it will lead to constraints that are already in the given constraint set. This is
different for (i). The DRS for (i) only contains a representation of the current state of the speaker. So in this
case the abductive process reveals a constraint that is not present yet, and which therefore has to be added
to the discourse context with the condition HoldsAt(flu, now).
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φ1 → q
φ2 → q
...
φn → q
This is a strengthened form of closed world reasoning.
A second type of integrity constraint occurs when the top query must fail. This is
important for sentences about the past.
(28) Max arrived.
This sentence tells us that Max’s arrival was situated entirely in the past, and thus is not
going on any more at the present. The positive query
?Happens(e, t), t < now
expresses just the first part. The second part can only be expressed by the negative con-
straint, which can be represented as
?Happens(e, now), fails
Since the resolution process also accepts queries beginning with a negation we can reduce
this negative query to the positive query
¬Happens(e, now)
Since both positive and negative constraints are admitted and the latter are identified by
the term fails, it is natural to introduce a similar term to flag the positive queries. We use
succeeds. So the constraints contributed by (28) can be given as
?Happens(e, t), t < now, ¬Happens(e, now) succeeds
We will say that an integrity constraint IC is satisfiable if it can be made to succeed in
case it is positive, and can be made to fail in case it is negative.
3.5 Reification
DRSs will in general contain not only (discourse referents for) events, but also for states.
The version of CLP we have presented so far differs in that it has variables for events but
not for states. This gap can be filled by expanding our version of CLP with a reification
component. This component makes it possible to associate a ‘res’ with each condition. In
particular, it will enable us to associate with each condition of the formHoldsAt(f, t) an
entity that can be regarded as the state of the fluent f obtaining.6 The reification procedure
is based on a method due to S. Feferman.
We will explain briefly how this works. For this purpose we will enrich the event
calculus with a specialization of the theory of truth and abstraction in Feferman (1984).7
6Reification can be put to many other uses as well, but this is the one for which we need it here.
7For the most recent version of this theory see Feferman (2008).
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Consider the predicate burn(x, y, t) where t is a parameter for time. Feferman’s sys-
tem allows to form terms from this predicate in two different ways. The first possiblity
is to existentially bind t and construct the term ∃t.burn[x, y, t]. The square brackets are
used here as a notational device to indicate that ∃t.burn[x, y, t] is a term and not a predi-
cate any more. The second possibility is to abstract over the temporal parameter and form
the term burn[x, y, tˆ]. Informally burn[x, y, tˆ] should be understood as the set of times
at which burn(x, y, t) is true. But note that burn[x, y, tˆ] is a term and therefore denotes
an object. Feferman’s system thus provides two different kinds of structured abstract ob-
jects. Intuitively we want to think of ∃t.burn[x, y, t] as the event type corresponding to
x’s burning of y and of burn[x, y, tˆ] as the fluent or state corresponding to x’s burning
y.8 However nothing in the formal set up so far tells us that ∃t.burn[x, y, t] is an event
type and burn[x, y, tˆ] is a fluent. In order to make sure that burn[x, y, tˆ] behaves as a
fluent HoldsAt has to be turned into a real truth predicate. The following theorem from
Feferman (1984) provides the necessary technical result.
Theorem 1 Any system that is consistent – in the sense that it has a model – can be
extended to a system with truth axioms.9 The extension is conservative over the original
system.
For the special theory under discussion here we need just one truth axiom, which reads
as follows:
HoldsAt(φ[tˆ], s) ↔ φ(s)
The specialization for burn[x, y, tˆ] therefore is:
HoldsAt(burn[x, y, tˆ], s) ↔ burn(x, y, s)
This shows that burn[x, y, tˆ] behaves like a fluent. Moreover, ∃t.burn[x, y, t] cannot
be substituted as an argument of the HoldsAt–predicate, but it can be substituted as an
argument of the Happens–predicate. Hence, with regard to the axioms of the event calcu-
lus, abstract terms like ∃t.burn[x, y, t] function as event types and terms like burn[x, y, tˆ]
as fluents.
To see what this process of reification adds to the representations developed so far,
consider again sentence (25), here repeated as (29).
(29) I have caught the flu.
The structure of this sentence was represented by the simple fluent flu in the derivation
of Section 3.4. For the purposes of this section this representation was sufficient. How-
ever, we would like to have access to the internal structure of sentence (29) as well. For
simplicity, we will assume that the personal pronoun I is represented by the individual
constant i. Under this assumption, sentence (29) can be formalized as the structured flu-
ent flu[i, tˆ]. This representation allows us to have access to the subject of the sentence.
We will see in a moment that the possibility to structure fluent and event type objects is
an indispensible prerequisite for the transformation of DRSs to integrity constraints.
8For an analysis of these different types of English gerunds see van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005),
chapter 12.
9A model for the event calculus was constructed in (van Lambalgen and Hamm, 2005).
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3.6 Event Calculus and DRS
In this section we will outline the connection between DRT and EC with the simplest
example from Hamm et al. (2006). Consider again sentence (30).
(30) Max arrived.
The DRS for this sentence is given in (31):
(31)
m t e
t ≺ n
e ⊆ t
e: arrive(m)
Since DRSs introduce existential presuppositions which have to be accommodated,
integrity constraints are the appropriate means to represent their inferential potential. First
we assume that the constant m and the predicate arrive(x, t) are given. This predicate
will be used in its reified form. We use the first possibility for reification and derive the
event type ∃s.arrive[x, s].
It has often been observed that the simple past uttered out of the blue is infelicitous.
This tense requires that the context provides additional information something like a ‘ref-
erence time’. We will represent the context here with a new fluent constant f and the
clause HoldsAt(f, t). This constant can then be unified with further contextually given
information.
The discourse referent e corresponds to ∃s.arrive[x, s] and the condition e: arrive(m)
to the clause Happens(∃s.arrive[m, s], t); n is set to now and t correspond to the context
fluent f. In this way, the DRS for sentence (30) is turned into integrity constraint (32).
(32) ?HoldsAt(f, t), t), Happens(∃s.arrive[m, s], t), t < now,
¬Happens(∃s.arrive[m, s], now), succeeds
Since in the rest of this paper we will not be concerned with tense, we will simplify
integrity constraints as much as possible. First we will drop the clause for the context
fluent and the negative integrity constraint. Moreover, we will skip over the internal
structure of fluent and events whenever this does not lead to confusion. For instance we
will simply write e for ∃s.arrive[m, s]. Given these assumptions integrity constraint (32)
now reads:
(33) ?t), Happens(e, t), t < now, succeeds
This is certainly not completely adequate, but the topics to be discussed in the rest of
this paper will not be affected by this simplification.
3.7 Scenarios and Hierarchical Planning
In this section we will start our discussion of more complex examples. The first one is the
verb absperren and the derived ung-nominal Absperrung respectively the NP die Absper-
rung des Rathauses. Let us start with the accomplishment verb absprerren. According
to van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005), every Aktionsart determines a specific ‘scenario’.
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A scenario should be considered as a local program in contrast to the global program
given by the axioms of the event calculus. These local programs provide the additonal
information for the Aktionsarten in question, in this case the information specific to ac-
complishments. In order to formulate this local program we need the following terms in
the language of the event calculus.
• construct is an activity fluent.
• barrier(x) is a parameterized fluent indicating the construction state x of the barrier.
• m a real constant indicating the construction stage at which the barrier is considered
finished. Thus barrier(m) may be considered the completed object.
• 0 is a real constant indicating the state at which the construction of the barrier starts.
• start is an event initiating constructing.
• finish is the event terminating the constructing activity when the barrier is finished.
• a fluent accessible(r) represententing the state in which the town hall is accessible,
where r is a constant denoting the town hall.
• g is a function relating the constructing activity to the construction stage of the
barrier. To keep things simple we assume that g is monotone increasing.
These terms allow us to write the following set of clauses as one possible scenario for
the accomplishment verb absperren.
(34) a. Initially(barrier(0))
b. Initially(accessible(r))
c. HoldsAt(barrier(m), t) ∧ HoldsAt(construct , t) →
Happens(finish, t)
d. Initiates(start , construct , t)
e. Initiates(finish, barrier(m), t)
f. Terminates(finish, accessible(r), t)
g. Terminates(finish, construct , t)
h. HoldsAt(barrier(x), t) →
Trajectory(construct , t, barrier(x + g(d)), d)
i. Releases(start , barrier(0), t)
The scenarios for the Aktionsarten are not determined uniquely, but every scenario
is required to include information specific to the Aktionsart of the verb under considera-
tion. For the example above, this means that every scenario has to include clauses about
the starting and finishing events, about the activity constructing, the state accessible(r),
and clauses relating this activity to the state of the partial object barrier(x). Together
with the axioms of the event calculus these clauses determine inferences triggered by the
Aktionsart of absperren and the lexical content of this verb.
We are primarily interested in the noun phrase Absperrung des Rathauses. We will
first concentrate on the event reading; the result state reading will be discussed later.
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The first step consists in establishing an event type corresponding to the event reading
of Absperrung des Rathauses. Using Feferman coding we can transform the predicate
absperren(x, r, t) into the abstract event type a = ∃t.absperr[x, r, t]. Here r is an indi-
vidual constant representing the town hall. This is a possible denotation for Absperrung
des Rathauses, but so far this event type is not related to the verb from which Absperrung
is derived.
In order to link the nominal to the semantics of the base verb given by its scenario,
we introduce an event definition by hierarchical planning. The intuitive idea is that hi-
erarchical planning allows to abstract from certain details of the verb’s eventuality while
maintaining the most important features of the verb’s time profile. Formally hierarchical
planning is given by program clauses defining an event occurring in the head atom of a
clause. We will use the following definition.
Definition 1 Suppose a scenario for the fluent f is given. In the context of this scenario,
the event e is interpreted using f by hierarchical planning if Happens(startf , s) ∧ s <
r ∧ HoldsAt(f, r) → Happens(e, r)
In the special case considered here Definition 1 gives:
Happens(startconstruct, s) ∧ s < r ∧HoldsAt(construct, r)
→ Happens(∃t.absperr[x, r, t], r)
We will simply write a for the event type ∃t.absperr [x, r, t] defined in this way. We
thus have a denotation for the event reading of the NP die Absperrung des Rathauses.
Next, we have to consider the verbal contexts of this NP. The first verb is behindern in
(35).
(35) Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde behindert.
The cordoning-off of-the town hall was hampered.
Let us assume that an event type valued function behindern is given. Then we arrive
at the following integrity constraint:10
(36) ?−Happens(a, t), Happens(behindern(a), t), t < now succeeds
This is certainly too simple. An event type like behindern requires its own scenario. We
think that for behindern to be applied successfully, the activity of cordoning-off must have
been initiated and behindern supplies the additional information that this activity does not
proceed in a smooth way. However, we think that although the activity of cordoning-off
is hampered in more or less serious ways, nevertheless the goal – the sealing off of the
town hall – will eventually be achieved (non-monotonically).
This changes when one considers our next verb, verhindern. In (37) the result state –
the town hall being sealed off – is clearly not achieved.
(37) Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde verhindert.
‘The cordoning-off of-the town hall was prevented.’
10This is a simplification: The scenario for behindern plus hierarchical planning triggered by past tense
introduces an event type e which has to be unified with a.
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This is adequately represented by integrity constraint (38). Since according to (38) finish
is not allowed to happen, we cannot deriveHoldsAt(barrier(m), s) and¬HoldsAt(accessible(r), s)
for some time s.
(38)
?− Happens(a, t),Happens(finish, t), t < now , fails
4 Anaphora resolution
4.1 Reconstructing anaphoric relations
In this section, we will show why anaphora resolution is possible in (39a) and explain
why is it blocked in (39b) in a slightly more formal way.
(39) a. Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde vorgestern von Demonstranten behin-
dert. Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhalten.
‘The cordoning-off of the town hall was disturbed by protesters the day be-
fore yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it is maintained today as well.’
b. Die Absperrung des Rathauses wurde vorgestern von Demonstranten ver-
hindert. *Wegen anhaltender Unruhen wird sie auch heute aufrecht erhal-
ten.
‘The cordoning-off of the town hall was prevented by protesters the day
before yesterday. Due to continuing unrest, it is maintained today as well.’
Clearly, in (39a) the pronoun sie in the second sentence refers to the target state of being
cordoned off introduced by the first sentence. The impossibility of such an interpreta-
tion – this is what “*” is meant to signal – suggests that due to the meaning of the verb
verhindern, such a target state is not available in (39b).
We will simplify the formalisation as far as possible, concentrating only on what is
essential for anaphora resolution. The first sentence of (39a) is represented by integrity
constraint (36), i.e. by
?− Happens(a, t),Happens(behindern(a), t), t < now succeeds
The important part of the second sentence is the one containing the verb aufrecht
erhalten (sustain) and the pronoun sie. Choosing a fluent variable s – s is mnemonic for
state – and a fluent valued function aufrecht− erhalten we formalise this part as:
?− HoldsAt(aufrecht-erhalten(s), s), s < now , succeeds
The whole little discourse in (39) is thus represented by the integrity constraint in (40).
(40) ?− Happens(a, t),Happens(behindern(a), t),
HoldsAt(aufrecht-erhalten(s), t), t < now , succeeds
Since aufrecht-erhalten requires a state – a special type of fluent – as an argument, s
cannot be unified with event type a. This is the formal version of the already explained
type mismatch. Therefore it seems that anaphora resolution is blocked in this case.
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We will now show that it is nevertheless possible to reconstruct an anaphoric relation
by using information contained in the scenario for the verb absperren. Since aufrecht-
erhalten selects the (result) state reading of the NP die Absperrung der Botschaft we
first have to introduce a denotation for this NP representing this reading. Note that
we assume that behindern allows – perhaps later as planned – finish to happen (non–
monotonically). From this we can derive via resolution ¬HoldsAt(accessible(r), w) for
some time w. Using Ferferman coding we can reify this formula and obtain the fluent
object ¬HoldsAt [accessible(r), wˆ]. We take this object as denotation of the (result) state
reading of the NP die Absperrung des Rathauses.11 Now we can compute the anaphoric
relation between the pronoun sie and its antecedent die Absperrung des Rathauses by
unifying s – representing sie – with ¬HoldsAt [accessible(r), wˆ]. Writing inaccessible for
¬HoldsAt [accessible(r), wˆ] we arrive at the following representation for discourse (39a):
(41) ?− Happens(a, t),Happens(behindern(a), t),
HoldsAt(aufrecht-erhalten(inaccessible), t), t < now , succeeds
Summing up, we reconstructed the anaphoric relationship between the pronoun sie and
and the antecedent NP die Absperrung des Rathauses in three steps. First, we derived the
formula ¬HoldsAt(accessible(r), w) by resolution using information of the scenario of
the verbs absperren and behindern. Second, we transformed this formula into the term
¬HoldsAt[accessible(r), wˆ] = inaccessible and third, we unified s with this term. In
the minimal model this is the only possibility because there are no other result states, but
in richer models there may very well be more than just one result state. In this case, s
could be freely unified with these other states, but this would result in a deictic reading
for the second sentence of example (39a).
Consider now the mini-discourse in (39b). Combinig integrity constraint (38) with the
representation of the second sentence of example (39b) we get integrity constraint (42)
for (39b).
(42) ?−Happens(a, t), Happens(finish, t), t < now, fails,
HoldsAt(aufrecht-erhalten(s), t), t < now, succeeds
Since this integrity constraint forbids finish to happen for any time t we are no longer
in a position to derive ¬HoldsAt(accessible(r), t). But then we cannot unify s with the
reified version of ¬HoldsAt(accessible(r), t) and thus the resolution of the pronoun sie
with the NP die Absperrung des Rathauses is correctly blocked.
Note that the possibility to reconstruct the anaphoric relation in (39a) depended on the
fact that ¬HoldsAt(accessible(r), t) contains a temporal parameter. This is crucial for
our next example involving the object reading of die Absperrung des Rathauses – here
repeated as (43).
(43) *Die Absperrung wurde heute versta¨rkt. Sie war am Vortag massiv behindert
worden.
‘The barrier was fortified today. It [the cordoning-off] had been massively ham-
pered the day before.’
11This is justified in Hamm and Kamp (2009)
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In example (43), the pronoun sie cannot refer back to Absperrung. As mentioned above,
this is somewhat surprising for a “lazy” approach. We need only briefly indicate, how we
can account for the inacceptability of the sequence in (43).
To fortify a barrier presupposes that a barrier already existed. Let us represent this
state of the material object which is established by the cordoning-off activity by the fluent
barrier(m) which is contained in the scenario of the verb absprerren. This fluent holds
after the finish event happened. It corresponds to a completed barrier. The denotation for
the object reading of the noun Absperrung can now be given by (44).
(44) Absperrung(barrier(m))
Note that this formula does not contain a temporal parameter. Therefore the three step
procedure for reconstructing anaphoric relations introduced above cannot be applied in
such cases. This explains why the pronoun sie in example (43) cannot refer back to the
NP Die Absperrung.
4.2 Formal Discourse Semantics
In all classical theories of formal discourse semantics, it was assumed that certain logical
operators like negation, disjunction and universal quantification – in contrast to existen-
tial quantification and conjunction – block anaphora resolution.12 These operators were
considered as static. For instance, in early DRT the accessibility relation – a geometrical
relation on the DRS level – caused discourse referents contained in a negated DRS to be
inaccessible. In DPL the semantics of negation as a test did not allow scope extension
of the existential quantifier as it did in non–negated sentences. This accounted for the
grammaticality distribution in (45).
(45) a. A man walked in the park. He whistled.
b. No man walked in the park. *He whistled.
However, there are cases for which this prediction is too strong:
(46) It is not the case that John does not own a car. It is red and it is parked in front of
the house.
For this reason, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990) introduce a dynamic negation which
restores the binding potential of the double negated sentence (45). This kind of negation
was improved among other by Dekker (1993).
The following examples due to Ba¨uerle (1988), however, show that the presence or
absence of negation is not the determining factor of anaphora resolution alone. Rather, the
interaction of negation with certain types of verbs is crucial. Consider first the examples
in (47), which are coherent with the predictions of the early formal discourse theories.
(47) a. Hans
Hans
schrieb
wrote
einen
a
Brief.
letter.
Das
It
dauerte
lasted
zwei
two
Stunden.
hours.
‘Hans wrote a letter. This took him two hours.’
12In this section we will only consider negation.
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b. Hans
Hans
schrieb
wrote
keinen
no
Brief.
letter.
*Das
It
dauerte
lasted
zwei
two
Stunden
hours.
‘Hans did not write a letter. This took him two hours.’
Introducing a variation in the second sentence, the following sequences are not in accor-
dance with formal discourse theories.
(48) a. Hans
Hans
schrieb
wrote
einen
a
Brief.
letter.
Das
It
u¨berraschte
surprised
uns
us
alle.
all.
‘Hans wrote a letter. We were all surprised by that.’
b. Hans
Hans
schrieb
wrote
keinen
no
Brief.
letter.
Das
It
u¨berraschte
surprised
uns
us
alle.
all.
‘Hans did not write a letter. We were all surprised by that.’
We will now show that the proposed formalism allows us to account for this grammatical-
ity distribution as well. Again, we will only give those formal details which are essential
for anaphora resolution. Let us first consider the examples in (47). Let e be the event type
representing Hans writing a letter. The first sentence of (47a) is then formalised as
?−Happens(e, t), t < now, succeeds
and the second as (with e′ as a variable representing the pronoun das).
?Happens(dauern(e′), t), t < now, t = 2 hours succeeds
Together they represent the discourse in (47a).
(49) ?−Happens(e, t), t < now,Happens(dauern(e′), t),
t = 2 hours, succeeds
In the minimal model computed by integrity constraint (49), e′ and ewill be unified. Thus,
das refers to the event of Hans writing a letter. In non–minimal models, e′ may be unified
with other event types. This will give the deictic reading again.
The integrity constraint for the first sentence of example (47b) is as in (50):
(50) ?Happens(e, t), t < now, fails
The integrity constraint for the second sentence is the same as the one for (47a). Integrity
constraint (50) computes a model in which there is no event type with the required prop-
erty, i.e. of Hans writing a letter. Therefore das cannot be unified with such an event type.
This explains the grammaticality distribution in (47).
We will now consider the examples in (48a). First we have to determine the sort of
arguments u¨berraschen requires. We will assume here that this verb takes only facts as
arguments. In case that u¨berraschen turns out to be ambiguous between an event and a
fact reading a slightly more involved argument will explain the facts in (48a) too.
The first parts of the sentences in (48a) are of course formalised as above. The second
part gives rise to the following integrity constraint:
(51) ?−HoldsAt(surprise(f), t), t < now, succeeds
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Here, we are facing a type mismatch again. The variable f cannot be unified with event e
provided by the first sentence since e and f belong to different sorts.
However, we can reify Happens(e, t) occurring in the integrity constraint for the
first sentence and thereby get: Happens[e, tˆ]. Intuitively one can consider this term as
denoting the fact that event e occurred. Unifying f with this term results in:
(52) ?−HoldsAt(surprise(Happens[e, tˆ]), t), t < now, succeeds
This means that the fact that Hans wrote a letter surprised us. Let us now consider
example (48b). The integrity constraint for the first sentence is:
?−Happens(e, t), t < now, fails
An integrity constraint fails if and only if its negation succeeds. Therefore, we get the
following equivalent constraint
?− ¬Happens(e, t) t < now, succeeds
Applying reification to theHappen–part of this constraint we derive the term¬Happens[e, tˆ].
Since this is a term of the same sort as f , it is possible to unify f with ¬Happens[e, tˆ].
The result is:
?HoldsAt(surprise(¬Happens[e, tˆ]), t), t < now, succeeds
The formula says that the fact that Hans didn’t write a letter surprised us. This shows
that we get the correct results in this case as well.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In the paper, we argued that disambiguation may be non-monotonic. We discussed ex-
amples of anaphora resolution involving a type conflict between anaphora and disam-
biguated antecedents. Since the anaphora picks up a reading which was discarded for
the antecedent, we apply a process of reambiguation to the antecedent to resolve the type
mismatch.
Future work needs to address the generality of such maps as the above, both with
regard to deverbal nominalisations (for which a mapping from e.g. states to events seems
rather awkward) and to other kinds of systematically ambiguous nouns. One case at hand
involves the dot objects discussed by Pustejovsky (1997):
(53) Jonathan Strout hat das Buch [content] geschrieben, es [manifestation] hat 539
Seiten und ist 2004 im Bertelsmann Verlag erschienen.
‘Jonathan Strout wrote the book, it has 539 pages and was published by Bertels-
mann.’
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